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Research	Centre,	 Faculty	of	Law,	QUT.	Again,	 the	conference	has	attracted	an	 impressive	 list	of	
internationally	distinguished	keynote	and	panel	speakers	from	the	United	Kingdom,	United	States,	
Australia,	 New	 Zealand,	 Canada	 and	 this	 time	 Latin	 America,	 as	 well	 as	 high	 quality	 paper	
submissions.			
	
The	papers	at	 this	 conference,	 some	of	which	are	contained	 in	 this	compendium,	 reflect	on	 the	
crucial	 links	among	social	 democracy,	 crime	 control	 and	 criminal	 justice	policies.	Why	 is	 it	 so	
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date,	 ‘queer	 criminology’	 remains	 a	 loose	 collection	 of	 studies	 and	 criminal‐justice	 related	




This	 paper	 considers	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 term	 'queer'	 has	 been	 used	 in	 these	
criminological	and	criminal	justice	discourses.	 It	suggests	that	 ‘queer’	has	been	used	in	two	
dominant	ways:	as	an	'umbrella'	term	for	lesbian,	gay,	bisexual,	intersex,	and	queer‐identified	









The	 paper	 will	 conclude	 by	 suggesting	 that	 using	 ‘queer’	 as	 a	 verb	 to	 signify	 a	 more	
deconstructive	 project	 directed	 towards	 criminology	 is	 a	 possible	 direction	 for	 these	
discussions.	 While	 this	 approach	 has	 its	 own	 effects,	 and	 articulates	 with	 existing	
deconstructive	approaches	in	criminology,	it	is	important	to	explore	these	possibilities	at	this	
point	 in	 the	 development	 of	 a	 ‘queer/ed	 criminology’	 for	 two	 reasons:	 it	 highlights	 that	





The	 term	 ‘queer’	 is	being	employed	with	greater	 frequency	 in	research	on	particular	 criminal	
justice	 issues,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 broader	 theoretical	 reflections	 on	 how	 a	 ‘queer/ed	 criminology’	




‘Queer’	 largely	 refers	 to	 an	 intellectual	 approach	 that	 seeks	 to	 deconstruct	 binaries	 such	 as	
homosexual/heterosexual	 or	 male/female	 and	 their	 institutionalisation	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 social	
sites	 (see	 Butler	 1990;	 Sedgwick	 1990).	 These	 studies	 developed	 out	 of	 numerous	 radical	
political	 movements	 focused	 on	 HIV	 activism,	 as	 well	 as	 those	 that	 sought	 to	 critique	 the	
assimilationist	and	often	essentialising	 tendencies	of	many	gay	and	 lesbian	political	struggles.	
Queer	 theorists	critique	essentialist	understandings	of	 identity	–	particularly	 in	 the	context	of	
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attitude	or	a	position,	especially	 in	relation	to	what	 is	 taken	to	be	 ‘normal’.	As	Sullivan	(2003:	
52)	highlights,	dictionary	definitions	of	‘queer’	often	define	it	as	‘to	quiz	or	ridicule,	to	spoil,	to	
put	out	of	order’.	While	many	authors	focus	on	deconstructing	or	‘queering’	norms	of	sexuality	
and	 gender	 (Duggan	 2001:	 223;	 Smith	 in	 Sullivan	 2003:	 43)	 –	 an	 approach	 that,	 as	 will	 be	






unpacking	of	 categories,	pulling	apart	essences,	oppositions,	 and	 foundational	 assumptions	 to	
understand	 how	 particular	 phenomena	 or	 questions	 about	 our	 social	 world	 have	 been	
constructed	 in	 the	ways	 they	have	been	 (Jagose	1996:	98;	 Sullivan	2003:	50‐51).	 In	 this	 vein,	
David	Halperin	suggests	that	‘queer’	‘...	acquires	its	meaning	from	its	oppositional	relation	to	the	
norm.	‘Queer’	is	by	definition	whatever	is	at	odds	with	the	normal,	the	legitimate,	the	dominant.	
There	 is	 nothing	 in	 particular	 to	which	 it	 necessarily	 refers’	 (Halperin	 1995:	 62,	 emphases	 in	
original).	 ‘Queer’	 can	 therefore	 be	 a	position	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 norm,	 rather	 than	 a	 positivity	






unsettled	 and	 every	 citation	 of	 the	 term	 mobilises	 a	 particular	 understanding	 of	 ‘queer’,	
reproducing	the	specific	effects	that	attend	to	that	understanding	along	the	way,	this	paper	does	
not	seek	to	pin	down	a	definition	of	 ‘queer’.	Rather,	 it	explores	the	ways	that	 the	term	 ‘queer’	
has	 been	 used	 in	 criminal	 justice	 discourses,	 and	 charts	 some	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 these	
different	uses.2	It	identifies	two	primary	uses	of	the	term	‘queer’	in	criminal	justice	discourses:	
‘queer’	as	an	umbrella	term	doing	the	work	of	an	identity	category	(‘queer’	as	noun);	and	‘queer’	
as	 signifying	 a	 set	 of	 theoretical	 tools	 mobilised	 to	 effectively	 understand	 and	 represent	
sexuality	 and	 gender	 diversity	 in	 criminological	 research	 (what	 might	 be	 thought	 of	 here	 as	
‘queer’	 as	 ‘sensitising	 concept’).	 It	 then	 explores	 the	 implications	 of	 each	 of	 these	 different	
citations	 of	 the	 term	 and	 concludes	 by	 highlighting	 that	 one	 use	 of	 ‘queer’	 that	 is	 largely	
overlooked	in	these	discussions	is	its	use	as	a	verb,	to	signify	a	position	or	attitude.	It	suggests	






what	 purposes	 [it	 is]	 used’	 (Butler	 1993:	 229).	 Reflecting	 on,	 and	 articulating	 with	 greater	
precision,	the	understanding	of	‘queer’	that	is	being	mobilised	must	become	a	central	part	of	any	
conversation	about	the	use	of	the	term	in	criminological	and	criminal	justice	discourses	for	two	
primary	 reasons:	 because	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 there	 are	 multiple,	 and	 indeed	 competing,	
‘queer/ed	 criminologies’	 that	 ought	 not	 be	 confused;	 and	 it	 expands	 the	 diverse	 possibilities	









refer	 to	 an	 identity	 category	 or	 umbrella	 of	 identity	 categories	 under	 which	 lesbian,	 gay,	
bisexual,	transgender,	intersex,	and	queer‐identifying	(LGBTIQ)	people	may	be	placed,	or	along	




‘Queer’	 is	used	 in	 this	way	 in	academic	research	such	as	Queering	Conflict:	Examining	Lesbian	
and	Gay	Experiences	of	Homophobia	 in	Northern	 Ireland	 (Duggan	2012),	Queer	 (In)justice:	The	
Criminalisation	 of	 LGBT	People	 in	 the	United	 States	 (Mogul	 et	 al.	 2011),	 and	 Intimate	Partner	
Violence	 in	 LGBTQ	 Lives	 (Ristock	 2011),	 to	 name	 a	 few.	 These	 works	 address	 criminological	
problems	 of	 relevance	 to	 LGBTIQ‐identified	 people	 –	 whether	 this	 is	 a	 unique	 crime	 that	 is	
experienced	 by	 them	 (hate	 crimes,	 for	 example),	 a	 crime	 conventionally	 studied	 by	
criminologists	but	where	 these	 communities	 have	been	overlooked	 (such	 as	 intimate	partner	
violence),	 or	 a	 particular	 (usually	 negative)	 experience	 of	 one	 aspect	 of	 the	 criminal	 justice	
system	(such	as	the	impacts	of	policing	or	prison).	They	comprehensively	discuss	the	problems,	




This	 particular	 use	 of	 ‘queer’	 also	 appears	 in	 recent	 attempts	 to	 forge	 a	 ‘queer	 criminology’.	
Jordan	Blair	Woods,	for	instance,	has	suggested	that	‘queer	criminology’	would	provide	a	space	
in	 which	 ‘LGBTQ	 people’	 can	 represent	 themselves	 within	 criminological	 conversations,	 be	
recognised	 as	 part	 of	 these	 conversations,	 and	 ensure	 that	 accurate	 and	 appropriate	
understandings	of	themselves	are	furthered	in	this	field.	The	desire	of	such	a	project	appears	to	
be	to	‘[reorient]	the	focus	of	criminological	inquiry	to	give	due	consideration	to	the	relationship	
between	 sexual	 orientation/gender	 identity	 and	 victimisation,	 offending,	 and	 desistance	 from	
crime’	(Woods	forthcoming).	
This	 use	 of	 ‘queer’	 –	 as	 an	 umbrella	 identity	 category,	 or	 as	 a	way	 of	 referring	 to	 a	 group	 of	
people	 –	 is	 productive.	 It	 allows	 for	 those	with	 shared	 experiences	by	 virtue	of	 their	 existing	






‘Queer’	 has	 also	 been	 used	 in	 these	 discourses	 to	 signify	 the	 application	 of	 some	 theoretical	
perspectives	 or	 conclusions	 from	 queer	 theory	 in	 criminological	 analyses.	 The	 variety	 of	
research	projects	here	have	utilised	queer	theoretical	insights	about	non‐essentialised	identities	





For	 example,	 queer	 theoretical	 discussions	 about	 the	 government	 of	 sexuality	 through	 the	
norms	 embedded	 in	 various	 social	 sites	 have	 been	 used	 to	 explore	 the	 regulation	 and	 often	
criminalisation	of	those	that	live	non‐heteronormative	or	non‐cisgendered	lives,	particularly	as	








Mason	2001;	 Lamble	2009),	 explore	how	criminology	might	 engage	with	 these	 concerns,	 and	
how	criminal	justice	might	be	better	achieved.	
	
The	 queer	 theoretical	 analysis	 of	 essentialised	 identities	 has	 also	 been	 used	 to	 critique	 the	
understandings	 of	 victims	 and	 perpetrators	 (not	 to	mention	 the	 binarised	 understandings	 of	
homosexual	 and	 heterosexual)	 that	 appear	 in	 knowledge	 about,	 and	 current	 approaches	 to	
address,	hate	crimes	(Tomsen	2006:	394;	Tomsen	2009:	10‐13,	15;	Tomsen	1997:	39,	40,	42;	
Lamble	 2008:	 29).	 Additionally,	 these	 theoretical	 tools	 have	 been	 used	 to	 understand	 and	
represent	 gender‐	 and	 sexuality‐diverse	people	 in	 this	 context.	 For	 example,	 Chakraborti	 and	
Garland	 suggest	 that	 such	work	 ‘...	 is	 important	 for	 developing	 a	 framework	 that	 can	 include	
some	of	those	who	are	the	victims	of	homophobic	and	transphobic	violence	...	[because	s]uch	a	








suggested	 that	 the	 critique	 of	 binary	 thinking	 that	 queer	 theory	 offers	 could	 be	 put	 to	




also	 include	 an	 ‘ongoing	 emphasis	 on	 the	 performativity	 of	 criminalised	masculine	 identities	
and	a	progressive	psychoanalytic	stress	on	the	tense	proximity	of	homo	and	hetero	desire	that	
feeds	much	male	aggression,	misogyny	and	risk	taking’	(Tomsen	2006:	403).	Groombridge	also	
recommended	 queer	 criminology	 should	 follow	 Seidman’s	 suggestion	 that	 any	 analysis	






discourses,	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 one	 consistent	 feature	 of	 these	 uses	 is	 that	 they	 signify	 a	
mobilisation	 of	 the	 concepts	 of	 queer	 theory	 in	 ways	 that	 assume	 that	 these	 concepts	 offer	
accurate	ways	of	understanding	and	representing	gender‐	and	sexuality‐diverse	people.	Not	only	
do	 these	 concepts	 allow	 researchers	 to	 appreciate	 the	 impact	 of	 heteronormative	 discourses	
and	 regulations	 in	 the	 field	 of	 criminal	 justice,	 but	 they	 offer	 researchers	 what	 might	 be	






a	 variety	 of	 potential	 impacts	 –	 they	 can	 lead	 to	 particular	 courses	 of	 action	 and	 ways	 of	
thinking,	and	preclude	others.	
	
While	 the	 term	 ‘queer’	 is	 often	 used	 productively	 as	 an	 umbrella	 term	 to	 signify	 a	 range	 of	




can	 erase	 very	 important	 differences	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 race,	 ethnicity,	 and	 class	 that	 exist	
between	those	 that	might	be	considered	 ‘queer’	 (Anzaldúa	 in	Sullivan	2003:	44).	Additionally,	
this	 use	 of	 the	 term	 as,	 for	 all	 intents	 and	 purposes,	 an	 identity	 category,	 can	 lead	 to	




is	 an	 ongoing	 (and	 perhaps	 unresolvable)	 issue	 in	 queer	 politics	 (see	 Gamson	 1995;	 Butler	
1993).	 A	 large	 part	 of	 queer	 theorising	 has	 developed	 as	 a	 response	 to	 and	 critique	 of	
essentialised	understandings	of	sexuality,	gender,	and	identity,	with	many	people	that	 identify	
as	 queer	 embracing	 this	 understanding	 (Jagose	 1996:	 77‐78).	 Using	 ‘queer’	 as	 an	 identity	
category	 in	 order	 to	 include	 these	 people	 in	 particular	 forms	 of	 research	 does	 allow	 for	 the	







incidence	of	 such	violence	 in	 the	 lives	of	 ‘queers’,	 and	 some	of	 this	work	 engages	with	queer	
theoretical	 insights	 insofar	 as	 they	 point	 out	 that	 our	 discourses	 about	 such	 violence	 are	
heteronormative,	 or	 that	 identities	 are	 not	 stable.	 However,	 in	 much	 of	 this	 research,	 the	
understanding	 of	 violence	 itself	 is	 not	 ‘queered’,	 and	 remains	 heteronormative	 or,	 indeed,	
homonormative	(see	Ball	2013;	Holmes	2009).3	
	
A	related	point	can	be	made	about	 the	ways	 that	 ‘queer’	 is	used	to	signify	 the	mobilisation	of	
queer	 theoretical	 concepts	 and	 tools	 to	 understand	 sexuality	 and	 gender	 diversity	 in	 these	
criminal	 justice	 discourses.	 These	 queer	 theoretical	 concepts	 and	 tools	 are	 used	 primarily	 to	
assist	 in	 the	understanding	of,	 and	 the	appropriate	 representation	of,	 gender	–	and	sexuality‐
diverse	 people.	 However,	 this	 representation	 and	 understanding	 takes	 place	 within	 what	
remain	largely	conventional	criminological	analyses.	Thus,	while	queer	theoretical	insights	are	
used	 here	 to	 guide	 research	 in	 theoretically	 sophisticated	 ways	 and	 allow	 for	 a	 critical	
examination	of	the	problematic	assumptions	that	have	long	characterised	the	engagement	with	
these	 issues	within	 criminal	 justice	discourses,	 the	deconstructive	critiques	 that	queer	 theory	
can	offer	may	be	restricted.	These	queer	theoretical	tools	are	used	to	assist	in	understanding	the	
subjects	of	 research,	 and	 to	appreciate	 the	 forms	of	 regulation	and	normalisation	 that	 impact	
upon	them,	thereby	contributing	to	the	development	of	knowledge	about	these	people	and	their	
experiences,	 and	 to	 the	development	of	more	 effective	policies	 to	 address	 injustice.	However,	




the	context	of	hate	 crime,	queer	 theoretical	work	 ‘...	 is	 important	 for	developing	a	 framework	
that	can	include	some	of	those	who	are	the	victims	of	homophobic	and	transphobic	violence	...’.	

















and	 deconstruction	 that	 is	 possible	 in	 criminal	 justice	 discourses.	 It	 is	 also	 to	 point	 out	 that	











and	 gender,	 and	 these	 appear	 to	 remain	 the	 proper	 objects	 of	 these	 queer	 criminological	






















in	directions	 that	 criminologists	may	perceive	 as	 irrelevant,	 or	 outside	 the	 bounds	of	what	 is	
taken	to	be	criminology.	Deconstructive	projects	of	this	kind	might	also	be	perceived	as	being	of	
little	 relevance	 to	addressing	 immediate	material	 injustices	 (for	preliminary	 responses	 to	 this	
critique,	see	Ball	forthcoming;	Cohen	1998:	117).	And,	of	course,	articulating	whether	this	way	
of	 using	 ‘queer’	 interacts	 with,	 replicates,	 draws	 from,	 challenges,	 reinvigorates,	 or	 indeed	






criminal	 justice	 discourses,	 and	 pointed	 to	 some	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 these	 uses.	 It	 has	







These	discussions	contribute	 to	 the	development	of	a	 ‘queer/ed	criminology’	–	or	what	might	
more	appropriately	be	 termed	 ‘queer/ed	criminologies’	 –	by	encouraging	authors	engaging	 in	







The	 slipperiness	 of	 ‘queer’	 highlighted	 in	 this	 paper	 is	 advantageous	 to	 criminal	 justice	
discourses,	and	not	something	that	ought	to	be	foreclosed.	As	Judith	Butler	points	out,	the	term	
needs	 to	 ‘...	 be	 vanquished	by	 those	who	are	 excluded	by	 the	 term	but	who	 justifiably	 expect	
representation	by	it’,	by	those	who	use	it	in	different	ways,	in	order	‘...	to	let	it	take	on	meanings	
that	cannot	now	be	anticipated’,	and	also	by	those	‘...	whose	political	vocabulary	may	well	carry	







1		 Here,	 the	 deconstruction	 of	 queer	 theorists	 can	become	difficult	 to	 untangle	 conceptually	 from	other	 forms	 of	
deconstruction.	This	is	the	focus	of	ongoing	work,	and	queer	criminological	work	that	takes	this	direction	needs	
to	explore	this	point.	
2		 Authorial	sovereignty	over	 the	ways	 the	 term	 is	used,	or	 the	effects	produced,	 is	not	 implied	here.	 Instead,	 the	
focus	is	on	the	potential	effects	of	these	uses	of	the	term,	the	assumptions	implied	in	each	of	these	uses,	and	the	









































































































Vulnerable	 and	 marginalised	 populations	 are	 not	 only	 over‐represented	 in	 the	 criminal	
justice	system,	but	also	in	civil	jurisdictions	like	the	coronial	system.	Moreover,	many	of	the	
personnel	who	 deal	with	 criminal	matters,	 especially	 in	 rural	 and	 regional	 areas,	 are	 also	
those	who	manage	the	coronial	death	investigation.	This	movement	back	and	forth	between	
civil	 and	 criminal	 jurisdictions	 is	 difficult	 for	 the	 both	 professional	 personnel	 and	 the	
families,	 but	 especially	 for	 those	 families	 who	 may	 also	 have	 had	 dealings	 with	 these	
personnel	in	the	criminal	justice	system,	or	who	present	as	suspicious	due	to	larger	historical	
and	 global	 issues.	 While	 coronial	 legislation	 now	 allows	 families	 to	 raise	 cultural	 and	
religious	concerns	about	the	process,	particularly	to	do	with	the	autopsy	of	their	loved	one,	
this	 also	 requires	 them	 to	 identify	 themselves	 to	 police	 at	 the	 initial	 stage	 of	 the	 death	
investigation.	This	paper,	part	of	a	larger	body	of	work	on	autopsy	decision	making,	discusses	
the	ways	in	which	this	information	is	gathered	by	police,	how	it	is	communicated	through	the	





The	 coronial	 investigation	 sits	 between	 civil	 and	 criminal	 jurisdictions,	 as	 an	 inquisitorial	
system	 which	 focuses	 on	 finding	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 matter	 without	 the	 allocation	 of	 blame	 or	
liability.	For	this	reason,	the	coroner	has	wide	powers	of	inquiry,	and	is	not	bound	by	the	usual	
rules	of	evidence,	being	able	to	admit	hearsay	for	example,	and	extend	privilege	to	witnesses	in	
inquests	 (Scott	 Bray	 2010).	 Nevertheless,	 all	 of	 the	 key	 players	 in	 the	 coronial	 death	
investigation	 have	 experience	 (sometimes	 the	 majority	 of	 their	 experience)	 in	 criminal	





investigating	 more	 than	 a	 few	 coronial	 deaths	 each	 year	 (Drayton	 2011),	 while	 most	
pathologists	who	work	in	the	coronial	jurisdiction	are	forensically	trained	and	appear	in	court	
as	specialist	witnesses	in	both	inquests	and	criminal	trials	(Kramar	2006).	The	important	issue	












to	 engage	 with	 the	 implications	 of	 this,	 where	 families	 may	 bring	 with	 them	 pre‐existing	
relationships	(if	the	family	is	known	to	the	local	police	or	magistrate),	as	well	as	‘innuendos	of	
suspicion’	and	the	‘general	 impression’	by	both	the	bereaved	family	and	the	wider	community	
‘that	 it	 is	 wrongdoing	 rather	 than	 tragedy	 that	 is	 being	 investigated’	 (Clarke	 and	McCreanor	
2006:	33).		
	




Indigenous	population	and	members	of	 Islam	and	 Judaism.	This	requires	bereaved	 families	 to	
not	only	identify	themselves	to	police	but	to	understand	and	negotiate,	in	the	traumatised	state	
of	 a	 sudden	 bereavement,	 the	 medical	 and	 legal	 implications	 of	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 internal	
autopsy	of	a	loved	one	(Drayton	2011).	This	is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	the	Coroner	has	the	
final	 determination	 as	 to	whether	or	not	 an	 internal	 autopsy	will	 proceed	and	 that	 a	 family’s	
objection	may,	despite	their	strongly	held	beliefs,	be	over‐ruled.		
	
This	 involvement	 of	 families	 can	 be	 situated	 as	 a	 relatively	 recent	 addition	 to	 coronial	
legislation,	 influenced	 by	 an	 increasing	 multicultural	 tolerance	 of	 difference	 by	 public	
authorities,	 supported	 as	 a	 last	 resort	 through	 laws	 against	 discrimination	 (Humphrey	 2007:	
10).	However,	such	adjustments	to	coronial	law	also	fit	with	the	‘jurisdiction’s	pro‐therapeutic	
potential	 ...	 and	 its	 capacity	 to	 produce	 social	 benefits	 and	 restorative	 outcomes	 from	 tragic	
circumstances’	 (Scott	 Bray	 2010:	 567).	 This	 is	 related	 to	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 coronial	
investigation	from	a	reactive	to	a	proactive	jurisdiction,	with	a	statutory	basis	for	the	prevention	
of	avoidable	deaths	through	recommendations	to	relevant	public	authorities	(Scott	Bray	2010:	
570‐571).	 Embedded	 in	 a	 larger	 research	project	 on	 autopsy	decision	making	 and	 interviews	






In	 coronial	 legislation,	 the	 expectation	 that	 religion	 and	 culture	 will	 serve	 as	 a	 means	 for	
objecting	to	an	invasive	internal	autopsy,	can	bring	vulnerable	populations	to	the	forefront	of	a	
death	investigation.	In	Australia	the	three	main	groups	in	this	regard	–	Indigenous,	Jewish	and	





...	 and	 I’ve	 found	 that	Muslims	 have	 a	 tendency	 to	 object	 big	 time.	 It’s	 not	 that	 I	 hate	
Muslims	it’s	just	that	they	are	prominent	on	the	objection	side,	‘oh	you	don’t	need	to	do	this	
because	you’re	cutting	up	 the	body’	and	well	hang	on,	 I	 immediately	get	suspicious	when	
somebody,	 ‘oh	no	you	shouldn’t	you	shouldn’t’.	What	have	you	had	to	do	with	this	death	in	




at	 death	 (Campbell	 1998:	 295).	 Three	 further	 beliefs	 support	 such	 a	 proscription	 against	
autopsy.	 The	 first	 is	 a	 general	 concern	 that	 the	 autopsy	 procedure	 will	 delay	 burial,	 which	
Belinda	Carpenter,	Gordon	Tait,	Carol	Quadrelli	
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according	 to	 Islamic	 law	 should	 occur	within	 24	 hours	 of	 the	death.	 The	 second	proscription	
comes	from	the	Islamic	belief	in	the	sacredness	of	the	body	and	this	is	due	to	the	religious	belief	
that	the	body	belongs	to	God.	The	third	is	the	perception	that	the	dead	perceive	pain,	with	such	




While	 the	 Islamic	 objection	 to	 autopsy	 is	 well	 founded,	 the	 suspicion	 inherent	 in	 such	 an	
objection	is	also	apparent,	and	in	our	interviews,	missing	from	discussions	of	other	cultural	or	
religious	 objections.	 While	 it	 is	 convenient	 to	 point	 to	 the	 rising	 Islamophobia	 in	 western	
nations	 post	 9/11	 (Spalek	 2008;	 Poynting	 and	 Mason	 2006),	 it	 is	 also	 clear	 that	 Muslim	
immigrants	have	been	seen	as	a	problem	community	since	Lebanese	Muslims	started	arriving	in	
Australia	 in	 significant	 numbers	 from	 the	 1970s	 (Humphrey	 2007:	 12;	 Poynting	 and	 Mason	
2007).	 There	 may	 be	 a	 number	 of	 reasons	 for	 this.	 First	 is	 the	 intertwining	 of	 religion	 and	
politics	in	Islam	and	its	portrayal	as	in	opposition	to	secular	modernity,	which	correlates	with	




just	 a	 cultural	 difference,	 and	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 control	 and	 treatment	 of	women.	
Such	 an	 understanding	 constructs	 Muslims	 as	 ‘trapped	 by	 tradition’	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	West	
which	 is	 ‘liberated	 from	 cultural	 constraints	 and	 individually	 autonomous’	 (Humphrey	 2007:	
21).	Finally,	is	the	more	recent	moral	panic	around	terrorism	which	has	led	to	a	situation	‘where	
any	expression	of	 Islamic	religious	 identity	 is	 suspicious’,	possibly	 indicative	of	an	underlying	
and	dangerous	 fundamentalism	(Humphrey	2006:	13).	This	has	 led	to	the	creation	of	 ‘suspect	
communities’	 who	 should	 be	 ‘monitored	 by	 state	 agencies,	 casting	 new	 questions	 about	
citizenship,	identity	and	loyalty’	(Spalek	2008:	211).	Such	an	understanding	is	now	widespread	
in	 Australian	 society	with	 the	 ‘Arab	 other’	 constructed	 through	 a	 ‘complex	 process	 involving	







liaison	 fellow	 from	 the	 Jewish	community,	and	he’ll	get	 involved	pretty	quickly.	 It’s	really	
just	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 burial	 takes	 place	 as	 soon	 as	 possible.	 That’s	 not	 necessarily	 an	








In	 Judaism,	 it	 is	 considered	 a	 desecration	 to	 interfere	with	 the	body	of	 the	dead	 (Segal	 2006:	
102).	This	is	because,	according	to	Mittleman	et	al.	(1992:	826),	the	Jewish	faith	never	views	a	
deceased	 person	 as	 a	 corpse.	 ‘Having	 housed	 God’s	 soul,	 the	 body,	 even	 after	 death,	 is	








is	 stark	 and	 speaks	 to	 the	 different	 space	 that	 the	 Jewish	 community	 occupy	 in	 Australian	
society.	 Part	 of	 the	 reason	 for	 this,	 according	 to	 Stratton	 (2000)	 is	 that	 the	 ‘Jew’	 is	 a	 socially	
constructed	 ‘gentile,	Western	Other’,	 homogenised	 and	othered	 in	much	 the	 same	way	as	 the	
‘Asian’,	but	not	 to	 the	same	extent	because	 the	 Jew	 is	also	white,	European	and	Western.	 It	 is	
also	 consistently	 noted	 that	 prominent	 members	 of	 the	 Jewish	 community	 were	 part	 of	 the	
founding	government	of	Australia,	and	continued	to	use	their	influence	in	policy	and	legislation	
regarding	 Jewish	 immigration	 after	 WWII	 (Rutland	 2005).	 Research	 also	 demonstrates	 that	
anti‐Semitism	 is	 on	 the	 decrease	 in	 Australia,	 unlike	 many	 other	 countries	 (Stobbs	 2008;	
Rutland	2008)	and	that	the	Jewish	community	are	neither	over‐policed	nor	over‐criminalised	in	
Australia	(Stobbs	2008).	Finally,	the	recasting	of	Judaism	after	the	Holocaust	as	integral	to	the	















Indigenous	 cultural	 proscriptions	 against	 autopsy	 are	 in	 place	 to	 protect	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	
deceased,	which	it	is	argued	would	be	harmed	by	a	mutilation	of	the	body	and	thus	prevented	
from	entering	the	dreamtime	(Lynch	1999:	72).	As	Vines	(2007:	17)	identifies	‘the	relationship	
between	 Aboriginal	 people	 and	 their	 dead	 is	 one	 of	 custodianship.	 The	 body	 should	 remain	
whole	 so	 that	 the	 spirit	will	have	 somewhere	 to	go.	Autopsy	 is	often	 seen	as	desecration	and	
destructive	of	the	spirit’.	Unlike	the	space	in	which	Muslim	objections	may	find	themselves	–	as	





police.	 Second,	 given	 the	 over‐representation	 of	 Indigenous	 people	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	
system	–	also	well	documented	–	it	may	be	that	if	their	cultural	identity	is	known,	this	is	through	





either	 the	Muslim	or	 the	 Jewish	community	 (Carpenter	and	Tait	2009;	Carpenter	et	al.	2011).	
Ironically,	the	silence	and	invisibility	of	the	Indigenous	community	occurs	against	a	backdrop	of	
‘the	 endemic	 losses	 of	 colonialism	 and	 the	 heightened	 mortality	 of	 ongoing	 alienation’,	 and	
which	 in	 other	 contexts,	 such	 as	Maori	 in	New	 Zealand,	 have	 been	 argued	 to	 increase	 rather	

























These	 statements	 raise	 a	 number	 of	 relevant	 issues	 in	 the	 grief	 work	 required	 of	 Coronial	
personnel,	which	is	replicated	in	the	little	research	there	is	on	families	dealings	with	a	coronial	
death,	 with	 most	 suggesting	 that	 coronial	 processes	 can	 cause	 further	 trauma	 to	 family	
members	 already	 suffering	 significant	 grief	 (Green	1992;	Harwood	 et	 al.	 2002;	Biddle	2003;	
Robb	 and	 Sullivan	 2004;	 Clarke	 and	 McCreanor	 2006;	 Drayton	 2011).	 While	 this	 has	 been	
noted	in	particular	during	the	inquest	(Biddle	2003;	Green	1992),	and	in	the	scandals	relating	










intensified	during	a	 coronial	death	 investigation	due	 to	 the	added	 trauma	of	 the	unexpected	
and	often	violent	nature	of	 the	death	 (Neria	and	Litz	2004).	This	 is	partly	because	decisions	
about	autopsy	occur	when	families	are	still	in	the	grip	of	the	shock	and	disbelief	of	the	death	
notification,	 ‘when	 their	 ability	 to	 process	 and	 retain	 complex	 information	may	 be	 severely	
compromised’	(Drayton	2011:	238).	In	such	conversations,	two	competing	representations	of	
the	 dead	 body	 are	 evident:	 the	 medico‐legal	 body	 which	 is	 ‘mechanistic’,	 ‘devoid	 of	
personality’,	‘tissue’;	and	the	body	as	‘beloved	and	lamented’	(Drayton	2011:	240).		
	
Research	has	also	 shown	 that	when	cultural	 difference	 is	added	 to	 the	medico‐legal	 inquiry,	
harm	 and	 trauma	 can	 be	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 coronial	 procedures	 interrupt	
culturally	 specific	 grieving	 practices,	 many	 of	 which	 focus	 on	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 body	 (Tatz	
2005;	Byard	and	Chivell	2005;	Clarke	and	McCreanor	2006).	Moreover,	while	the	appearance	
of	police	at	a	death	investigation	may	cause	alarm	in	many	families,	with	the	innuendos	of	guilt	
and	suspicion	 that	 they	bring,	 this	 is	particularly	pronounced	 for	 those	communities	already	
over	 policed	 and	 over	 criminalised,	 like	 Aboriginal	 people	 in	 Australia,	 or	 Maori	 in	 New	
Zealand	(Carpenter	and	Tait	2010;	Clarke	and	McCreanor	2006;	Tatz	2005).	In	stark	contrast,	




community	 generally,	 with	 religious	 objections	 influencing	 Coroners	 to	 make	 less	 invasive	
autopsy	decisions	 (Carpenter	 et	 al.	 2011).	 It	 is	 also	 the	 case,	 however,	 that	 such	 knowledge	
does	not	necessarily	decrease	feelings	of	suspicion	and	heightened	trauma	of	grieving	families,	





And	 I	 just	think	that’s	so	 important	and	 I	see	the	 fallout	of	what	happens	 if	people	aren’t	
heard	and	you	know	if	someone	has	a	really	strong	objection	because	of	religion	and	I	can	









board,	 you	 know,	 I	 don’t	 think	 religious	 objections	 should	 have	 any	 part	 to	 do	with	 it.	
(Police	Officer)	
	
There	has	 to	be	a	bloody	good	reason	 to	over‐ride	an	objection	 to	autopsy.	A	really	good	
reason.	Usually	the	only	reason	is	if	there’s	criminal	behaviour	involved.	(Coroner)	
	
There	 is	 clearly	 a	 tension,	 evident	 in	 the	 statements	 above,	 between	 the	 medico‐legal	 death	
investigation	 and	 the	 emotion	 and	 humanity	 of	 the	 family.	 It	 is	 perhaps	 not	 surprising	 that	
pathologists	stand	in	opposition	to	what	they	perceive	as	this	recent	impost	on	the	process	of	a	




determination’	 (Drayton	2011:	238).	What	may	be	more	 curious	 is	 the	diametrically	opposed	
position	 of	 police	 and	 Coroners	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	 familial	 beliefs	 –	 who	 are	 both	 legal	
officers	 of	 the	 court	 and	 yet	 who	 offer	 either	 resentment	 or	 respect	 to	 the	 idea.	 While	 the	




Since	 all	 coronial	 legislation	 now	 stresses	 ‘the	 rights	 of	 the	 family	member	 to	 be	 involved	 in	
decisions	concerning	the	deceased’	(Barnes	2003:	1.1),	it	is	increasingly	being	suggested	that	a	
Coroner’s	work	is	intimately	connected	with	‘well	being’	and	thus	fits	squarely	within	the	ambit	





have	argued	elsewhere	 (Carpenter	 and	Tait	2010)	 that	 the	 central	debate	within	 the	 coronial	
jurisdiction	 is	 between	 the	pillars	 of	 law	and	medicine,	 it	 also	 seems	 likely	 that	 the	bereaved	
views	 in	relation	 to	autopsy	 introduce	a	 third	discourse	 into	 the	debate	–	 ‘knowledge	born	of	
emotional	attachment’	or	 ‘suffering’	 (Drayton	2011:	236).	Moreover	this	discourse	of	 loss	and	







The	 introduction	 of	 bereaved	 families’	 views	 into	 the	 medico‐legal	 death	 investigation	 has	
added	 three	 central	 tensions	 to	 the	 process.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 different	 spaces	 occupied	 by	 the	
families,	 depending	 on	 their	 cultural	 or	 religious	 location	 in	 larger	 social	 and	 historical	
processes.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	wider	 fears	 over	 Islamic	 fundamentalism	 post	 9/11	 has	 influenced	
suspicion	 in	 the	minds	of	 some	coronial	personnel,	while	 Jewish	political	 and	 social	 influence	
has	been	used	to	advocate	more	successfully	for	bereaved	families.	The	silence	and	invisibility	
of	 Indigenous	 beliefs	 and	 concerns	 speaks	 to	 their	 ambiguous	 position	 in	 a	 coronial	
investigation	often	overseen	by	personnel	who	also	act	in	the	criminal	justice	space.		
	
Second,	 these	 conflicting	 and	 contradictory	 engagements	 with	 bereaved	 families	 who	 have	
legitimate	 reasons	 for	 objecting	 to	 an	 autopsy	 is	 compounded	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 a	 reportable	
death	 –	 unexpected	 and	 often	 violent	 –	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 coronial	 procedures	 disrupt	
traditional	 grieving	 practices.	 Specifically,	 it	 is	 the	 differing	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 dead	 body	 is	
perceived	 –	 corpse	 or	 beloved	 –	 and	 its	 forced	 removal	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 medico‐legal	
process	of	death	investigation	that	is	most	often	cited	as	the	cause	of	suffering	and	pain	for	the	
family.	This	 is	compounded	by	the	role	of	police	 in	the	 investigation	of	coronial	deaths,	which	





on	 the	 relation	 between	 their	 role	 in	 the	 prevention	 of	 avoidable	 deaths	 and	 the	 therapeutic	
potential	 of	 a	 death	 investigation	 for	 families.	 As	 the	 primary	 decision	 makers	 in	 a	 coronial	
death	 investigation,	 this	 convergence	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 undermine	 more	 traditional	
knowledges	 like	 science	 and	 medicine	 as	 the	 final	 arbiters	 in	 a	 death	 investigation.	 CSI	 not	








































































































Persistent	 high	 levels	 of	 recidivism	 among	 young	 offenders	 (Luke	 and	 Lind	 2002;	
Weatherburn	et	al.	2012)	and	the	over‐representation	of	Indigenous	young	people	(Cunneen	
and	White	 2011;	 Snowball	 2008;	 Tauri	 2012)	 have	 long	 been	 features	 of	 youth	 justice	 in	




Pereira	 2009)	 –	 have	 emerged	 more	 recently.	 In	 this	 paper,	 we	 draw	 on	 the	 concept	 of	
‘imaginary	penalities’	(Carlen	2010)	to	argue	these	chronic	problems	are	partly	informed	by	
‘imaginary’	 understandings	 of	 how	 and	 why	 young	 people	 (re)offend;	 reflect	 ‘imaginary’	









beginning	 of	 the	 20th	 century,	 and	 the	 subsequent	 removal	 of	welfare	 offences	 in	 the	 1980s	
(Carrington	 and	 Pereira	 2009).	 Yet	 much	 has	 changed	 over	 the	 last	 century	 that	 shapes	
contemporary	 problems	 of	 youth	 offending	 and	 contemporary	 responses.	 Australia	 has	 eight	
jurisdictions,	 each	 with	 its	 own	 youth	 justice	 system,	 legislation,	 policy	 frameworks	 and	
statutory	 youth	 justice	 agency,	 operating	 within	 a	 national	 policy	 framework	 that	 includes	
strategic	 frameworks	 such	 as	 the	 National	 Youth	 Policing	 Model	 (Attorney‐General’s	
Department	 2010)	 and	 the	 National	 Youth	 Justice	 Framework	 (Australasian	 Juvenile	 Justice	
Administrators	 (AJJA)	 forthcoming).	 There	 are	 stark	 discrepancies	 in	 youth	 justice	 outcomes	
across	Australia	 in	 rates	of	 Indigenous	over‐representation,	 in	 the	efficacy	of	 interventions,	 in	
the	 age	 and	 sex	 of	 youth	 offenders	 involved	 in	 the	 system,	 and	 in	 rates	 of	 recidivism.	 For	
example,	 while	 Indigenous	 young	 people	 are	 overrepresented	 in	 youth	 detention	 in	 every	
jurisdiction,	this	varies	from	three	times	the	rate	of	non‐Indigenous	young	people	in	Tasmania	
to	 69	 times	 in	 Western	 Australia	 (Richards	 2011).	 Moreover,	 policies	 such	 as	 diversionary	
measures	 produce	highly	 varied	 results	 across	 jurisdictions.	While	 youth	 justice	 conferencing	
has	been	legislated	in	every	jurisdiction,	the	proportion	of	young	offenders	referred	by	police	to	
a	conference	varies	substantially	across	jurisdictions,	from	2%	of	young	offenders	in	the	ACT	to	







simply	 provide	 an	 outline	 of	 the	 kind	 of	 research	 questions	 such	 a	 project	might	 entail.	 Key	
questions	include:	
	







Our	 analysis	 is	 framed	 by	 a	 range	 of	 criminological	 and	 sociological	 theories	 of	 crime,	 ‘race’,	
youth	 and	 gender.	 It	 draws	 upon	 these	 theories	 to	 explain	 both	 how	 certain	 social	 factors	
predispose	 some	marginalised	 young	 people	 towards	 criminalisation	 (Carrington	 and	Pereira	
2009)	and	how	we	develop	and	use	‘fictions’	of	 ‘criminals’,	 ‘justice’,	and	‘young	offenders’	as	if	
they	are	real	even	when	they	have	little	bearing	on	the	real	(Carlen	2008;	Vaihinger	1935).	The	
concept	 of	 ‘imaginary	 penalities’	will	 also	 be	 used	 to	 frame	 our	 analysis.	 This	 refers	 to	 penal	
policies	 and	 practices	 that	 are	 unrealisable,	 yet	 those	 authorised	 to	 develop	 and	 implement	
them	 act	 ‘as	 if’	 they	 are	 effective	 (Carlen	 2008;	 Vaihinger	 1935).	 As	 a	 result,	 a	 process	 of	
‘institutional	 goal	 adaptation’	 occurs,	 whereby	 the	 unrealisable	 goals	 that	 form	 the	 officially‐
recognised	 rationale	 for	 a	 criminal	 justice	 policy	 or	 practice	 are	 replaced	with	 aims	 that	 are	
easier	 to	 achieve	 (Carlen	 2008).	 Acting	 ‘as	 if’	 policy	works	when	 it	 doesn’t	 is	 a	 phenomenon	
evident	 in	many	other	domains	 from	child	protection	to	national	and	 international	economics	
(Argyris	and	Schön	1974;	Heffernan	2011).	A	number	of	world‐views	referred	to	as	neo‐liberal	
penal	 regimes	 also	 underpin	 ‘imaginary	 penalities’	 of	 this	 kind.	 These	 include	 perhaps	 most	
significantly,	the	institution	of	new	modes	of	governance	of	crime	through	the	paradigm	of	risk	
(O’Malley	2010).	In	what	follows	we	consider	four	problems	that	underscore	the	crisis	in	youth	





Research	 consistently	 demonstrates	 that	 a	 small	 ‘core’	 of	 young	 people	 is	 responsible	 for	 a	
disproportionate	 amount	of	 crime,	 and	 that	 these	young	people	 repeatedly	 come	 into	 contact	
with	youth	justice	systems	(Hua	et	al.	2006;	Weatherburn	et	al.	2012).	While	most	young	people	
who	offend	do	not	have	contact	with	the	justice	system,	more	than	half	of	those	who	proceed	to	
a	 caution,	 conference	or	 the	children’s	 court	do	have	 further	 contact,	 and	 those	who	 reoffend	
are,	 on	 average,	 prolific	 offenders	 (Weatherburn	 et	 al.	 2012).	 Why	 do	 a	 small	 proportion	 of	
young	offenders	reoffend	repeatedly,	despite	interventions	aimed	at	preventing	their	offending?	




in	 any	 re‐imagining	 of	 youth	 justice	 in	 the	 21st	 century.	 Specifically	 these	 include	 an	
examination	 of	 the	 extent	 to	which	 ‘imaginary	penalities’	 target	 ‘imaginary	 offenders’	 (Carlen	
2008).	For	example,	restorative	justice	measures	are	premised	on	an	‘imaginary’	young	person	
who	 is	emotionally	 intelligent	and	articulate	(Roche	2004),	despite	evidence	 that	many	young	
offenders	 do	 not	 have	 the	 cognitive	 and/or	 communication	 skills	 required	 to	 adequately	
comprehend	the	‘rules	of	the	game’	and	engage	in	such	processes	(Shapiro	1999).	Some	of	the	
critical	questions	 that	 require	 further	 research	 if	 effective	positive	policy	 responses	are	 to	be	
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developed	 to	meaningfully	 address	 problems	 of	 recidivism	 therefore	 include:	 To	what	 extent	
are	 youth	 justice	 policies	 and	 programs	premised	 on	 an	 ‘imaginary’	 young	 offender	who	will	
desist	 from	offending	 after	 contact	with	one	 of	 these	 interventions?	To	what	 extent	 do	 youth	
justice	 policies	 and	 programs	 ‘imagine’	 a	 young	 offender	 who	 easily	 desists,	 rather	 than	 the	




Problem	 2:	 Why	 do	 Indigenous	 young	 people	 continue	 to	 be	 over‐represented	 in	
Australia’s	youth	justice	systems,	despite	policies	designed	to	address	this?	
Statistics	 reveal	high	 levels	of	over‐representation	of	 Indigenous	young	people	at	all	 stages	of	
the	youth	justice	system,	and	particularly	at	the	most	severe	end	of	the	system,	with	Indigenous	
young	 people	 being	 24	 times	 as	 likely	 as	 non‐Indigenous	 young	 people	 to	 be	 in	 detention	
(Australian	 Institute	 of	 Health	 and	Welfare	 (AIHW)	 2012).	 While	 the	 over‐representation	 of	
Indigenous	 young	 people	 has	 increased	 steadily	 over	 the	 last	 two	 decades,	 this	 increase	 has	




successful	 in	 reducing	 the	 incarceration	 of	 non‐Indigenous	 young	 people	 but	 have	 failed	 for	
Indigenous	 young	 people	 (Cunneen	 2008).	 Moreover	 why	 have	 even	 those	 interventions	
designed	specifically	for	Indigenous	young	people	not	been	successful?	We	think	that	imaginary	
constructs	 of	 young	 offenders,	 based	 on	 Anglophone	 norms,	 are	 part	 of	 this	 problem.	 For	
example,	 why	 is	 it	 the	 case	 that	 most	 youth	 justice	 policies	 and	 programs	 ‘imagine’	 an	
abstracted	 Anglo‐Saxon	 offender	 (see	 Tauri	 2012),	 and/or	 that	 the	 positivistic	 ‘what	 works’	
approach	 to	measuring	 program	 outcomes	 is	 Anglocentric?	 To	what	 extent	 are	 youth	 justice	
policies	 and	 programs	 designed	 for	 non‐Indigenous	 young	 people,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	
nationally,	 half	 of	 all	 young	 people	 in	 detention	 are	 Indigenous?	 While	 we	 know	 and	 have	
known	for	two	decades	that	Indigenous	young	people	are	over‐represented	in	Australian	youth	









offending	 by	 and	 against	 Indigenous	 young	 people	 (Dwyer	 2011;	 O’Brien	 2010).	 The	
criminalisation	of	teen	sexting	has	created	a	new	crime	where	young	people’s	voices	are	largely	
silenced	in	the	public	and	political	debate	about	the	harm	or	innocuousness	of	such	antics	(Lee	
et	 al.	 2013).	 This	 criminalisation	 of	 adolescent	 sexting	 has	 occurred	 in	 the	 perverse	 context	
where	 adult	 sexting	 is	 a	 legitimate	 and	 legal	 adult	 activity	 (Lee	 et	 al.	 2013).	 This	 is	 a	 classic	
example	of	how	an	imaginary	young	offender	 is	created	through	social	reaction	and	then	how	
law	 creates	 deviance	 in	 its	 own	 image.	 This	 all	 begs	 the	 larger	question	of	 to	what	 extent	 do	
rising	 rates	 of	 sexual	 offences	 reflect	 changes	 in	 young	 people’s	 conduct	 or	 changes	 in	 the	
regulation	 of	 young	 people’s	 sexual	 behaviours,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 sexting,	 or	 changes	 to	
definitions	 of	 sex	 offences?	 To	what	 extent	 are	 young	 people	 unwittingly	 criminalised	 in	 the	
justice	 system	 as	 a	 result	 of	 responses	 to	 sexual	 offending	 designed	 for	 adult	 offenders?	
Moreover,	what	 interventions	might	 better	 address	 young	people’s	 sexual	 offending,	much	of	











Australia	 (Arnull	 and	Eagle	2009;	US	Department	of	 Justice	 2011;).	 In	Australia,	 boys	 still	 far	
outnumber	girls	among	those	drawn	into	the	youth	justice	system,	but	from	1960	to	2007	the	
gender	gap	narrowed	significantly	from	around	one	in	thirteen	to	around	one	in	four	females	to	
males	(Carrington	and	Pereira	2009).	During	 this	 timeframe	there	were	dramatic	 increases	 in	




of	 females	 who	 came	 to	 police	 attention	 over	 that	 period	 ‘increased	 by	 15%,	 whereas	 the	
number	of	males	remained	stable’	(Holmes	2010:	2).		
	
Explanations	 for	 the	 rising	 rates	 of	 female	 violence	 are	 under‐researched,	 remain	 highly	
contentious,	and	raise	a	number	of	questions	(Alder	and	Worrall	2004;	Carrington	and	Pereira	
2009).	 There	 is	 ongoing	 debate	 about	 whether	 statistical	 increases	 in	 female	 offences	 are	
generated	 by	 less	 serious	 offences	 being	 brought	 into	 the	 system	 or	 by	 decreases	 in	 male	
offending	behaviour,	or	whether	young	women	really	are	becoming	more	violent	(Acoca	2004;	
Alder	 and	 Worrall	 2004;	 Arnull	 and	 Eagle	 2009;	 Brown,	 Chesney‐Lind	 and	 Stein	 2007;	
Carrington	2006;	Muncer	and	Campbell	2001).	Are	these	patterns	the	product	of	new	forms	of	
social	 control,	 scrutiny,	 and	 governance,	 changing	 methods	 of	 recording	 and	 reporting	
information,	changes	in	styles	of	policing	and	policy,	or	changes	in	attitudes	to	female	offending?	
Certainly	 the	 idea	of	 the	new	 female	violent	offender	captivates	 the	public	 imagination	and	 is	
partly	an	effect	of	moral	panics	and	attention‐grabbing	media	shock	jocks.	One	argument	is	that	
young	women	 are	 not	 becoming	more	 violent,	 but	 rather	 social	 and	 regulatory	 responses	 to	
their	 violent	behaviour	 are	 changing,	 leading	 to	 a	net‐widening	of	 offences	defined	 as	 violent	
(Alder	and	Worrall	2004;	Chesney‐Lind	and	Shelden	2004;	Steffensmeier	et	al.	2005).		
	

















Youth	 justice	 systems	 in	 Australia	 appear	 to	 be	 affected	 by	 a	 growing	 gap	 between	 the	
‘imagined’	 way	 youth	 justice	 is	 conceptualised	 by	 policy‐makers,	 practitioners	 and	 media	




which	Australia	 is	a	 signatory,	and	 is	a	 feature	of	every	 jurisdiction’s	youth	 justice	 legislation,	
the	 number	 of	 young	 people	 actually	 in	 detention	 has	 increased	 substantially	 over	 the	 last	
decade	(AIHW	2012).	Some	 jurisdictions	are	placing	more	young	people	on	custodial	remand,	
despite	 evidence	 that	detention	 for	young	people	 is	 criminogenic	 (see	Richards	and	Renshaw	
forthcoming).	 Another	 critical	 ‘gap’	 characterising	 youth	 justice	 systems	 across	 Australia	 has	
opened	 up	 between	 what	 the	 evidence	 tells	 us	 about	 effective	 interventions	 with	 young	
offenders,	 and	 certain	 legislative	 reforms.	 For	 example,	 the	 Queensland	 Government	 has	
recently	introduced	legislative	amendments	that	will	limit	the	use	of	youth	justice	conferences,	
despite	 evidence	 about	 their	 efficacy	 (Luke	 and	 Lind	 2002),	 replacing	 them	with	 boot	 camps	
(see	 Richards	 et	 al.	 2013).	 These	 features	 of	 contemporary	 youth	 justice	 in	 Australia	 clearly	
illustrate	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 overriding	 coherent	 purpose	 and	 rationale	 that	 work	 to	 inform	
policy	and	practice.	Rather	what	we	have	is	a	patchwork	of	diverse	(sometimes	competing	and	
contradictory)	 rationales,	 discourses,	 policies	 and	 practices.	 It	 is	 timely	 to	 systematically	
investigate	the	rationale	and	effectiveness	of	Australia’s	youth	justice	policies,	and	to	re‐imagine	













































































The	 current	 discourse	 surrounding	 victims	 of	 online	 fraud	 is	 heavily	 premised	 on	 an	
individual	 notion	 of	 greed.	 The	 strength	 of	 this	 discourse	 permeates	 the	 thinking	 of	 those	
who	 have	 not	 experienced	 this	 type	 of	 crime,	 as	 well	 as	 victims	 themselves.	 The	 current	
discourse	 also	manifests	 itself	 in	 theories	 of	 victim	 precipitation,	 which	 again	 assigns	 the	
locus	 of	 blame	 to	 individuals	 for	 their	 actions	 in	 an	 offence.	 While	 these	 typologies	 and	
categorisations	of	victims	have	been	critiqued	as	‘victim	blaming’	in	other	fields,	this	has	not	
occurred	with	regard	to	online	fraud	victims,	where	victim‐focused	ideas	of	responsibility	for	
the	offence	continue	 to	dominate.	This	paper	 illustrates	 the	nature	and	extent	of	 the	greed	
discourse	 and	 argues	 that	 it	 forms	 part	 of	 a	 wider	 construction	 of	 online	 fraud	 that	 sees	
responsibility	 for	 victimisation	 lie	with	 the	 victims	 themselves	 and	 their	 actions.	 It	 argues	
that	the	current	discourse	does	not	take	into	account	the	level	of	deception	and	the	targeting	
of	 vulnerability	 that	 is	 employed	 by	 the	 offender	 in	 perpetrating	 this	 type	 of	 crime.	 It	
concludes	by	advocating	the	need	to	further	examine	and	challenge	this	discourse,	especially	






2000:18).	 Early	 explanations	 and	 typologies	 of	 victimisation	 were	 derived	 from	 positivism,	
which	 focused	on	 individual	notions	of	 responsibility	 (Dignan	2005:	32;	Walklate	2012:	174).	
Early	victimisation	theories	argued	that	the	behaviour	and	characteristics	of	victims	contributed	





relevance	 to	 how	 victims	 are	 constructed	 by	 society	 and	 themselves.	 The	 current	 discourse	
surrounding	online	fraud	victimisation	is	presented,	using	excerpts	from	interviews	undertaken	
with	 85	 seniors	 (aged	 50	 years	 or	 older)	 who	 had	 received	 a	 fraudulent	 email	 request	 for	
money,	personal	details	or	passwords.	The	analysis	will	demonstrate	that	greed	is	internalised	












Overall,	 this	 paper	 establishes	 the	 dominance	 of	 positivist	 theories	 underpinning	 current	
discourses	 surrounding	 online	 fraud	 victims.	 This	 is	 argued	 to	 lead	 to	 potentially	 devastating	









dedicated	 to	 the	 study	 of	 victims	 (Burgess,	 Regehr	 and	 Roberts	 2013:	 76).	 All	 early	
victimological	 theories	 were	 based	 on	 acts	 of	 physical	 violence,	 such	 as	 homicide	 and	 rape.	




imaginary	victims,	who	 suffer	no	 actual	harm	but	 falsely	 accuse	another	 party	 (Burgess	et	 al.	
2013:	77).	This	classification	was	primarily	based	on	the	attribution	of	guilt	since	‘the	ascription	










biologically	 weak	 victims,	 socially	 weak	 victims,	 self	 victimising	 victims	 and	 political	 victims	
(Burgess	 et	 al.	 2013:	 80).	 Schafer’s	 typology	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 victim	
precipitation,	which	attributes	a	level	of	blame	to	the	victim	for	their	victimisation	and	therefore	
implies	 that	 victims	 can	 take	 actions	 to	 prevent	 their	 victimisation.	 It	 is	 evident	 that	 early	
victimisation	theory	focused	heavily	on	the	level	of	guilt	and	responsibility	borne	by	victims	in	
contributing	to	their	victimisation.	Each	typology	can	be	viewed	as	a	continuum	of	blame,	from	
the	 completely	 innocent	 to	 the	 fully	 culpable.	 However	 these	 typologies	 did	 not	 just	 ascribe	
blame	 to	 individuals	 who	 were	 seen	 to	 incite	 or	 provoke	 their	 victimisation,	 but	 also	
incorporated	 those	 who	 had	 become	 victims	 through	 unintentional	 actions	 of	 ‘carelessness,	






interviews	 conducted	with	 85	 seniors	 (aged	 50	 years	 or	 older)	 across	 Queensland,	 who	 had	
received	a	fraudulent	email	request	for	money,	personal	details	or	passwords.	Semi‐structured	
interviews	were	 held	with	 non‐respondents	 (those	 who	 had	 received	 the	 fraudulent	 request	
and	 not	 responded)	 and	 respondents	 (those	 who	 responded	 in	 some	 way	 to	 the	 fraudulent	






The	 remainder	 of	 the	 paper	 presents	 excerpts	 from	 these	 interviews2	 to	 illustrate	 the	
prevalence	 of	 a	 discourse	 founded	 on	 victim	 typologies	which	 ascribe	 blame	 and	 guilt	 to	 the	
victim	for	their	actions.	The	existence	of	this	discourse	manifests	itself	through	the	construction	
of	 online	 fraud	 victims	 as	motivated	 by	 greed.	 This	 is	 an	 individualistic	 characteristic,	 which	
leads	 to	 attributing	 blame	 and	 responsibility	 to	 the	 victim	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 if	 they	were	 not	
greedy	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 they	 would	 not	 respond	 and	 become	 victims.	 It	 is	 derived	 from	
positivist	 thinking,	which	seeks	 to	 find	causal	 explanations	 for	both	victimising	and	offending	
behaviours.	The	paper	also	demonstrates	that	greed	is	internalised	by	victims,	however	this	is	
directed	at	other	victims	of	online	 fraud	and	allows	them	to	disassociate	 themselves	 from	the	





or	 message	 boards	 to	 present	 fraudulent	 solicitations	 to	 prospective	 victims,	 to	 conduct	
fraudulent	transactions	or	to	transmit	the	proceeds	of	fraud	to	financial	institutions	or	to	others	
connected	 with	 the	 scheme’	 (Australian	 Federal	 Police	 2012).	 While	 fraud	 is	 not	 new,	 the	
internet	has	 facilitated	an	 increase	 in	 the	accessibility	of	potential	victims.	While	 there	are	an	
infinite	number	of	possible	 fraudulent	approaches	(Cross	2012),	 the	current	study	 focused	on	
advanced	fee	fraud	(where	a	victim	is	asked	to	send	a	small	amount	of	money	with	the	promise	
of	receiving	a	larger	amount	of	money	in	the	future)	(Ross	and	Smith	2011:	1);	phishing	emails	
(where	 a	 victim	 receives	 an	 email	 from	 a	 legitimate	 institution	 asking	 for	 confirmation	 of	
personal	details)	(Choo	2011:	3);	and	romance	fraud	(where	a	victim	is	defrauded	in	what	they	
believe	 to	 be	 a	 legitimate	 relationship)	 (Rege	 2009:	 497).	 Participants	 were	 asked	why	 they	




feel	 is	 plausible,	 based	 on	 the	 offender’s	 skillful	 manipulation	 of	 an	 individual	 weakness	 or	
vulnerability	(Drew	and	Cross	forthcoming).	While	the	situation	may	seem	obviously	false	by	an	
outsider	(such	as	 family,	 friend	or	police	officer),	 the	victim	believes	 in	the	 legitimacy	of	 their	
situation.	Importantly,	once	trust	and	rapport	is	developed	between	the	victim	and	the	offender	
and	 a	 relationship	 is	 established	 (romantic	 or	 otherwise),	 the	 offender	 can	 successfully	 elicit	
compliance	 from	the	victim	to	 their	 requests	 for	money,	personal	details	or	passwords	(Drew	
and	 Cross	 forthcoming).	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 not	 unusual	 for	 victims	 to	 carry	 out	multiple	money	








overriding	 belief	 in	 the	 greed	 of	 online	 fraud	 victims.	 It	 is	 the	 most	 dominant	 explanation	
offered	by	non‐respondent	participants	as	to	why	individuals	respond	to	fraudulent	emails:		
	
The	 Nigerian	 scams,	 I	 mean	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 messages	 you	 know	 are	 clearly	
absurd,	 I’ve	 heard	 people	 say	 especially	 the	 police	 it’s	 just	 pure	 greed	 that	 draws	

















Nobody’s	making	you	do	 it	 are	 they.	Nobody	 is	holding	a	gun	 to	your	head	 saying	




This	 comment	 explicitly	 articulates	 the	 view	 that	 responding	 to	 fraudulent	 emails	 is	 a	 choice	
people	 make	 that	 is	 motivated	 by	 greed.	 However,	 it	 was	 not	 just	 non‐respondents	 who	
expressed	greed	as	the	prime	reason	for	responding.	Nicholas	and	Cynthia	also	cited	greed	as	a	




in	 the	 free	 lunch	or	whatever	 it	 is,	 that	we’ve	been	 told	does	not	exist.	 Is	 it	greed,	
well	 maybe	 that’s	 a	 bit	 harsh,	 I	 think	 people	 get	 involved	 to	 see	 if	 there’s	 really	
something	in	it	for	them	…	Yeah	I	think	that	[it	is]	greed	and	I	think	people	perhaps	







The	above	excerpts	 illustrate	 that	although	Nicholas	and	Cynthia	hold	strong	views	about	 the	
greed	of	those	who	respond	to	fraudulent	emails,	it	did	not	stop	them	from	participating	in	the	





greed	 of	 other	 victims,	 but	 do	 not	 perceive	 their	 own	 actions	 in	 the	 same	 way.	 While	 they	





argument	 to	 support	 online	 fraud	 victims	 as	 greedy	 and	 therefore	 attribute	 blame	 and	
responsibility	to	them	for	their	victimisation.	Even	victims	themselves	hold	these	same	negative	






























combination,	 each	 of	 these	 excerpts	 of	 respondents	 and	 non‐respondents	 demonstrate	 the	





However,	 not	 all	 victims	 believe	 themselves	 to	 be	 greedy	 or	 subscribe	 to	 the	 dominant	
discourse.	Martha,	who	was	involved	in	an	inheritance	fraud	and	lost	over	$50,000	across	a	six	







Martha:	 Getting	 something	 for	 nothing?	 No	 one	 can	 get	 something	 for	 nothing.	 I	
mean	 anyone	 has	 to	 pay	 for	 something.	 You	 can’t	 get	 something	 for	 nothing.	 You	
have	to	pay.	You	order	something	over	the	internet	and	you	have	to	pay	for	it.	It	is	
the	same	type	of	thing.	You	are	getting	all	this	money	so	you	have	to	pay	for	all	the	
certificates	 and	 everything.	 I	 mean	 if	 I	 ordered	 another	 birth	 certificate	 over	 the	
internet	I	still	have	to	pay	for	it.	(Martha,	respondent,	63	years)	
	
Martha	clearly	refutes	 the	argument	 that	victims	expect	 to	get	 something	 for	nothing	and	she	
denies	greed	as	a	reason	why	she	responded.	When	she	was	informed	of	being	a	beneficiary	to	a	









It	 is	 evident	 that	 greed	 is	 the	 dominant	 discourse	 surrounding	 online	 fraud	 victimisation,	
expressed	by	both	respondents	and	non‐respondents	alike.	However,	despite	the	dominance	of	
this	 rhetoric,	 the	 reality	 of	 victimisation	 detailed	 by	 victims	 of	 online	 fraud,	 presents	 no	
evidence	 to	 substantiate	 these	 claims	of	 greed.	 Rather,	 the	 narratives	 provided	by	 victims	 on	
how	they	became	involved	in	fraud,	illustrate	the	complexity	by	which	offenders	target	victims	














Hazel:	 I	 think	 the	way	 that	 they	came	at	 it,	mainly	because	 I	was	so	keen	 to	go	 to	





her	 involvement	 was	 initiated	 through	 a	 desire	 to	 help	 children	 in	 Africa	 rather	 than	 a	 self‐
centred	desire	 to	make	money.	The	ability	of	 the	offender	 to	 target	Hazel’s	aspiration	 to	help	
African	children	 increased	the	 likelihood	of	Hazel	responding	to	the	 initial	request	and	can	be	



























I’d	 spent	 two	 one	 hour	 sessions,	 probably	 a	 long	 time	 with	 two	 different	









Frank’s	 situation	 illustrates	 the	 insidious	 way	 that	 offenders	 will	 manipulate	 a	 person’s	
emotions	 and	 circumstances	 to	 obtain	 financial	 benefits.	 It	 demonstrates	 the	way	 that	 Frank	
was	presented	with	a	situation	that	 involved	multiple	actors	(the	woman,	her	brother	and	the	
doctor)	in	order	to	increase	the	likelihood	that	he	would	consent	to	the	request	for	money.	The	






whereby	 victims	 are	 targeted	 implicitly	 (such	 as	 Hazel	 through	 her	 wish	 to	 help	 African	
orphans)	 or	 explicitly	 (such	 as	 Frank,	 whereby	 his	 wife’s	 death	 was	 used	 as	 a	 means	 to	
manipulate	and	cloud	his	judgment)	to	send	money	to	overseas	offenders.	It	demonstrates	the	
complexity	and	high	 level	of	sophistication	 that	characterise	many	 fraudulent	approaches	and	





The	 above	 excerpts	 have	 clearly	 articulated	 the	 negativity	 currently	 associated	 with	 online	
fraud	 victimisation,	 one	 that	 firmly	 holds	 victims	 responsible	 for	 their	 own	 victimisation,	
through	their	decision	 to	respond	to	a	 fraudulent	email	out	of	perceived	greed.	As	mentioned	
earlier,	the	simplicity	of	this	explanation	fails	to	acknowledge	many	factors,	including	the	ability	
of	 the	offender	 to	 skillfully	manipulate	and	exploit	 victim	weaknesses	and	vulnerabilities	 and	
the	dynamics	of	the	relationship	between	the	two	(Drew	and	Cross	forthcoming).	While	victim	
typologies	which	assign	guilt	and	responsibility	to	the	victim	have	sustained	criticism	for	victim	
blaming	 in	other	 fields	 (such	as	 sexual	 assault	 and	 rape),	 this	has	not	 occurred	 for	victims	of	





explain	 other’s	 victimisation	 is	 not	 always	 internalised	 by	 themselves.	 Lastly,	 through	 the	
examples	 of	 Hazel	 and	 Frank,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 there	 is	 a	 disjuncture	 between	 the	






of	 online	 fraud,	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 ability	 to	 access	 support	 services	 and	 the	 criminal	 justice	
system	more	broadly,	 given	 their	 lack	of	 recognition	as	 legitimate	victims.	Further	 analysis	 is	











permissions	 have	 been	 granted	 to	 use	 these	 data	 and	 present	 these	 research	 findings.	 The	 author	 gratefully	
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omissions	are	solely	the	responsibility	of	the	author.	














































with	the	right	 to	 jury	 trial	 is	characterised	as	a	deviation	 from	the	norm.	However,	 trial	by	
jury	is	consistently	undermined	and	rolled	back	particularly	in	the	context	of	organised	crime	
and	terrorism:	Ireland,	New	Zealand,	the	UK	and	the	United	States	have	all	adopted	measures	
curtailing	 trial	 by	 jury	 in	 these	 contexts.	 In	 contrast	 the	 rhetorical	 support	 for	 jury	 trial	 in	
Australia	 is	matched	by	 an	 apparent	 unwillingness	 to	 interfere	with	 the	 right	 to	 jury	 trial.	







freedom	 lives’	 (Devlin	 1966:	 164)	 the	 jury	 has	 achieved	 a	 totemic	 position	 throughout	 the	
common	 law	 world.	 However,	 trial	 by	 jury	 is	 consistently	 undermined	 and	 rolled	 back	
particularly	in	the	context	of	organised	crime	and	terrorism:	Ireland,	New	Zealand,	the	UK	and	
the	 United	 States	 have	 all	 adopted	 measures	 curtailing	 trial	 by	 jury	 in	 these	 contexts	
(Darbyshire	1991;	Davis	2012;	Donohue	2007).	This	paper	will	build	on	previous	work	by	the	




The	paper	will	begin	by	outlining	the	role	of	 jury	trial	 in	the	counter‐terrorism	context.	 It	will	
then	 briefly	 examine	 the	 international	 experience.	 The	 paper	 will	 consider	 what,	 if	 any,	
underlying	 justifications	 for	 abandoning	 trial	 by	 jury	 in	 the	 counter‐terrorism	 context	 have	








Court	 developed	 that	 view	 emphasising	 the	 role	 of	 the	 jury	 in	 fairly	 determining	 guilt	 or	
innocence.	They	stated	that:		
	







Thus	 the	 justification	 for	 maintaining	 trial	 by	 jury	 is	 that	 it	 is	 the	 best	 available	 means	 of	








1187).	Alexis	de	Tocqueville	argued	 that	 the	 jury	was	a	 ‘predominately	republican	 institution’	
which	‘entrusts	the	actual	control	of	society	into	the	hands	of	the	ruled	…	rather	than	into	those	
of	the	rulers’	(de	Tocqueville	2003:	317‐18).	And,	as	we	shall	see,	Governor	Macquarie	and	the	






with	 the	 state	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 inspiring,	 empowering,	 educational,	 and	 habit	
forming	…	This	perspective	provides	a	new	appreciation	of	 the	unique	position	of	




society	 is	 clear’;	 noting	 that	people	who	actually	 serve	on	 juries	overwhelmingly	 feel	positive	
about	the	institution	and	feel	‘satisfaction	at	having	done	their	civic	duty’	(2001:	para.	474).	This	
‘cohesive	 force’	 is	 measurable:	 there	 is	 a	 demonstrable	 link	 between	 jury	 service	 and	 voter	
participation	(Gastil	et	al.	2002:	593).	
	
In	 keeping	with	 the	 view	of	 the	 jury	 as	 a	 communal	means	of	 political	 participation	 the	High	
Court	of	Australia	has	stressed	that	the	right	to	trial	by	jury	is	not	solely	a	right	of	the	accused,	
but	is	a	‘constitutional	guarantee	…	for	the	community	as	a	whole’	(Brown	v	the	Queen	at	201).	
Similarly,	 the	 US	 Supreme	 Court	 emphasised	 the	 right	 of	 the	 individual	 to	 serve	 on	 a	 jury	





The	value	of	 the	 jury	as	a	communal	good	becomes	all	 the	more	 important	 in	the	context	of	a	
terrorist	threat	(Davis	2013).	The	threat	of	terrorism	weakens	civil	society	–	 it	can	distort	the	
political	 debate	 and	 impede	 parliamentary	 dissent	 (Ivie,	 2002:	 277).	 At	 the	 same	 time	 the	
executive	claims	to	possess	peculiarly	sensitive	information	can	have	a	negative	impact	on	the	
ability	 of	 the	 courts	 to	 act	 as	 a	 restraint	 on	 executive	 power	 (de	 Londras	 and	 Davis	 2010;	




A	number	 of	 reasons	 have	 been	 advanced	 to	 justify	 the	 international	willingness	 to	 abandon	











demonstrates	 a	 significant	 problem	 with	 juror	 understanding	 of	 legal	 proceedings.	 Juror	
comprehension	of	complicated	scientific	evidence	has	also	been	seen	as	problematic	(Myers	et	
al.	1999:	150‐56).	There	is	evidence	that	jurors	believe	that	they	have	understood	the	evidence	
presented	 (Matthews	 et	 al.	 2004:	 72‐74).	 However,	 there	 remains	 a	 problem	 with	 assessing	





In	 the	specific	context	of	 terrorism	there	are	 two	additional	concerns.	Lord	Diplock	noted	 the	
vulnerability	of	juries	to	intimidation	(1972:	para.	36).	The	actual	risk	and	extent	of	intimidation	
are	difficult	 to	assess.	 Indeed	Diplock	was	criticised	 for	adducing	 little	evidence,	 ‘statistical	or	
otherwise’,	 in	 support	 of	 his	 findings	 (Twining	 1973:	 413).	 Lord	 Diplock	 sidestepped	 that	
difficulty	by	arguing	that	it	does	not	matter	whether	juror	fears	are	well	founded:	a	‘frightened	
juror	is	a	bad	juror	even	though	his	own	safety	and	that	of	his	family	may	not	actually	be	at	risk’	
(para.	 36).	 If	 jurors	 are	 unable	 to	 comprehend	 the	 evidence	 presented	 or	 they	 are	 too	
intimidated	 to	 independently	 reach	 a	 verdict	 it	 calls	 into	 question	 their	 ability	 to	 fulfil	 the	









argued	 that	 widespread	 sectarianism	 meant	 that	 juries	 were	 an	 impediment	 to	 a	 fair	 trial	
(Diplock	 1972:	 paras	 35‐41).	 Similarly,	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation,	
referring	to	the	European	Court	of	the	Human	Rights	jurisprudence,	held	that	the	right	to	trial	
by	jury	was	not	a	prerequisite	to	a	fair	trial.	As	a	result,	it	upheld	the	suspension	of	trial	by	jury	
in	 all	 terrorism	 cases	 because	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 terrorist	 threat	 would	 prevent	 juries	 from	
functioning	effectively	(Constitutional	Court	of	 the	Russian	Federation	8‐P	/2010,	 s.	2.1).	This	
supposed	inability	of	the	jury	to	guarantee	a	fair	trial	rests,	in	part,	on	the	fear	that	jurors	will	be	
biased	 against	 those	 accused	 of	 committing	 acts	 of	 terrorism.	 As	 Donohue	 argues,	 ‘those	
appalled	at	the	latest	acts	of	violence	may	be	 looking	to	find	someone	–	anyone	–	responsible.	
Jurors	 may	 be	 biased	 against	 defendant	 sharing	 an	 ethnic	 or	 religious	 background	 of	 those	





in	Northern	 Ireland	and	Russia	and	by	 the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights.	There	 are	other	
examples:	Military	Commissions	 at	 Guantánamo	Bay	 (de	 Londras	 2008);	 the	 Special	 Criminal	
Court	 in	 the	Republic	of	 Ireland	 (Davis	2007);	non‐jury	 trial	 in	New	Zealand	 (Davis	2012).	 In	
each	 of	 these	 jurisdictions	 some	 variation	 upon	 the	 argument	 that	 juries	 are	 incapable	 of	







Australian	history	gives	 trial	by	 jury	an	additional	political	significance:	 the	 jury	 is	 tied	 to	 the	
broader	national	narrative.	Following	the	initial	European	settlement,	trial	by	jury	was	deemed	
inappropriate	 by	 the	 colonial	 power.	 In	 the	 early	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 there	was	 a	
concerted	 push	 by	 the	 emancipists	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 trial	 by	 jury	 in	NSW	 (Neal	 1991,	
Chapter	7).	Between	1810	and	1823	juries	began	to	be	used	in	coronial	inquests	and	this	began	
a	 process	 of	 gradual	 attainment	 of	 the	 right	 to	 trial	 by	 jury	 (Bennett	 1959‐61).	 Governor	
Macquarie	believed	 that	 ‘once	a	convict	has	become	a	 freeman	…	he	should	 in	all	 respects	be	
considered	on	a	footing	with	every	other	man	in	the	colony’	and	that	this	should	extend	to	the	
right	 to	 sit	 on	 a	 jury	 (Bennett	 1959‐61:	 465).	 Eventually,	 the	 New	 South	 Wales	 Act	 1823	
provided	for	a	modified	form	of	trial	by	jury,	albeit	one	that	suffered	from	executive	influence.	
Trials	 were	 conducted	 by	 ‘the	 respective	 judges	 of	 the	 said	 courts	 and	 jury	 of	 seven	
commissioned	 officers	 of	 His	 Majesty’s	 sea	 or	 land	 forces’2	 accompanied	 by	 a	 gradual	
normalisation	of	 trial	by	 jury	 in	civil	 cases.	Civil	 juries	were	 recognised	as	a	success	and	over	
time	the	jury	of	seven	officers	of	the	defence	forces	was	decried	as	the	‘rude	experiments	of	rude	
times’	 (Bennett	 1959‐61:	 471).	 Just	 as	 the	 emancipists	 saw	 trial	 by	 jury	 as	 a	 means	 of	
integrating	 former	 convicts	 into	 free	 society,	 the	 steady	 spread	 of	 the	 jury	 was	 part	 of	 the	









section	 80	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 substantive	 guarantee	 but	 it	 actually	 only	 applies	 to	 ‘trials	 on	
indictment’.	An	‘indictment’	is	‘a	written	accusation	of	crime	made	at	the	suit	of	the	prosecution	
against	 one	 or	more	 persons’	 which	 ‘must	 be	 signed	 by	 a	 person	 authorised	 to	 do	 so’	 (Ross	
2010:	para.	9.160).	A	‘trial	on	indictment’	is	the	‘opposite’	of	a	trial	held	summarily;	it	means	a	
trial	 commenced	by	an	 indictment,	with	a	 jury	deciding	 the	guilt	of	 the	accused	rather	 than	a	
judge	or	magistrate	sitting	alone.	Thus	the	description	‘the	trial	on	indictment	of	any	offence’	is	
a	 description	 of	 a	 certain	 procedure.	 Read	 literally,	 section	 80	 does	 not	 require	 that	 certain	
types	of	crimes	be	tried	by	jury,	as	one	might	expect.	The	High	Court	has	endorsed	that	literal	
interpretation	 of	 section	 80.	 It	 has	 refused	 to	 interpret	 section	 80	 so	 as	 to	 require	 ‘serious’	








This	Constitutional	point	 is	 significant.	 It	might	have	been	supposed	 that	 the	reason	Australia	
has	not	eagerly	followed	Ireland,	Russia,	New	Zealand,	the	UK	and	the	US	is	limiting	trial	by	jury	
for	terrorism	offences	rests	on	the	constitutional	guarantee.	That	is	not	the	case.	In	fact	in	every	
state	 and	 territory	 and	 at	 the	 Commonwealth	 level,	 many	 offences	 which	 are	 classified	 as	
indictable	are	nevertheless	capable	of	being	tried	without	a	jury.	The	High	Court	has	held	that	







The	Crimes	Act	1914	 (Cth)	 enables	 indictable	 offences	 to	be	 tried	 summarily	 in	 certain	 cases.	











a	distinction	between	 ‘strictly	 indictable	offences’	 and	 indictable	offences	which	may	be	 tried	
summarily.	 The	 starting	 position	 is	 that	 an	 offence	 must	 be	 tried	 on	 indictment	 unless	
legislation	provides	that	it	may	or	must	be	dealt	with	summarily	(Criminal	Procedure	Act	1986	
(NSW)	s	5).	Also	of	note	is	section	42	of	the	Serious	and	Organise	Crime	(Control	Act)	2008	(SA)	–	
the	 ‘anti‐bikie’	 legislation,	held	 invalid	(on	other	grounds)	 in	South	Australia	v	Totani.	This	act	
created	 some	 criminal	 offences	 –	 for	 example,	 it	made	 it	 an	 offence	 to	 associate	with	 outlaw	
motorcycle	gangs.	These	offences	were	punishable	by	up	to	five	years	imprisonment.	Section	42	
of	 the	act	 then	provided	 that	all	such	offences	were	to	be	 tried	summarily.	The	provision	was	
somewhat	unusual;	 the	 offence	 could	be	 tried	 summarily	 at	 the	discretion	of	 the	prosecution	
(without	 any	 need	 for	 consent	 of	 the	 accused),	 but	 if	 the	 court	 determined	 that	 the	 accused	
should	 be	 sentenced	 to	 a	 term	 of	 imprisonment	 exceeding	 2	 years,	 the	 matter	 had	 to	 be	
committed	to	the	District	Court	 for	sentence.	 It	seems	the	rationale	behind	this	provision	was	
the	 fear	 that	 jurors	would	be	 threatened	or	 intimidated	by	the	accused	(Government	of	South	
Australia,	2011).		
	
In	 some	 states	 and	 territories,	 it	 is	 also	 possible	 for	 an	 indictable	 offence	 to	 be	 tried	 on	
indictment,	but	by	judge	alone.	This	does	not	affect	the	indictable/summary	distinction;	rather,	
it	 changes	 the	procedure	of	 a	 trial	 on	 indictment	 so	as	 to	 remove	 the	 jury.	This	 is	possible	 in	
NSW	 (Criminal	Procedure	Act	1986	 s	132),	 Queensland	 (Criminal	Code	1899	 ss	 614,	 615),	 SA	
(Juries	Act	1927	s	7),	WA	(Criminal	Procedure	Act	2004	s	118)	and	the	ACT	(Supreme	Court	Act	
1933	68B).	 There	 are	 restrictions	 on	 this;	 for	 example,	 a	 court	may	 need	 to	 be	 satisfied	 that	




In	 some	 states	 it	 is	 also	 possible	 for	 an	 accused	 to	be	 convicted	 on	 the	majority	 (rather	 than	












state	 and	 territory	 level	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 circumvent	 the	 Commonwealth	 Constitution’s	
Fergal	Davis	
38	 Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	2nd	International	Conference,	2013	
provisions.	 Furthermore,	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 High	 Court	 of	 Australia	 indicates	 that	 a	
Commonwealth	 government	 would	 be	 free	 to	 describe	 any	 counter‐terrorism	 offences	 as	
summary	 –	 no	 matter	 how	 serious	 –	 and	 have	 them	 heard	 without	 a	 jury.	 Internationally,	




Since	 2001	 Australian	 governments	 have	 shown	 a	willingness	 to	 adopt	 and	 adapt	 a	 range	 of	
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The	battered	women’s	movement	 in	 the	United	States	contributed	to	a	sweeping	change	 in	
the	recognition	of	men’s	violence	against	female	intimate	partners.	Naming	the	problem	and	
arguing	 in	 favour	 of	 its	 identification	 as	 a	 serious	 problem	meriting	 a	 collective	 response	
were	key	aspects	of	this	effort.	Criminal	and	civil	 laws	have	been	written	and	revised	in	an	
effort	 to	 answer	 calls	 to	 take	 such	 violence	 seriously.	 Scholars	 have	 devoted	 significant	
attention	to	the	consequences	of	this	reframing	of	violence,	especially	around	the	unintended	
outcomes	of	the	incorporation	of	domestic	violence	into	criminal	justice	regimes.	Family	law,	










revised	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 answer	 calls	 to	 take	 such	 violence	 seriously,	 with	 most	 substantive	
changes	 on	 the	 order	 of	 reforms	 to	 policing	 and	 legal	 practice,	 especially	 around	 arrest	 and	
orders	 for	 protection	 (Buzawa	 2012,	 Coker	 2001‐2002;	 Gerstenberger	 and	 Williams	 2013;	
Schneider	2000).		
	
Criminologists	 have	 devoted	 significant	 attention	 to	 the	 consequences	 of	 this	 reframing	 of	
violence.	 Scholars	 in	 criminology,	 law,	 and	 social	 work	 have	 investigated	 the	 operation	 and	
impact	 of	 legal	 responses	 to	 violence	 (See	 for	 example	 Bell	 	 et	 al.	 2011;	 Breines	 and	Gordon	
1983;	 Pleck	 1987;	 Pleck	 1989).	 In	 addition	 to	 changes	 in	 criminal	 law	 and	 its	 application,	
criminologists	have	investigated	the	utilization	and	efficacy	of	civil	 legal	remedies	to	domestic	
violence,	 (Connelly	 and	 Cavanagh	 2007;	 DeJong	 and	 Burgess‐Procter	 1996;	 Fleury‐Steiner,	
Fleury	 Steiner	 and	Miller	 2011).	 They	 have	 also	 highlighted	 the	 unintended	 outcomes	 of	 the	
incorporation	of	domestic	violence	into	criminal	justice	regimes	as	new	policies	have	variously	
been	 co‐opted,	 resisted,	 and	 ignored	 in	 practice	 (Daniels	 1997;	 Durfee	 2012;	 Ferraro	 1996;	
Goodmark	 2011;	 Kim	 2012;	Miller	 1989;	 Miller	 and	Meloy	 2006;	 Moore	 2008;	 Ptacek	 2010;	












removal	 of	 their	 children	 for	 ‘failure	 to	 protect’	 if	 they	 fail	 to	 do	 so.	 However,	 at	 separation,	







is	 the	 latest	 variation	 on	 the	 victim	 blaming	 and	 discrediting	 tactics	 that	 have	 cropped	 up	 in	
response	to	public	acknowledgement	of	abuse	by	family	members	and	intimates	stretching	back	
to	the	early	twentieth	century	(Olafson,	Cordwin	and	Summit	1993;	Salter	2012;	Smart	2000).	
While	 research	 in	 family	 studies,	 public	 health,	 and	 law	 have	 begun	 to	 document	 abuse	 that	
occurs	 at	 separation	 in	 the	 context	 of	 family	 law	 proceedings	 (Hardesty	 2002;	 Hardesty	 and	
Chung	2006;	Hardesty	and	Ganong	2006;	Haselschwerdt,	Hardesty	and	Hans	2010;	McMurray	







factors	were	deemed	important	 in	determining	the	best	 interest	of	the	child	 intensified	as	 the	
federal	government	encouraged	U.S.	states	to	offload	the	cost	of	supporting	children	from	social	
systems	onto	individual	fathers.	The	U.S.	rewarded	child	support	collection	schemes	as	part	of	
retrenchment	 of	 public	welfare	 programs	 during	 the	 1980s.	 The	 confluence	 of	 rising	 divorce	
rates,	child	support	enforcement,	and	legal	 intervention	into	domestic	violence	resulted	in	the	
coalescence	of	organized	resistance	to	 interventions	 in	violence	against	women	in	the	 form	of	
antifeminist	men’s	and	fathers’	groups	(Dragiewicz	2008;	Dragiewicz	2012).		
	
But	 these	 were	 not	 the	 only	 groups	 to	 organize	 in	 the	 face	 of	 such	 changes.	 Increasing	
privatization	of	fact	finding	in	the	family	court,	another	outcome	of	rising	divorce	rates,	unclear	
criteria	for	custody	determination,	and	efforts	to	offload	the	costs	of	state	functions	onto	private	
citizens,	 contributed	 to	 the	 growth	 of	 a	 cottage	 industry	 of	 forensic	 psychologists,	 special	
masters,	 guardians	 ad	 litem,	 mediators,	 and	 parenting	 coordinators	 who	 assess,	 report,	 and	
testify	for	pay	in	child	custody	cases	that	shape	child	support	and	custody	arrangements.	These	
pseudo‐legal	personnel	regularly	invoke	social	science	research	on	violence	and	abuse	as	part	of	
their	practice.	They	also	 increasingly	 contribute	 to	 the	 literature	via	 their	own	peer	 reviewed	
journals	and	propose	and	promote	theories	that	are	useful	in	their	consulting	work.		
	
Although	a	surprising	amount	of	 the	divorce	and	custody	 literature	 refers	 to	delinquency	and	
criminality	 as	 a	 putative	 outcome	of	 divorce	 and	mother	 custody,	 criminology	 does	not	 often	
engage	with	the	 field.	As	a	result,	claims	about	the	criminogenic	 influence	of	single	mothering	





children	 than	 ever	 before	will	 be	 drawn	 into	 the	 family	 law	 system.	While	 these	 changes	 are	
explicitly	 intended	 to	 offload	 the	 cost	 of	 child	 maintenance	 from	 the	 state	 onto	 individual	
fathers,	they	also	include	provisions	to	decrease	payment	amounts	relative	to	‘parenting	time’.	
Although	 motivated	 by	 austerity,	 these	 proposed	 changes	 cannot	 be	 understood	 without	
attention	 to	 gender,	 racism,	 and	 class	 due	 to	 their	 differential	 impact	 on	 different	 families.	
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‘Responsible	 fatherhood’	 programs	 promote	 marriage	 and	 male	 breadwinning	 in	 minority	
communities	in	order	to	push	children	and	mothers	off	of	welfare	rolls.	At	the	same	time,	cutting	
child	 support	 payments	 in	 proportion	 to	 ‘parenting	 time’	 is	 sure	 to	 please	 upper	 income	
divorced	 fathers.	 However,	 the	 earning	 ability	 of	mothers	 is	 not	 altered	 by	 the	 percentage	 of	
‘parenting	 time’	 allocated	 to	 each	 parent.	 Nor	 is	 the	 cost	 of	 raising	 a	 child	 lessened	
proportionately	to	custody	arrangements.	Such	facially	neutral	income	support	policies	penalize	
all	lower	income	parents,	but	are	especially	damaging	for	survivors	of	abuse	who	face	increased	




Privatisation	 of	 income	 support	 via	 responsibilising	 low	 income	 fathers	 on	 the	 one	hand	 and	
appeasing	high	 income	 fathers	on	 the	other	presents	a	barrier	 to	abused	women	who	seek	 to	
leave	an	abuser	who	 is	 the	 father	of	her	 children.	Despite	 requirements	 to	 consider	domestic	





Recent	 critical	 criminological	 critiques	of	 domestic	violence	policies	and	practices	have	called	
for	a	turn	away	from	the	law	based	on	serious	concerns	for	the	ways	in	which	criminal	law,	in	




violence	 and	 abuse	 into	 account.	 As	 part	 of	 divorce	 agreements,	 child	 custody	 and	 support	
orders	 increasingly	 force	 unwilling	 parties	 into	 heterosexual	 co‐parenting	 regardless	 of	 the	
presence	of	 violence	and	despite	 improvements	 in	 recognizing	violence	 in	other	areas	of	 civil	
law.		
	
The	 possibilities	 of	 legal	 responses	 to	 violence	 in	 the	 family	 law	 system	 will	 be	 profoundly	
shaped	 by	 state	 approaches	 to	 a	 number	 of	 social	 and	 structural	 issues	 including	 income	
support	 for	mothers	 and	 their	 children	 and	 the	 privatization	 of	 fact	 finding	 and	 legal	 orders	
enforcing	heterosexual,	patriarchal	family	structures.	As	the	U.S.	moves	to	tether	child	support	







gender,	 class,	 and	 racialized	 inequalities	 that	 lead	 to	 violence	 and	 produce	 many	 of	 the	
shortcomings	and	 inconsistencies	of	 legal	responses	 to	violence	against	women.	This	 includes	
investigating	 what	 is	 happening	 on	 the	 ground	 in	 the	 family	 courts,	 participating	 in	 debates	




Our	 intervention	 strategies	must	 go	 beyond	 offering	 emotional	 support;	 we	must	











Critical	 feminism	 rejects	 the	 fantasy	 that	 we	 stand	 outside	 law’s	 power	 in	 some	
neutral	space	free	from	imperfect	empirical	assumptions	and	imperfect	political	and	
social	 commitments.	We	 always	 live	 embedded	 in	 law,	 privileged	 or	 penalized	 by	
legal	 institutions;	 all	 our	 actions	 or	 inactions	 work	 to	 reinforce	 or	 change	 a	 legal	


















more	 states	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 more	 survivors	 of	 violence	 by	 same‐sex	 partners	 will	
undoubtedly	play	out	differently	in	court.	Likewise,	the	contradictory	forces	created	by	millions	
of	dollars	being	poured	into	marriage	and	fatherhood	promotion	programs	in	under‐resourced	







States.	What	 does	 exist	mostly	 ignores	 the	 possibility	 of	 violence	 and	 abuse	 due	 to	 incorrect	
assumptions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 abuse	 in	 the	 field	 of	 family	 studies	 and	 the	 overwhelming	
involvement	of	scholars	with	financial	and	professional	conflicts	of	interest.	There	is	a	real	need	
for	 research	 from	 critical	 criminologists	 whose	 income	 is	 not	 linked	 to	 paid	 testimony	 and	
whose	 lines	 of	 inquiry	 are	 not	 dictated	 by	 federal	 funding	 which	 is	 increasingly	 focused	 on	
crude	performance	indicators.	
	
It	 is	 essential	 that	 critical	 criminologists	 address	 epistemological	 issues	 as	well.	 The	 creeping	
menace	of	poorly	conceived	‘evidence	based	practice’,	the	continuing	fetishisation	of	ostensibly	
representative	 sample	 surveys	 that	 are	 utterly	 unable	 to	 contribute	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	
violence	 and	 its	 effects,	 a	 lack	 of	 conversation	 with	 scholars	 in	 other	 fields	 that	 deal	 with	
violence	and	abuse,	and	criminologists’	unwillingness	 to	acknowledge	 the	politics	of	scholarly	
knowledge	production	are	central	concerns	for	those	of	us	who	seek	to	understand	violence	and	
responses	 to	 it.	We	 need	 to	 have	 honest	 conversations	 about	 the	 persistent	 unwillingness	 to	
foreground	 consent	 in	 discussion	 about	 rape,	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	 sexism,	 reluctance	 to	 deal	
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with	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 in	 the	 family,	 idealization	 of	 heterosexual	 nuclear	 families,	 and	 the	
contradictory	 social	 norms	 promoting	 and	 proscribing	men’s	 and	women’s	 violence.	We	 also	
need	 to	 be	 cognizant	 of	 the	 certainty	 that	 self‐critique	will	 be	 appropriated	 in	 the	 service	 of	
backlash	efforts	to	eliminate	those	legal	remedies	and	resources	that	are	available,	with	specific	
risks	for	different	survivors	along	the	lines	of	established	social	hierarchies	(Pleck	1987;	Ptacek	





































































































Since	 the	 late	 1980s,	 an	 international	 group	of	 scholars	has	made	 some	key	 empirical	 and	
theoretical	 contributions	 to	 a	 rich	 social	 scientific	 understanding	 of	 various	 types	 of	
separation/divorce.	 Still,	 there	 is	much	more	 research	 to	be	done	and	more	 theories	 to	be	





Keeping	 up	with	 the	 rapidly	 growing	 social	 scientific	 literature	 on	woman	 abuse	 in	 intimate	
relationships	is	a	daunting	task.	Nearly	every	week,	most	of	our	colleagues	in	the	field,	receive	
announcements	 from	 Sage	 Publications	 about	 new	 articles	 in	 the	 Online	 First	 version	 of	 the	
journal	Violence	Against	Women.	This	is	because	it	is	one	of	the	most	successful	scholarly	outlets	
in	 the	 world,	 with	 12	 hard	 copy	 issues	 published	 each	 year.	 The	 editor,	 Dr.	 Claire	 Renzetti,	
recently	 told	 us	 that	 she	 receives	 over	 400	 submissions	 a	 year	 and	 the	 acceptance	 rate	 is	













more	 likely	 to	 experience	 more	 severe	 types	 of	 violence	 than	 their	 married	 counterparts	
(Brownridge	and	Halli	2001;	DeKeseredy	2007).		
	
It	 is	 also	 well	 known	 today	 that	 North	 American	 separated	 and	 divorced	 women	 are	 at	
significantly	 greater	 risk	 of	 being	 beaten,	 sexually	 abused,	 and	 even	 killed	 than	 are	 married	
women	 (Brownridge	 et	 al.	 2008;	DeKeseredy	 and	 Schwartz	 2009;	 Rennison,	DeKeseredy	 and	
Dragiewicz	2012).	In	fact,	the	process	of	exiting	a	marriage	or	cohabiting	relationship	is	one	of	
the	 most	 dangerous	 times	 for	 women	 (Brownridge	 2009;	 Dawson	 Bunge	 and	 Balde	 2009).	
Basile	 and	 Black	 (2011:	 119)	 correctly	 point	 out	 in	 their	 review	 of	 the	 separation/divorce	
assault	research	that,	‘Rage,	despair,	loss	of	control,	and	patriarchal	expectations	of	male	rights	












at	 elevated	 risk	 for	 violence	 compared	 to	married	women,	with	 separated	women	
having	 by	 the	 far	 the	 greatest	 risk	 for	 post‐separation	 violence.	 It	 appears	 that	
separated	women	have	as	much	as	thirty	times	the	likelihood,	and	divorced	women	




justice	 officials,	 shelter	 workers,	 and	 scores	 of	 others	 assert	 that	 abused	 women’s	 most	
important	 tool	 in	 the	 struggle	 to	 end	 their	 victimization	 is	 to	 divorce	 or	 separate	 from	 their	
partners.	Most	battered	women	make	 ‘dangerous	exits’,	but	separation	or	divorce	alone	often	
does	not	make	 them	safer.	Thus,	women	 ‘fleeing	 the	house	of	horrors’	 require	more	effective	
and	 creative	 solutions	 (DeKeseredy	 and	 Schwartz	 2009;	 Sev'er	 2002).	 Developing	 such	
initiatives,	though,	requires	a	richer	social	scientific	understanding	of	woman	abuse	during	and	
after	separation/divorce.	The	main	objective	of	this	paper,	then,	is	to	help	achieve	this	goal	by	





the	 social	 scientific	 community	 does	 not	 have	 is	 an	 agreed‐upon	 firm	 definition	 of	
separation/divorce.	Nonetheless,	 unlike	 debates	 about	whether	 to	 use	narrow	or	 broad	or	 to	
employ	 gender‐neutral	 or	 gender‐specific	 definitions	 of	 violence	 in	 intimate	 heterosexual	
relationships,	 the	disagreements	 among	 scholars	 over	 conceptualizing	 separation/divorce	 are	
not	 as	 ‘old,	 fierce,	 and	 unlikely	 to	 be	 resolved	 in	 the	 near	 future’	 (Kilpatrick	 2004:	 1218).3	
Actually,	 those	who	study	separation/divorce	assault	admire	 each	other’s	work	 and	 routinely	
exchange	ideas	and	publications.	Even	so,	they	remain	divided	into	two	camps	when	it	comes	to	
defining	 the	 concept	 of	 separation/divorce.	 This	 is	 hardly	 a	 trivial	 concern	 because	 how	
relationships	 and	 behaviours	 are	 defined	 have	 major	 effects	 on	 the	 lives	 of	 many	 people.	
Further,	definitions	are	used	as	tools	in	social	struggles.	Together	with	poverty,	unemployment,	
terrorism,	 and	 other	 social	 problems,	 violence	 against	 women	 is	 a	 highly	 politicized	 topic	 of	
social	 scientific	 inquiry,	 and	 definitions	 of	 concepts	 related	 to	 this	 harm	 reflect	 this	 reality	
(DeKeseredy	and	Schwartz	2011;	Dragiewicz	and	DeKeseredy	2012;	Ellis	1987).	
	
Most	 separation/divorce	 assault	 studies	 assume	 couples	 must	 live	 apart	 to	 be	 separated	 or	
divorced.4	Consequently,	the	large	number	of	beatings,	rapes,	and	other	attacks	that	occur	when	
a	 woman	 emotionally	 exits	 a	 relationship	 but	 remains	 in	 the	 home,5	 decides	 to	 leave	 her	
partner,	 or	 when	 she	 makes	 an	 unsuccessful	 escape	 from	 a	 ‘dangerous	 domain’	 are	 not	
measured	(DeKeseredy	in	press;	Johnson	1996;	Ptacek	1999).	For	example,	Brownridge	(2009:	
56)	restricts	his	analysis	to	‘post‐separation	violence’,	which	he	defines	as	‘any	type	of	violence	
perpetrated	 by	 a	 former	married	 or	 cohabiting	male	 partner	 or	 boyfriend	 subsequent	 to	 the	
moment	of	physical	 separation’.	The	problems	with	definitions	 such	as	Brownridge’s	 are	well	
documented	 elsewhere	 (see	 DeKeseredy	 in	 press;	 DeKeseredy	 and	 Schwartz	 2009),	 but	 it	 is	
necessary	to	revisit	two	concerns.	First,	narrow	conceptualizations	contribute	to	the	perennial	
problem	 of	 underreporting.	 Consequently,	 an	 entire	 survey	 can	 be	 discredited	 if	 researchers	












relationship	 right	 now.	 This	 may	 be	 for	 financial	 or	 economic	 reasons,	 or	 because	 she	 was	
unable	to	make	adequate	arrangements	to	care	for	her	children,	or	for	a	variety	of	other	reasons	
(Davies	2011;	Renzetti	2011).	As	a	 result,	 some	 feminist	 scholars	do	not	view	separation	and	





definitions	 like	 Brownridge’s	 (2009)	 have	 a	 positive	 element	 that	 other	 feminist	
conceptualizations	have	so	far	not	addressed,	which	is	recognizing	that	dating	breakups	are	also	










from	 reading	 the	 separation/divorce	 assault	 literature.	 This	 body	 of	 knowledge	 is	 guilty	 of	
heteronormativity,	 but	 the	 same	 can	 be	 said	 about	 the	 bulk	 of	 the	 empirical,	 theoretical,	 and	
policy	work	on	any	type	of	intimate	partner	violence.	Needless	to	say,	there	is	violence	in	same‐
















measuring	 the	 incidence,	 prevalence,	 correlates,	 and	 consequences	 of	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 harms	
women	endure	in	ongoing	relationships	and	in	the	process	of	or	after	leaving	intimate	partners	
is	now	an	international	concern.	Even	so,	the	 field	would	not	be	where	it	 is	today	without	the	
methodological	 advances	made	 in	 the	 US	 Canadian	work	 also	 had	 a	major	 impact	 on	 survey	














expanding	 on	 the	 scope	 of	 an	 earlier	 US	 study	 of	 campus	 sexual	 assault	 (Koss,	 Gidycz,	 and	
Wisniewski	1987).	Additionally,	Canadian	scholars	like	Brownridge	(2009)	are	at	the	forefront	
of	examining	violence	against	women	during	and	after	separation/divorce.	 In	 fact,	 the	bulk	of	














type	 of	 woman	 abuse	 than	 those	 derived	 from	 self‐report	 surveys	 administered	 to	 men	
(DeKeseredy	 et	 al.	 2004).	 Still,	 the	 research	 community	 is	 now	 at	 the	 point	 where	 it	 can	
confidently	 state	 that	 a	 substantial	 number	 of	 women	 experience	 separation/divorce	 assault	
and	 hence	 it	 is	 time	 to	 use	 some	 different	 techniques	 to	 yield	 better	 answers	 to	 some	 very	
important	questions,	such	as	‘Why	Does	He	Do	That?’	(Bancroft	2002).	This	is	not	to	say,	though,	
that	interviewing	women	or	administering	victimization	surveys	do	not	help	achieve	this	goal.	
They	 certainly	 do	 and	 DeKeseredy	 and	 colleagues’	 interviews	 with	 43	 rural	 southeast	 Ohio	
women	 uncovered	 some	 rich	 information	 on	 the	 characteristics	 of	 men	 who	 engage	 in	
separation/divorce	assault.	The	women	revealed	 that	 receiving	patriarchal	male	peer	support	
for	abuse,	the	consumption	of	pornography,	drugs	and	alcohol,	and	an	adherence	to	the	ideology	
of	 familial	 patriarchy	 were	 strongly	 associated	 with	 their	 ex‐partners’	 abusive	 behaviors	
(DeKeseredy	and	 Joseph	2006;	DeKeseredy	and	Schwartz	2009;	DeKeseredy,	Schwartz,	Fagen	
and	 Hall	 2006).	 Kurz’s	 (1995)	 interviews	 with	 129	 divorced	 Philadelphia	 women	 produced	
some	 similar	 findings.	 Nonetheless,	 interviews	with	men	 are	 in	 short	 supply	 and	 so	 are	 self‐
report	surveys	administered	to	men.	Terry	Arendell	 (1995:	3)	 is	one	of	 less	 than	a	handful	of	




perceptions	 and	 actions	 persists	 even	 though	 divorce	 research	 increased	
dramatically	over	the	past	several	decades,	as	the	divorce	rate	remained	strikingly	
high.	This	neglect	of	men,	and	particularly	of	divorced	fathers,	 is	not	unique	but	 is	





Another	 relevant	 point	 to	 keep	 in	mind	 is	 that	 separation/divorce	 is	 a	major	 determinant	 of	
intimate	 femicide	 in	 the	 US,	 which	 a	 country	 characterized	 by	 a	 vast	 amount	 of	 homicide	






Self‐report	data	 from	men	will	 tell	us	much	about	what	drives	 them	to	be	abusive	and	enable	
researchers	 to	 more	 effectively	 test	 some	 of	 the	 theories	 of	 separation/divorce	 recently	
developed	by	DeKeseredy	et	al.	 (2004)	and	DeKeseredy,	Donnermeyer,	Schwartz,	Tunnell	and	
Hall	 (2007).	 Several	 hypotheses	 derived	 from	 them	 could	 easily	 be	 tested	 using	measures	 of	
male	 peer	 support	 developed	 by	 DeKeseredy	 (1988),	 Smith’s	 (1990)	 familial	 patriarchal	
ideology	 items,	 as	well	 as	 other	measures.	Much	 support	 for	 parts	 of	 the	 above	 theories	 are	
found	in	interview	data	collected	in	rural	Ohio	by	DeKeseredy	and	his	colleagues,	but	there	has	
been	 no	 attempt	 to	 determine	 their	 explanatory	 power	 using	 quantitative	 techniques.	
Essentially,	in	recent	years,	Block	and	DeKeseredy	(2007)	and	Brownridge	(2009)	are	the	only	
scholars	 to	 be	 guided	 by	 theoretical	 perspectives	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 statistical	 data	 on	




is	 an	 attempt	 to	explain	marital	 status	variations	 in	woman	abuse.	Ecological	models	address	
multiple	 levels	 of	 influence	 and	 maintain	 that	 violence	 against	 women	 should	 be	 examined	
within	 a	 nested	 set	 of	 environmental	 contexts	 or	 systems	 (Graham‐Berman	 and	 Gross	 2008;	
Dragiewicz	2011).	
	
In	 sum,	a	variety	of	methods	enhances	a	 social	 scientific	understanding	of	 separation/divorce	






from	 the	 past	 that	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account.	 If	 the	 pioneering	 woman	 abuse	 survey	
researcher	Michael	D.	Smith	(1987:	185)	were	alive	today,	he	would	surely	repeat	what	he	said	
26	years	ago:	‘Obtaining	accurate	estimates	of	woman	abuse	in	the	population	at	large	remains	
perhaps	 the	 biggest	methodological	 challenge	 in	 survey	 research	 on	 this	 topic’.	 Regardless	 of	
how	 carefully	 a	 survey	 is	 crafted,	 many	 abused	 women	 and	 male	 offenders	 do	 not	 disclose	
incidents	 because	 of	 embarrassment,	 fear	 of	 reprisal,	 ‘forward	 and	 backward	 telescoping’,	
deception,	 and	memory	 error	 (DeKeseredy	 and	 Schwartz	1998;	 Schwartz	 2000;	 Smith	1994).	




These	 problems	 still	 plague	 woman	 abuse	 researchers	 and	 they	 are	 perhaps	 getting	 worse	
because	of	the	neglect	to	answer	Smith’s	(1987,	1994)	call	for	the	use	of	supplementary	open‐	
and	 closed	 ended	 questions.	 While	 a	 growing	 cadre	 of	 survey	 researchers	 employ	 multiple	
quantitative	 measures	 of	 abuse	 (see	 Jacquier	 et	 al.	 2011),	 in	 numerous	 studies,	 many	
respondents	 are	 not	 given	 additional	 opportunities	 to	 disclose	 abusive	 experiences	 and	 this	
problem	is	endemic	to	survey	research	on	separation/divorce	assault.	At	the	outset,	people	may	




by	 an	 interviewer	 or	 asked	 to	 complete	 self‐report,	 supplementary,	 open‐	 and	 closed‐ended	
questions,	some	silent	or	forgetful	participants	will	reveal	having	been	victimized	or	abusive.11	
For	example,	Smith	(1987)	found	that	some	silent	or	forgetful	female	victims	(N	=	60)	changed	
their	 answers	 when	 asked	 again	 in	 different	 words	 by	 a	 telephone	 interviewer.	 Belated	










reluctant	 to	 talk	 about	 their	 experiences.	 But	 we’re	 also	 a	 bit	 worried	 that	 we	
haven’t	asked	the	right	questions.	So	now	that	you	have	had	a	chance	to	think	about	
the	topics,	have	you	had	any	(any	other)	experiences	in	which	you	were	physically	
and/or	 sexually	 harmed	 by	 your	 dating	 partners	 while	 you	 attended	 college	 or	
university?	Please	provide	this	information	in	the	space	below.	
	
On	 top	of	 giving	 respondents	more	opportunities	 to	 reveal	 information	 about	 abusive	events,	
supplementary	 open‐ended	 questions	 build	 researcher‐respondent	 rapport	 and	 respond	 to	
well‐founded	 concerns	 about	 the	 hierarchical	 nature	 of	 ‘male‐stream’,	 positivist	 research	
(Schwartz	2000).	According	to	Smith	(1994:	115):		
	
For	 one	 thing,	 an	 open	 format	 may	 reduce	 the	 threat	 of	 a	 question	 on	 violence,	
because	it	allows	the	respondent	to	qualify	her	response,	to	express	exact	shades	of	
meaning,	 rather	 than	 forcing	her	 to	choose	 from	a	number	of	possibly	 threatening	
alternatives.	For	another,	open	questions	may	reduce	the	power	imbalance	inherent	
in	 the	 interview	 situation	 (the	 relationship	 between	 researcher	 and	 researched	
parallels	 the	 hierarchical	 nature	 of	 traditional	male‐female	 relationships)	 because	
open	 questions	 encourage	 interaction	 and	 collaboration	 between	 interviewer	 and	




Supplementary	 open‐ended	 questions	 and	 other	 qualitative	 techniques	 used	 in	 surveys	 have	
proven	to	be	successful.	However,	these	approaches	are	typically	given	short	shrift	compared	to	
quantitative	ones	in	journal	articles	and	book	chapters	that	offer	in‐depth	reviews	of	methods	
used	 to	glean	woman	abuse	data.14	 It	 seems,	at	 least	 in	 the	North	America,	 that	Smith’s	path‐
breaking	efforts	to	improve	the	quality	of	survey	research	are	forgotten	or	dismissed.	Even	so,	it	
would	be	remiss	not	to	state	that	the	US	National	Crime	Victimization	Survey	(NCVS)	includes	
‘incident	 narratives’,	 which	 are	 open‐ended	 responses	 to	 a	 final	 question	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	
survey	that	asks	participants	to	report	what	happened	to	them.	Albeit	qualitative	in	nature,	the	
narratives	are	not	the	actual	victims’	verbatim	accounts,	but	rather	statements	transcribed	by	















A	 somewhat	 similar	 problem	 plagues	 US	 separation/divorce	 assault	 research.	 For	 instance,	
Fleury,	Sullivan	and	Bybee	(2000),	as	well	as	Block	and	DeKeseredy	(2007),	included	categories	
like	 African	 American,	White,	 Asian,	 Hispanic/Latina,	 in	 their	 interview	 schedules.	 Of	 course,	
almost	every	US	study	of	any	type	of	crime	or	other	social	problem	takes	the	same	approach.	It	
is	 subject	 to	 much	 criticism	 because	 these	 and	 other	 ‘pan‐ethnic	 categories’	 are	 treated	 as	
homogenous	groups	but	in	reality	include	‘diverse	subpopulations	that	have	very	distinct	ethnic,	
religious,	 historical,	 philosophical	 and	 social	 values	 that	 may	 have	 important	 roles	 in	 the	
dynamics	 of’	 violence	 against	women	 (Perilla	 et	 al.	 2011:	 205).	Needless	 to	 say,	 not	 all	 Black	
people	 are	 the	 same	 and	 there	 are	 differences	 in	 rates	 of	 violence	 among	African‐Americans,	
African‐Caribbeans,	 and	 Africans.	 As	 well,	 there	 are	 variations	 in	 rates	 of	 violence	 among	
different	Aboriginal	groups	(Aldarondo	and	Castro‐Fernandex	2011;	Aldarondo	and	Fernandex	
2008;	DeKeseredy,	Dragiewicz	and	Rennsion	2012).	As	far	as	we	know,	the	National	Alcohol	and	
Family	 Violence	 Survey	 is	 the	 only	 major	 US	 survey	 specifically	 designed	 to	 overcome	 or	




US	 studies.	 These	 women	 are	 often	 classified	 as	 ‘White’	 in	 large	 surveys,	 obscuring	 issues	
related	to	ethnicity	and	immigration	status.	Related	to	these	pitfall	is	that	some	common	types	








of	 violence	 against	 ethnic/minority	 women	 as	 ‘Others’.	 As	 Aronson	 Fontes	 and	 McCloskey	
(2011:	152)	remind	us,	‘there	are	few	forms	of	violence	that	belong	exclusively	to	any	particular	













state	 of	 social	 scientific	 knowledge	 about	 separation/divorce	 assault	 is	 to	 use	 ‘a	 creative	
combination	of	measures	and	methods’	(Jacquier	et	al.	2011:	43).		
	
No	 matter	 what	 research	 techniques,	 research	 sites,	 or	 samples	 are	 selected,	 it	 is	 equally	





They	 can	 help	 inform	 the	 development	 of	 effective	 policies	 that	 prevent	 departures	 from	
intimate	relationships	from	becoming	dangerous	exits	(Block	and	DeKeseredy	2007).		
	
Above	 all,	 when	 doing	 any	 type	 of	 social	 scientific	 work	 on	 separation/divorce	 assault,	
researchers	 should	 always	 remember	 that	 exiting	 an	 intimate	 relationship	 demands	 an	
incredible	 amount	of	energy	and	 resolve,	but	 leaving	an	abusive	partner	 requires	much	more	
strength	and	bravery	 (Walker,	Logan,	 Jordan	and	Campbell	2004).	 It	 is	 also	vital	 to	 recognize	
that	 the	 people	 who	 are	 or	 who	 have	 been	 abused	 are	 more	 important	 than	 the	 data	 they	
















5		 Emotional	 exiting	 is	 a	woman’s	 denial	 or	 restriction	 of	 sexual	 relations	 and	 other	 intimate	 exchanges	 (Ellis	 &	










































































































































































































In	2010	a	couple	 in	Cairns	were	charged,	and	 later	 found	not	guilty,	of	 illegally	obtaining	a	
medical	 abortion	 through	 the	 use	 of	 medication	 imported	 from	 overseas.	 The	 court	 case	
reignited	the	contentious	debate	surrounding	the	illegality	and	social	acceptance	of	abortion	
in	 Queensland,	 Australia.	 Based	 on	 a	 critical	 discourse	 analysis	 of	 150	 online	 news	media	
articles	 covering	 the	 Cairns	 trial,	 this	 paper	 argues	 that	 the	 media	 shapes	 perceptions	 of	
deviance	 and	 stigma	 in	 relation	 to	 abortion	 through	 the	 use	 of	 language.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	
Cairns	couple	were	positioned	as	deviant	for	pursuing	abortion	on	the	basis	that	they	were	
rejecting	 the	social	norm	of	motherhood.	This	paper	 identifies	 three	key	 themes	evident	 in	
the	 articles	 analysed	 which	 contribute	 to	 shaping	 the	 construction	 of	 deviance	 –	 the	
humanising	of	 the	 foetus,	 the	stereotyping	of	 the	traditional	 female	role	of	mother,	and	the	
demonising	 of	 women	 who	 choose	 abortion.	 This	 paper	 argues	 that	 the	 use	 of	 specific	






Simone	 Leach	 and	 her	 partner,	 21‐year‐old,	 Sergie	 Brennan.	 As	 part	 of	 an	 ongoing	 murder	
investigation,	 police	were	 routinely	 searching	houses	 in	 the	 area	 for	witnesses	 or	 informants	
(Betts	2009:	25).	During	the	search,	police	found	empty	blister	packets	and	instructions	written	














both	 charges	 on	 14	 October	 2010.	 While	 the	 couple	 were	 both	 acquitted,	 the	 court	 case	
reignited	the	contentious	debate	surrounding	the	illegality	and	social	acceptance	of	abortion	in	
Queensland.	Public	outrage	over	the	case	increased	pressure	on	the	Queensland	Government	to	





2823	 of	 the	 Criminal	 Code,	 giving	 doctors	 the	 same	 legal	 protection	 to	 carry	 out	 medical	






about	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	media	 depicts	 and	 discusses	 abortion	 and	 those	who	 choose	 to	
abort.	 The	 couple	 involved	 in	 the	 Cairns	 case	 were	 faced	with	 significant	 attention	 from	 the	
media,	 as	well	 as	 being	 pursued	 by	 the	 police	 and	 the	 legal	 system.	 In	 addition	 to	 numerous	
media	articles	condemning	their	actions,	the	media	published	Leach	and	Brennan’s	names	and	




explores	how	media	discourses	 socially	construct	and	 label	 those	who	abort,	arguing	 that	 the	
use	 of	 language	 and	 key	 terms	 in	media	 coverage	 during	 the	 Cairns	 Trial	 demonstrates	 that	
those	who	abort	are	frequently	stigmatised	as	deviant.	Firstly	the	importance	of	 language	and	
labelling	 in	 media	 coverage	 of	 social	 issues	 is	 discussed,	 followed	 by	 an	 examination	 of	 key	
terms	and	phrases	consistently	used	in	the	media	representation.	It	is	argued	that	the	choice	of	
terms	such	as	‘baby’	and	‘mother’	align	more	closely	with	a	pro‐life	ideology,	and	results	in	the	




Language,	 including	 conversation	 and	 textual	 practises,	 has	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 constructing	
social	 meaning	 and	 political	 identities,	 as	 they	 are	 shaped	 and	 reshaped	 through	 power	
struggles	(Torfin	2011:	192‐197).	The	social	construction	of	women	who	choose	to	abort	is	thus	





2007;	 Betts	 2009;	 Douglas	 2009)	 and	 the	 debate	 between	 pro‐life	 and	 pro‐choice	 beliefs	
(Coleman	1988;	Singer	1993;	Dean	and	Allanson	2004;	Brown	2004;	Wyatt	and	Hughes	2009).	
The	overarching	conclusion	of	the	literature	is	that	the	variations	in	abortion	law	state	to	state	
create	 confusion	 and	 uncertainty,	 and	 that	 both	 policy	 and	media	 representations	 have	 been	
heavily	influenced	by	a	pro‐life	ideology.	A	notable	gap	in	the	existing	literature	on	abortion	is	
the	relation	to	deviance	from	a	labelling	perspective.	While	abortion	has	been	linked	to	deviance	
(Rosen	 and	 Martindale	 1980),	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 deviance	 has	 been	 framed	 within	 a	









media	 in	 framing	 the	 discourse	 surrounding	 abortion.	 Instead,	 it	 was	 a	 reflection	 of	 two	 key	
points.	Firstly,	mainstream	news	articles	available	in	papers	are	also	being	published	online	and	




the	 Digital	 Economy	 2011:	 13).	 Secondly,	 the	 online	 archiving	 of	 news	 available	 in	 papers	




The	 150	 articles	 were	 located	 with	 key	 terms	 in	 internet	 search	 engines	 as	 well	 as	 online	
databases	with	all	duplications	being	removed.	The	majority	of	the	articles	(99	of	the	150	total	
of	 articles)	 were	 published	 by	 the	 Cairns	 Post,	 Australian	 Associated	 Press,	 Sydney	Morning	
Herald,	 ABC	 Online	 and	 The	 Australian.	 Qualitative	 content	 analysis	 was	 primarily	 used	 to	
analyse	the	data.	A	qualitative	approach	best	aligned	with	this	project	because	the	examination	
of	 texts	 for	analysis	enabled	a	critique	of	 the	 linguistic	choices	and	how	they	carry	 ideological	
meaning	(Fairclough	1995:	25).	This	preliminary	content	analysis	identified	key	words	in	order	
to	 demonstrate	 what	 language	 was	 being	 communicated	 to	 the	 reader.	 The	 content	 analysis	
involved	counting	of	key	terms	including	abort/ion,	miscarriage,	procedure,	baby,	fetus/foetus4,	
unborn,	and	mother.	The	 findings	of	 this	content	analysis	were	 then	 interpreted	using	critical	
discourse	 analysis	 in	 order	 to	 discover	 patterns	 and	 meanings	 reflecting	 or	 reinforcing	
hierarchies	 of	 power,	 injustice,	 and	 political	 or	 social	 change	 (Champion	 2006;	 Keating	 and	
Duranti	 2011).	 This	 project	 interpreted	 the	 communication	 using	 critical	 discourse	 analysis	
informed	by	deviance	 theory	 focusing	 on	how	 the	 language	 stigmatised	 abortion	 and	 created	
conceptions	of	deviance.	The	method	of	critical	discourse	analysis	was	therefore	used	to	analyse	




Throughout	 the	media	coverage	of	 the	Cairns	 trial,	 articles	 frequently	used	 the	 terms	 ‘foetus’,	
‘baby’,	 ‘child’,	or	 ‘unborn’	 in	discussing	abortion.	 In	the	construction	of	women	who	abort,	 the	
impact	 and	 importance	 of	 these	 terms	 differs	 greatly	 as	 they	 connote	 competing	 social	
responses	 to	 the	 decision	 to	 terminate	 a	 pregnancy.	 The	 word	 ‘foetus’	 appeared	 45	 times	
throughout	the	150	articles.	Meanwhile	the	more	emotive	terms	‘baby’	and	‘child’	appeared	45	
times	and	91	 times	 respectively	 throughout	 the	150	articles.	The	use	of	 the	words	 ‘baby’	and	
‘child’	are	more	likely	to	humanise	the	foetus	and	are	often	used	to	present	a	pro‐life	message,	
where	abortion	is	not	a	clinical	term	to	describe	the	termination	of	a	pregnancy,	but	rather	the	
killing	 of	 a	 baby/child	 (Singer	 1993;	 Carey	 and	 Newell	 2007).	 The	 taking	 of	 a	 human	 life	 is	








An	 example	 of	 how	 this	 negative	 construction	 is	 achieved	 is	 by	 associating	 the	 foetus	 with	




October	 2010.	 One	 excerpt	 states	 ‘The	 existing	 Queensland	 law	 on	 abortion	 maintains	 a	
consistent	message	to	adults	that	intentional	violence	against	their	offspring	is	never	justified,	
whether	 before	 or	 after	 birth’	 (Van	 Gend	 2010).	 The	 use	 of	 the	 phrase	 ‘intentional	 violence	
against	their	offspring’	presents	two	key	elements	of	a	pro‐life	message.	Firstly,	the	reference	to	
‘offspring’	 elevates	 the	 foetus	 to	 the	 equivalent	 status	 of	 a	 child,	 establishing	 the	 humanising	
elements	consistent	with	the	choice	of	the	word	‘baby’	in	much	of	the	media	coverage.	Secondly,	
the	 words	 ‘intentional	 violence’	 labels	 the	 woman	 procuring	 the	 abortion	 as	 violent	 and	
The	Cairns	Abortion	Trial:	Deviance,	Stigma	and	the	‘Spoiled	Identity’	
Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	2nd	International	Conference,	2013							61	
murderous.	Other	media	 stories	 also	positioned	women	who	abort	as	 guilty	of	violent	 crimes	
against	unborn	children.	The	Salt	Shakers,	a	Christian	pro‐life	action	group,	published	an	article	





abortion	 as	 murderers.	 This	 criminalises	 abortion	 and	 serves	 to	 further	 the	 construction	 of	
those	who	obtain	an	abortion	as	deviants.	
	
While	 these	 two	 examples	 are	 from	 declared	 Christian	 news	 sites,	 and	 therefore	 predictably	
select	 emotive	 language	 to	 invoke	 a	 pro‐life	 message,	 several	 examples	 can	 be	 found	 from	
mainstream	news	media	sites.	One	article	from	The	Australian	on	the	15th	October	2010	quotes	
‘the	jury	must	be	satisfied	beyond	reasonable	doubt	that	the	drugs	Ms	Leach	took	were	noxious	




‘anti‐infant’.	 The	 article	 included	 ‘foetus’	 four	 times	 and	 ‘infant’/‘baby’/‘child’	 seven	 times.	







Petrinec	 2010;	 Ackland	 2009).	 The	 legislation	 refers	 to	 those	who	 are	 liable	 as	 ‘women	with	
child’	 and	 that	 the	 charge	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	woman	whether	 she	 ‘is	 or	 not	 is	 not	with	 child’.	
While	 an	 argument	 can	 be	 clearly	 made	 that	 the	 Queensland	 legislation	 criminalises	 women	
who	 abort,	 by	 including	 it	 in	 the	 legislation	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	 it	 can	 also	 be	 said	 that	 the	
legislation	 further	 stigmatises	 those	who	abort	by	 referring	 to	 them	as	 ‘with	 child’.	 Arguably,	
each	 time	 the	 media	 refers	 to	 the	 legislation	 without	 paraphrasing	 it	 to	 select	 less	 emotive	




The	 casting	 of	women	who	 abort	 as	 committing	 violent,	murderous	 acts	 against	 children	 not	
only	acts	to	humanise	the	foetus,	and	criminalise	women,	but	also	further	constructs	abortion	as	
a	 deviant	 act	 and	 as	 a	 rejection	 of	 the	 traditional	 expectations	 of	motherhood.	 The	 language	
choice	of	many	of	the	media	articles	serves	to	embed	notions	of	femininity	as	intrinsically	linked	
to	 motherhood	 by	 persistently	 using	 the	 term	 ‘mother’	 instead	 of	 women	 when	 discussing	
abortion.	‘Mother’	is	referred	to	72	times	in	the	150	articles.	In	the	22	articles	by	a	single	source,	
the	Australian	Associated	Press	(which	are	published	on	multiple	news	sites),	‘mother’	appeared	




perspectives.	One	Australian	Associated	Press	 article	 reported	on	 the	 sign	of	 a	pro‐life	 activist	
that	read	‘Thank	your	mother	you	were	not	aborted’	(Martin	2010).	Referring	to	Tegan	Leach	in	
the	 articles	 as	 the	 mother	 humanises	 the	 foetus	 as	 a	 child	 waiting	 to	 be	 born.	 In	 this	
construction,	the	definition	of	a	mother	as	one	who	has	conceived	a	foetus,	rather	than	one	who	









An	 article	 that	 furthered	 the	 stereotyping	 of	 the	 traditional	 female	 role	 of	 motherhood	 was	
published	 by	 Cherish	 Life	 in	 October	 2010	 titled	 ‘Cairns	 abortion	 case	 restates	 principle	 of	











“essential	nature”	of	women’.	The	decision	to	use	the	term	 ‘mother’,	 rather	than	 ‘woman’,	and	




The	 use	 of	 language	 that	 demonises	 and	 isolates	women	who	 obtain	 an	 abortion	 can	 further	
position	 those	who	 abort	 as	 ‘spoiled’	 or	 ‘harmed’	 and	 therefore	 deviant	 from	 the	 norm.	 In	 a	
Brisbane	Times	article	published	on	the	14	October	2010,	the	Cherish	Life	Queensland	President	






which	 causes	 harm	 ‘physically,	mentally,	 spiritually	 and	 emotionally’.	 This	 language	positions	
these	as	the	consequences	facing	women	who	have	an	abortion.	
	






ways	 in	which	women’s	 bodies	 have	 been	 governed	over	 the	 centuries.	 For	 example,	women	
who	engage	in	sex	work	are	often	positioned	as	‘wounded’,	or	‘fallen’,	for	rejecting	expectations	
of	 femininity	 that	 protect	 sexual	 activity	 as	 something	 that	 should	 occur	 only	 in	 committed,	
heterosexual	relationships	where	procreation	is	a	possibility	(Agustin	2007).	 In	a	similar	way,	
women	 who	 have	 chosen	 to	 abort	 are	 positioned	 as	 ‘wounded’,	 for	 acting	 outside	 the	
expectations	of	women	as	mothers.	In	this	instance,	the	decision	to	procure	an	abortion	is	not	
only	a	rejection	of	motherhood,	but	also	a	rejection	of	sexual	activity	primarily	for	the	purposes	
of	 procreation.	 These	 actions	 challenge	 traditional	 conceptualisations	 of	 femininity,	 and	 also	
challenge	the	primacy	of	the	state	in	the	governing	of	women’s	bodies.	
	
The	 Queensland	 abortion	 law	 itself	 positions	 women	 who	 choose	 to	 abort	 as	 deviant,	 by	




surgery	 or	 medical	 treatment	 if	 it	 is	 to	 preserve	 the	 mother’s	 life	 (Betts	 2009:	 26).	 The	





life	 and	 death	 as	 rejecting	 the	norm	of	motherhood	 and	 femininity.	Kumar	 et	 al.	 (2009:	 629)	
states	 over‐simplifying	 abortion	 and	 not	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 complex	 circumstances	
possibly	surrounding	the	decision	to	abort,	assists	in	creating	‘a	category	of	“women	who	abort”	
as	deviant	from	the	norm’.	By	creating	this	concept	that	abortion	is	a	deviation	from	the	norm	of	






they	had	before,	while	 the	media	 coverage	of	 the	Cairns	 case	demonstrated	 that	women	who	
choose	to	abort	are	largely	stigmatised	for	their	choices.	The	choice	of	key	terms	such	as	‘baby’	










This	 analysis	 of	 the	 media	 portrayal	 of	 the	 Cairns	 trial	 clearly	 demonstrates	 how	 media	
discourses	 contribute	 to	 the	 stigmatisation	 and	 social	 construction	 of	 abortion	 as	 deviant.	 If	






1		 Section	225:	Any	woman	who,	with	 intent	 to	procure	her	own	miscarriage,	whether	she	 is	or	 is	not	with	child,	
unlawfully	administers	 to	herself	any	poison	or	other	noxious	 thing,	or	uses	any	 force	of	any	kind,	or	uses	any	
other	means	whatever,	or	permits	any	such	thing	or	means	to	be	administered	or	used	to	her,	is	guilty	of	a	crime	
and	is	liable	to	imprisonment	for	7	years.	
2		 Section	226:	 Supplying	drugs	or	 instruments	 to	procure	 an	 abortionAny	person	who	unlawfully	 supplies	 to	or	
procures	 for	 any	 person	 anything	whatever,	 knowing	 that	 it	 is	 intended	 to	 be	 unlawfully	 used	 to	 procure	 the	








out	medical	abortions	 through	the	prescription	of	drugs.	Section	282	of	 the	Criminal	Code	Act	1899	 (QLD)	 falls	
under	Chapter	27:	Duties	relating	to	the	preservation	of	human	life	and	now	states:	










4		 The	 spelling	 in	 this	 paper	 is	 ‘foetus’	 as	 most	 media	 articles	 reporting	 on	 the	 Cairns	 abortion	 trial	 used	 this	
spelling.	 The	 Oxford	 Dictionary	 online	 definition	 of	 fetus/foetus	 is	 “an	 unborn	 or	 unhatched	 offspring	 of	 a	
mammal,	in	particular,	an	unborn	human	more	than	eight	weeks	after	conception”	(2013).	In	the	context	of	the	




































































































































Covert	 recordings,	 from	hidden	 listening	devices	 and	other	 sources,	 feature	 as	 evidence	 in	
increasing	numbers	of	 criminal	 cases.	Due	 the	manner	of	 their	 recording,	 they	are	often	of	
extremely	poor	quality,	so	much	so	that	only	those	with	background	knowledge	of	the	case	
can	make	out	what	is	said.	Current	law	allows	police,	in	the	role	of	so‐called	‘ad	hoc	expert’,	to	





This	 paper	 outlines	 two	 experiments	 using	 hard‐to‐hear	 audio	 from	 a	 recent	murder	 trial,	
along	with	 an	 inaccurate	 police	 transcript	 that	 formed	 crucial	 evidence	 in	 the	 prosecution	
case.	 The	 results	 add	 weight	 to	 previous	 arguments	 that	 a	 caution	 from	 the	 judge	 is	
insufficient	 to	 prevent	 juries	 being	 ‘primed’	 to	 hear	 words	 suggested	 by	 an	 inaccurate	
transcript.	 Transcripts	 must	 be	 properly	 verified	 before	 they	 are	 presented	 to	 a	 jury.	
However,	 these	 experiments	 go	 further,	 demonstrating	 that,	 in	 this	 particular	 case,	 the	
inaccuracy	 of	 the	police	 transcript	 is	 readily	 apparent	 to	 people	who	are	 enabled	 to	 listen	
carefully	 to	 the	 audio.	 This	 raises	 the	 significant	 question:	 why	 did	 no	 one,	 from	 either	
prosecution	or	defence,	challenge	this	manifestly	 inaccurate	police	transcript?	The	answers	
point	to	serious	failings	in	our	legal	system’s	handling	of	hard‐to‐hear	covert	recordings	used	
as	 evidence	 in	 criminal	 cases.	 It	 is	 suggested	 that	 lawyers	 take	 a	more	 critical	 attitude	 to	





The	 1980s	 saw	 mounting	 concern	 about	 courts	 accepting	 –	 with	 no	 more	 evidence	 than	 a	
detective’s	 say‐so	 –	 that	 a	 suspect	 had	 given	 a	 ‘verbal	 confession’	 (Wood	 1997).	 Widely	
publicised	 reforms	 in	 the	 1990s	 prevented	 this	 kind	 of	 ‘verballing’,	 by	 requiring	 assertions	
about	 what	 a	 suspect	 may	 or	 may	 not	 have	 said	 to	 police	 to	 be	 backed	 up	 by	 an	 electronic	
recording	 (Dixon	2008).	What	 is	 less	well	 known	 is	 that	 the	 same	era	brought	other	 changes	
with	 the	unintended	effect	of	 creating	a	new	path	by	which	police	can	put	words	 in	suspects’	
mouths	–	without	even	 intending	 to	do	 so.	The	context	was	 increasing	use	of	 covert	 listening	
devices.	These	can	provide	very	useful	evidence.	Unfortunately,	however,	 the	audio	 is	often	of	
extremely	 poor	 quality,	 to	 the	 extent	 background	knowledge	 of	 the	 case	 is	 need	 to	make	out	
















The	 present	 paper	 puts	 the	 focus,	 not	 on	 the	 jury,	 but	 on	 the	 lawyers	who	 allow	misleading	
and/or	inaccurate	police	transcripts	to	be	accepted	as	reliable	accounts	of	what	was	said.	Based	







day.	 After	 several	 weeks,	 police	 arrested	 the	 son,	 who	 eventually	 confessed	 to	 the	 murder,	
claiming	the	grandfather	had	repeatedly	humiliated	and	abused	him.	A	few	days	later,	the	father	
was	arrested.	A	conversation	between	father	and	son,	recorded	by	a	covert	listening	device,	was	
alleged	 by	 police	 to	 include	 a	 confession	 showing	 the	 father	 had	 been	 an	 accomplice	 in	 the	
murder.	The	half‐hour	recording	was	of	extremely	poor	quality,	but	was	nevertheless	admitted	
unopposed	 as	 evidence	 –	 along	with	 a	 police	 transcript,	 presented	 to	 the	 jury	with	 a	 caution	






misleading	 in	a	number	of	ways.	A	small	section	of	 the	audio	and	transcript	were	used	as	 the	
basis	 of	 two	 experiments.	 In	 the	 first,	 participants	 heard	 the	 audio	 without	 background	
knowledge	 of	 the	 case,	 while	 in	 the	 second,	 context	 was	 provided	 before	 the	 audio	 was	
presented.		
	
The	 experiments	 used	 an	 online	 survey	 tool	 (Qualtrics)	 enabling	 participants	 to	 listen	 to	 the	




















whispered,	urgent	 tone,	and	 the	 son	responds	several	 times	with	 ‘mm’,	but	 few	words	can	be	
heard	 with	 any	 confidence.	 The	 material	 would	 likely	 have	 been	 evaluated	 by	 a	 phonetics	
expert,	 if	 called,	 as	 ‘untranscribable’;	 i.e.	 while	 interpretations	might	 be	 offered	 none	 can	 be	




















The	 experiment	 also	 used	 an	 alternative	 interpretation	 of	 the	 audio,	 shown	 as	 Transcript	 2	
(Table	2).	This	differs	from	Transcript	1	only	in	Phrase	3.	It	is	important	in	understanding	the	
results	 of	 the	 experiments	 to	 be	 clear	 that	 this	 transcript	 is	 not	 suggested	 as	 an	 accurate	












Experiment	1	started	by	presenting	 the	audio	 to	both	groups	with	no	 information	beyond	the	
fact	it	was	a	covert	recording	from	a	real	murder	trial,	and	asking	participants	what	they	heard.	



















no	 transcript),	 then	 twice	 with	 transcripts	 differing	 only	 in	 Phrase	 3.	 Chart	 1	 presents	 the	
percentage	of	participants	who	agreed	with	each	phrase	of	the	transcript	in	open	condition,	and	
upon	first	and	second	presentation	of	the	transcript.	Phrase	5,	You	know	what	I	mean,	was	heard	
by	 about	 one‐third	 of	 participants	 in	 open	 condition,	 and	 by	 nearly	 three‐quarters	 with	 the	
transcript.	 Phrases	 1,	 2	 and	 4	 were	 heard	 by	 no	 one	 in	 open	 condition,	 but	 as	 soon	 as	 the	
transcript	was	presented,	around	half	the	participants	claimed	to	hear	the	words	suggested	for	
each	phrase.	The	 latter	 is	a	 typical	 ‘priming’	effect	 for	hard‐to‐hear	audio	(Fraser	2003).	With	
priming,	 by	 a	 transcript	 or	 context,	material	 that	 seems	 uninterpretable	 on	 its	 own	 suddenly	






















































Chart	2	 shows	how	many	participants	offered	 interpretations	of	Phrase	3	 in	 each	 category	 in	











Having	 interpreted	 the	 audio	 in	 open	 condition,	 participants	 were	 shown	 their	 group’s	
suggested	and	alternative	transcripts	(which	differed	only	in	the	crucial	Phrase	3).	In	Group	1,	
who	received	PACT	first,	27%	agreed	with	that	interpretation,	while	in	Group	2,	who	received	
PAYBACK	 first,	35%	agreed	with	 their	 transcript.	As	shown	 in	Chart	1,	both	PACT	(solid	 line)	
and	 PAYBACK	 (dashed	 line)	 were	 far	 less	 plausible	 interpretations	 than	 any	 of	 the	 other	
phrases.	
	
Participants’	 reaction	 to	 their	alternative	 transcripts	confirmed	 the	 implausibility	of	 the	PACT	
interpretation.	Group	1,	having	 seen	 the	PACT	suggestion,	preferred	 the	PAYBACK	alternative	
when	it	was	presented	(43%	compared	to	27%).	However,	Group	2,	having	seen	the	PAYBACK	





Participants	 who	 disagreed	 with	 the	 transcripts	 were	 invited	 to	 provide	 their	 own	
interpretation	 in	 a	 comments	 box.	 These	 interpretations	were	 coded	 as	 described	 in	 Table	 4.	
Chart	 3	 shows	 that	 all	 27%	of	Group	1	who	 initially	 agreed	 to	 the	 PACT	phrase	when	 it	was	
suggested,	abandoned	that	interpretation	when	the	PAYBACK	phrase	was	suggested,	with	57%	
offering	 the	 PAYBACK	 phrase	 or	 something	 similar	 (PAYBACK	 SIM),	 and	 none	 suggesting	
anything	 similar	 to	 the	PACT	phrase.	 For	Group	2,	 50%	of	 participants	 initially	 either	 agreed	
with	 the	 PAYBACK	 suggestion	 (35%),	 or	 provided	 a	 similar	 interpretation	 (PAYBACK	 SIM	 =	
15%).	No	one	who	disagreed	with	PAYBACK	provided	PACT.	When	this	group	was	shown	the	


















PACT PACT	SIM PAYBACK PAYBACK	SIM OTHER NOTHING
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The	 key	 observation	 from	 Experiment	 1	 is	 that	 PACT	 is	 not	 only	 an	 inaccurate	 but	 also	 an	
implausible	 transcription	 of	 Phrase	 3.	 No	 one	 ever	 heard	 the	 ‘pact’	 phrase	without	 it	 having	
been	 explicitly	 suggested.	 Its	 priming	 effect	 is	 also	 remarkably	 low	 and	 non‐persistent,	 with	
even	 those	 few	 who	 initially	 accepted	 it,	 readily	 abandoning	 it	 when	 an	 alternative	 was	
suggested.	The	relatively	high	acceptance	of	PAYBACK	and	PAYBACK	SIM	in	all	conditions	(even	
in	the	 face	of	priming	with	PACT)	 indicates	 this	 is	a	more	plausible	 interpretation	than	PACT.	
That	 is	 not	 an	 indication	 that	 PAYBACK	 is	 an	 accurate	 transcription	 (it	 is	 not),	 but	 does	 add	
weight	to	the	extreme	implausibility	of	PACT.		
	
In	 short,	 Experiment	 1	 shows	 the	 police	 transcript	 of	 Phrase	 3	 is	 so	 implausible	 that	 just	
listening	to	the	relevant	portion,	is	enough	to	demonstrate	its	inaccuracy	to	most	listeners.	This	
raises	 the	 serious	 question	 of	why	 the	manifest	 unreliability	 of	 the	 police	 transcript	was	 not	
picked	 up	 by	 either	 prosecution	 (who	 have	 the	 duty	 of	 fairness	 in	 relation	 to	 evidence)	 or	





Experiment	 2	 had	 43	 (different)	 participants,	 in	 one	 group.	 They	were	 recruited	 in	 a	 similar	
manner,	 and	 were	 similarly	 diverse	 in	 demographic	 characteristics,	 to	 Experiment	 1	
participants,	 and	 the	 same	audio	 and	 transcripts	were	used,	 in	 a	 broadly	 similar	 survey‐style	





















































his	 son	 to	 turn	himself	 in	 to	police,	 and	making	 a	pact	 to	 stand	by	him	no	matter	
what.	 The	 listening	 device	 recording	 is	 crucial	 evidence	 in	 deciding	which	 side	 is	







in	which	 the	 father	 discusses	 the	 pact.	 The	 recording	 is	 of	 very	 poor	 quality.	 You	
might	 not	 hear	 anything	 much	 except	 the	 word	 PACT,	 but	 try	 to	 make	 out	 the	






Transcript	 1	 was	 inaccurate,	 invited	 to	 listen	 to	 just	 the	 crucial	 phrase	 (2.5	 seconds),	 in	
isolation,	and	(with	no	alternative	 transcript)	asked	 to	 indicate	what	 they	now	heard.	Finally,	







As	 shown	 in	 Chart	 4,	 even	 with	 the	 very	 heavy	 contextual	 priming	 of	 Experiment	 2,	 no‐one	









































When	Transcript	1	was	provided,	65%	claimed	 to	hear	 exactly	 the	PACT	phrase	 (recall	 again	
that	 the	 acoustics	 contradict	 this	 interpretation).	 A	 further	 9%	 claimed	 to	 hear	 a	 different	
phrase	 including	 the	 word	 ‘pact’	 (PACT	 SIM).	 When	 participants	 were	 invited	 to	 doubt	
Transcript	1,	and	listen	just	to	Phrase	3	in	isolation,	the	number	hearing	either	PACT	or	PACT	
SIM	 fell	 to	a	 total	of	47%	(from	74%).	When	a	 specific	alternative	 (PAYBACK)	was	 suggested,	
7%	 still	 confidently	 claimed	 to	 hear	 PACT,	 while	 a	 further	 12%	 heard	 a	 different	 phrase	
including	the	word	‘pact’	(PACT	SIM).	
	
Consider	now	 the	 results	 for	 the	 alternative	 interpretation	of	Phrase	3,	PAYBACK.	Before	any	
transcript	 was	 offered,	 a	 total	 of	 21%	 heard	 either	 PAYBACK	 or	 PAYBACK	 SIM,	 despite	 the	
heavy	 contextual	 priming	 for	 PACT.	 After	 PACT	 was	 suggested,	 support	 for	 PAYBACK	 or	
PAYBACK	SIM	fell	to	a	total	of	9%.	However,	when	doubt	was	cast	on	the	PACT	interpretation,	






At	 the	 start	 of	 this	 experiment,	 and	 again	 at	 the	 end,	 participants	 were	 asked	 whether	 they	
thought	the	father	was	guilty.	At	first,	as	shown	in	Chart	5,	77%	said	they	had	no	opinion.	By	the	
end,	 only	 40%	 said	 they	 had	 no	 opinion,	with	 35%	 inclined	 to	 think	 he	was	 guilty	 and	 26%	
inclined	to	think	he	was	not	guilty	(and	various	reasons	offered	in	support	of	these	opinions).	In	








Experiment	 2	 confirms	 the	 manifest	 implausibility	 of	 the	 inaccurate	 police	 transcript	 of	 the	
crucial	phrase	demonstrated	by	Experiment	1.	However,	 it	shows	that	knowing	 the	context	of	
the	 case	makes	 listeners	 highly	 susceptible	 to	 overlooking	 that	 inaccuracy	 and	 accepting	 the	
police	 interpretation	 of	 what	 was	 said.	 Chart	 6	 demonstrates	 how	 the	 contextual	 priming	





































are	 heavily	 primed,	 first	 by	 contextual	 knowledge	 of	 the	 case,	 then	 by	 the	 transcript.	 An	
important	 difference	 from	 Experiment	 2	 is	 that	 it	 is	 rare	 for	 any	 alternative	 to	 the	 police	
transcript	 to	 be	 suggested,	 leaving	 listeners	 in	 a	 situation	 like	 that	 of	 ‘Experiment	 2,	 PACT	
transcript’	(Chart	5),	where	three‐quarters	of	listeners	accepted	the	inaccurate	police	transcript.	
(It	may	be	worth	noting	 explicitly	 that	 simply	 having	 an	 alternative	 transcript	 is	 no	panacea.	
Here,	 though	 seeing	 an	 alternative	was	useful	 in	 reducing	 confidence	 in	 the	police	 transcript,	
many	 participants	 simply	 accepted	 the	 alternative,	 itself	 inaccurate,	 and	 many	 more	 were	
influenced	by	it.	Remarkably	few	gave	the	right	answer,	which,	in	this	case,	is	that	the	audio	is	
uninterpretable.	 Listeners	 lacking	 training	 in	 phonetic	 science	 are	 unable	 to	 make	 reliable	
judgments	on	transcripts	of	poor	quality	audio.)	
	
In	 fact,	 the	 position	 of	 lawyers	 is	 typically	 far	 worse	 than	 that	 of	 these	 participants.	 The	
experiment	presented	a	tiny	portion	excised	from	the	half‐hour	recording,	with	a	special	player	
enabling	 participants	 to	 focus	 on	 individual	 phrases,	 and	 a	 guided	 sequence	 of	 listening	
experiences.	 Such	 facilities,	 of	 course,	 are	 rarely	 available	 in	 legal	 cases.	 Without	 them,	 few	
untrained	 individuals	 can	 even	 locate	 relevant	 portions	 within	 a	 half‐hour	 recording	 of	 this	






It	 is	surely	understandable,	 then,	 if	 lawyers,	 lacking	appropriate	 facilities	and	 time	 for	 critical	




























Finally,	 even	 with	 the	 necessary	 facilities	 and	 time,	 careful	 listening	 results	 only	 in	 an	
interpretation	not	 the	correct	 interpretation.	 In	the	experiments,	many	participants	expressed	
confidence	in	their	own	interpretations	–	unaware	that	others	had	come	with	equal	confidence	
to	very	different	interpretations.	For	all	these	reasons	and	more,	evaluating	transcripts	of	hard‐




Covert	 recordings	 and	 police	 transcripts	 are	 used	 as	 evidence	 in	 ever‐increasing	 numbers	 of	







this	 new	 form	 of	 ‘verballing’	 requires	 individuals	 at	 all	 levels	 and	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 our	







































Queensland	 legislation	 currently	 defines	 two	 legally	 recognised	 forms	 of	 prostitution:	 sex	
work	conducted	 in	a	 licensed	brothel;	or,	 sex	work	conducted	privately	by	a	sole	operator.	
Despite	 prostitution’s	 legality	 in	 these	 contexts,	 it	 continues	 to	 be	 heavily	 controlled	 and	
restricted	 by	 authorities,	 while	 also	 being	 rejected	 by	 surrounding	 communities.	 Such	
resistance	towards	prostitution	is	demonstrated	in	Queensland	where	over	200	towns	with	
populations	 of	 less	 than	 25,000	 have	 been	 successful	 in	 applying	 for	 exemption	 from	 the	
development	 of	 licensed	 brothels	 in	 those	 jurisdictions	 (Prostitution	 Licensing	 Authority	
2012).	 Queensland’s	 legislative	 acknowledgement	 of	 prostitution	 as	 a	 legal	 act,	 while	
simultaneously	 allowing	 small	 communities	 to	 reject	 such	 activity,	 seems	 somewhat	
contradictory.	 This	 paper	 will	 provide	 a	 theoretical	 examination	 of	 common	 community	
objections	 to	 prostitution	 in	 modern	 society,	 determining	 whether	 such	 attitudes	 are	
applicable	to	communities	 in	rural	and	regional	Queensland	towns.	Additionally,	 this	paper	
will	 incorporate	 an	 analysis	 of	 rural	 and	 urban	 areas	 via	 the	 ‘gemeinschaft‐gesellschaft’	






to	 be	 socially	 and	 politically	 positioned	 as	 the	 pinnacle	 of	 immorality,	 deviance	 and	 risk	
(Weitzer	2009;	O’Neill	et	al.	2008;	Hubbard	and	Sanders	2003;	Saunders	and	Kirby	2011),	and	
as	 a	 consequence,	 legislative	 frameworks	 enforced	 by	 governments	 to	 address	 prostitution	
activity	 are	 often	 dominated	 by	 elements	 of	 formal	 control	 and	 regulation.	 Ultimately,	 such	
regulatory	 regimes	 aim	 to	 minimise	 the	 prevalence	 and	 negative	 impacts	 of	 a	 vice	 like	
prostitution,	whilst	 at	 the	 same	 time	protecting	 surrounding	 communities	where	prostitution	
occurs	 (Hubbard	 et	 al.	 2013).	 This	 is	 currently	 demonstrated	 in	 Queensland	 where	 the	
regulatory	 approach	 enforced	 through	 the	 legislation	 limits	 and	 contains	 prostitution	 to	
designated	 areas,	 partly	 based	 on	 community	 concerns	 and	 negative	 attitudes	 about	 such	
activity.	 Though	 two	 forms	 of	 legal	 prostitution	 are	 currently	 recognised	 in	 Queensland	 the	




Queensland’s	 legislative	acknowledgement	of	prostitution	as	a	 legal	act,	 simultaneously	aligns	
with	the	law’s	acceptance	of	small	communities	rejecting	or	disallowing	such	activity,	and	thus	
seems	somewhat	 contradictory.	This	paper	will	provide	a	 theoretical	examination	of	 common	
community	objections	to	prostitution	in	modern	society,	and	examine	the	legislation	in	terms	of	
its	 acceptance	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 prostitution	 is	 an	 act	 inherently	 associated	 with	 urban	 or	
gesellschaft	 activities,	 and	 in	 opposition	 to	 rural	 or	 gemeinschaft	 communities.	 A	 brief	


















When	 initially	 implemented,	 the	 Act	 provided	 provisions	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	
Prostitution	 Licensing	 Authority,	 to	 be	 responsible	 for	 the	 strict	 licensing	 and	monitoring	 of	
legal	prostitution	 in	Queensland	(PLA	2012).	Currently,	 the	PLA	manages	and	decides	brothel	
licence	applications,	monitors	the	provision	of	prostitution	through	licensed	brothels,	receives	




operating	 throughout	 Queensland,	with	 the	majority	 of	 establishments	 located	 in	 the	 greater	
Brisbane	 city	 region.	 The	PLA	 (2012:	 23)	 additionally	 reported	 that	 currently,	 there	 are	 over	
200	Queensland	towns	with	populations	of	 less	 than	25,000	that	are	considered	exempt	 from	
the	 development	 of	 legal	 brothels	 (PLA	2012:	 23).	 This	 presents	 an	 interesting	 juxtaposition.	
Though	diverse	community	reactions	and	opinions	of	various	social	vices	can	be	present	in	and	
amongst	 differing	 environments	 and	 populations,	 it	 seems	 apparent	 that	 negative	 attitudes	
towards	 prostitution	 in	 smaller,	 rural	 or	 regional	 towns	 are	 given	 more	weight	 than	 similar	










Though	 there	 are	many	 configurations	 of	 sex	work	 (such	 as	male	 sex	work,	 transgender	 sex	
work,	or	 sex	work	between	only	 females),	prostitution	most	 commonly	 involves	 a	 female	 sex	
worker	 selling	 sex	 to	 a	 heterosexually	 identified	 man	 (Hubbard	 2012:	 60).	 This	 commercial	
exchange	 of	 sex	 is	 therefore	 often	 socially	 contested	 because	 it	 deviates	 from	 the	 socially	
acceptable	‘norm’	of	sex;	with	a	loving	partner	or	between	spouses	in	a	nuclear	family	(Agustin	
2005:	67).	Such	an	act	 is	additionally	portrayed	as	a	threat	to	the	 institution	of	marriage	as	 it	














‘good’	 women	 (Sullivan	 1997:	 100).	 Female	 sex	 workers	 are	 argued	 to	 symbolise	 an	
unacceptable	form	of	femininity	due	to	how	their	‘deviant	sexual	behaviour’	diminishes	overall	
levels	 of	 female	 ‘purity’	 (Sanders,	 O’Neill	 and	 Pitcher	 2009:	 2)	 and	 undermines	 the	 ‘family’	
character	 of	 the	 surrounding	 neighbourhood	 of	 where	 such	 behaviour	 occurs	 (O’Neill	 et	 al.	
2008:	 78).	 Through	 their	 positioning	 as	 the	 anti‐social	 ‘other’	 in	 society,	 sex	 workers	 are	
identified	 as	 engaging	 in	 behaviour	 that	 fails	 to	 positively	 contribute	 to	 surrounding	
communities	(O’Neill	and	Campbell	2006:	38;	O’Neill	et	al.	2008:	78).		
	






Communities	 therefore	 commonly	 express	 concern	 about	 the	 level	 of	 potential	 risk	 that	 is	
created,	 not	 only	 for	 those	who	 engage	 in	 such	 activity,	 but	 also	 for	 individuals	 in	 the	wider	
community.	 Sex	workers	 are	 often	 portrayed	 as	 having	 a	 heightened	 risk	 of	 being	 subject	 to	
violence,	 abuse,	 homicide,	 sexual	 assault,	 robbery	 and	 sexually	 transmitted	 diseases	 (O’Neill	




Residents	 for	 example	 can	 often	 feel	 intimidated	 about	 leaving	 their	 homes	 for	 fear	 of	
witnessing	sexual	acts	being	conducted	in	public,	or	a	 fear	of	being	harassed	or	propositioned	






public	 solicitation	occurs	 (O’Neill	 et	al.	2008:	76;	Scoular	et	al.	2007:	12;	Sanders,	O’Neill	and	
Pitcher	 2009:	 132;	 Shdaimah	 et	 al.	 2012:	 9).	 Overall,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 prostitution	 negatively	




The	 preceding	 summary	 of	 common	 community	 objections	 to	 prostitution	 identifies	 two	
important	 points.	 Firstly,	 the	majority	 of	 existing	 empirical	 research	 on	 community	 attitudes	
towards	 prostitution	 has	 been	 conducted	 in	 an	 urban	 context.	 Community	 objections	 to	
prostitution	 that	 have	 been	 identified	 within	 the	 literature	 therefore	 relate	 more	 closely	 to	
instances	of	sex	work	that	are	specific	to	urban	environments,	such	as	illegal	street	prostitution,	
While	there	is	the	assumption	that	these	negative	community	attitudes	can	be	applied	to	rural	
and	 regional	 communities,	 there	 is	 also	 a	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 and	 empirical	 focus	 toward	





is	 indeed	 present	 in	many	 urban	 contexts.	 From	 these	 findings	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 such	
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attitudes	 towards	 prostitution	 are	 also	 likely	 prevalent	 in	 highly	 populated	 and	 urbanised	
locations	 throughout	Queensland.	Despite	 this,	 it	 is	 apparent	 through	 the	exemption	 rule	 that	
Queensland	legislation	is	more	accommodating	to	the	attitudes	of	those	communities	in	smaller	
rural	or	regional	areas.	In	order	to	understand	the	potential	justification	or	explanation	for	the	




Rural	 and	 urban	 areas	 are	 considered	 characteristically	 different	 (Bouffard	 and	Muftic	 2006:	
57)	and	are	often	compared	through	Ferdinand	Tönnies’	 ‘gemeinschaft‐gesellschaft’	dichotomy	
(Christenson	 1984:	 160;	 Kamenka	 1965:	 3;	 Donnermeyer	 2007:	 15).	 Tönnies’	 dichotomy	
represents	two	opposing	models	of	society:	an	organic,	homogenous	collective	practicing	shared	
values,	 moral	 obligations	 and	 natural	 wills	 (gemeinschaft),	 in	 opposition	 to	 a	 superficial	




interaction,	 engage	 in	 high	 competition	 and	 hold	 dissimilar	 beliefs	 (Brint	 2001:	 2‐3).	 Whilst	
originally	not	 intended	by	Tönnies	as	a	comparative	distinction	between	specific	geographical	
locations	 (Bonner	 1998:	 174),	 the	gemeinschaft‐gesellschaft	 dichotomy	 is	 considered	 a	 useful	
typology	for	comparing	rural	and	urban	areas.	
	
The	 concept	 gemeinschaft	 most	 closely	 relates	 to	 rural	 areas,	 where	 such	 communities	 are	
thought	to	consist	of	small,	socially	intimate	and	cohesive	populations	that	share	social	norms	
and	 are	 free	 from	 social	 conflict	 (Donnermeyer	 2007:	 15;	 Scott	 et	 al.	 2006:	 153;	 Scott,	
Carrington	and	McIntosh	2011:	148).	A	fundamental	basis	of	gemeinschaft	is	family	life;	where	
communities	consider	themselves	to	be	large	families	responsible	for	accepting	or	rejecting	the	
membership	 of	 outsiders	 (Tönnies	 1957:	 228).	 ‘Gemeinschaftlich’	 relations	 are	 identified	 as	
being	sustained	through	these	strong	familial	bonds	that	 flourish	within	 typical	rural	 ‘ways	of	
life’	(Bonner	1998:	175‐4;	Tönnies	1957).	Individuals	within	gemeinschaft	rural	societies	are	not	
distinguishable	 from	 each	 other,	 as	 all	 work	 together	 for	 common	 tasks	 and	 experience	
enjoyment	 from	 this	 level	of	 communality	 (Aldous	1972:	1195).	Overall,	 the	nurturing	of	 this	
particular	 social	organisation	 is	what	Tönnies	 considered	most	 significant	about	gemeinschaft	
rural	life	(Bonner	1998:	175).		
	
In	 contrast,	 gesellschaft	 is	 depicted	 as	 a	 mechanical	 society	 consisting	 of	 an	 artificial	
construction	of	an	aggregate	of	human	beings	(Tönnies	1957:	64).	It	is	argued	that	gesellschaft	
in	 its	 purest	 form	 can	 be	 observed	 in	 larger,	 urbanised	 metropolitan	 centres	 (Aldous	 1972:	
1195).	 The	 emphasis	 on	 commerce	 and	 large‐scale	 capitalist	 industries	 within	 urbanised	
locations	encourages	 ‘gesellschaftlich’	relations	(Bonner	1998:	173;	Aldous	1972:	1197),	which	
are	 perceived	 as	 impersonal	 and	 formal	 and	 defined	 purely	 by	 contractual	 obligations	








the	 contractual	 exchange	 of	 labour	 for	 a	 profit	 (see	 Tönnies,	 1957).	 In	 contrast,	 prostitution	
conflicts	with	gemeinschaft	ideals	which	perpetuate	an	understanding	of	a	gendered	division	of	
labour;	where	women	are	placed	into	domestic	duties	within	the	home,	 in	comparison	to	men	









As	 expected,	 Tönnies’	 gemeinschaft‐gesellschaft	 dichotomy	 has	 been	 met	 with	 a	 number	 of	
criticisms.	 Overall,	 there	 is	 an	 apparent	 consensus	 that	 Tönnies’	 theory	 has	 failed	 to	 meet	 a	
standard	level	of	neutral	objectivity	(Bonner	1998;	Aldous	1972;	Brin,	2001).	The	discussion	of	
the	 two	 concepts	 is	 argued	 to	 convey	 a	 sense	 of	 favouritism	 or	 preference	 towards	 rural	
gemeinschaft	 communities	 (Aldous	 1972:	 1198).	 This	 is	 identified	 as	 problematic	 as	 the	
gemeinschaft	concept	 is	seen	to	portray	a	misrepresentative	and	overtly	romanticised	portrait	
of	 rural	 communities	based	upon	assumptions	and	myths	 (Brint	2001:	2;	Bonner	1998:	176).	
For	 Tönnies,	 there	 is	 a	 presumption	 that	 rural	 gemeinschaft	 communities	 are	 completely	
homogenous,	 with	 heterogeneity	 therefore	 being	 an	 intrinsic	 trait	 of	 urbanised	 gesellschaft	
areas	 (DeKeseredy	 et	 al.	 2007:	 298).	 However,	 Brint	 (2001:	 3)	 argues	 that	 small	 numbers	 of	








non‐resident	 ‘Fly‐In,	 Fly‐Out’	 (FIFO)	 or	 ‘Drive‐In,	 Drive‐Out’	 (DIDO)	 workforces	 (Carrington,	
Hogg	 and	 McIntosh	 2011:	 337).	 Rural	 and	 regional	 mining	 towns	 previously	 familiar	 with	
traditional	 gemeinschaft	 dynamics	 are	 now	 being	 increasingly	 subject	 to	 influences	 from	
gesellschaft	 lifestyle.	 Such	 communities	 are	 experiencing	 increases	 in	 non‐resident	
(predominantly	male)	visitors	to	the	area,	who	impose	significant	burdens	on	local	services	and	




the	 gemeinschaft‐gesellschaft	 dichotomy	 needs	 to	 be	 used	 with	 caution	 when	 examining	
prostitution	 in	 contemporary	 society.	 However	 despite	 the	 identified	 limitations,	 the	 distinct	
categorisation	 of	 rural	 and	 urban	 areas	 portrayed	 through	 the	 dichotomy	 is	 deemed	 highly	
relevant	 for	 this	 specific	 investigation,	as	 these	 ideas	of	 such	areas	appear	 to	be	 incorporated	
into	 the	 foundation	 of	 Queensland’s	 prostitution	 legislation.	 The	 brothel	 exemption	 rule	
afforded	to	small	towns	by	the	Act	has	been	described	as	a	means	of	‘respecting	the	interest	of	
local	 communities’	 (Schloenhardt	 and	 Cameron	 2009:	 199).	 With	 such	 an	 exemption	 only	
applicable	to	towns	who	meet	specific	population	criteria,	it	seems	that	respect	for	community	
attitudes	 towards	 prostitution	 is	 negated	 by	 the	 legislation	 if	 those	 communities	 are	 not	




Investigation	 into	 various	 social	 phenomena	 in	 specifically	 rural	 contexts	 is	 often	 largely	
ignored	 throughout	 most	 disciplines;	 however	 such	 focus	 is	 recently	 gaining	 more	 attention	
(see	 Hogg	 and	 Carrington:	 2006;	 Scott	 et	 al.:	 2007).	 This	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	 unique	
differences	 between	 rural	 and	 urban	 areas	 is	 vitally	 important	 to	 achieve	 a	 greater	
understanding	of	how	community	attitudes	towards	particular	social	issues	are	influenced.	With	
regard	 to	 prostitution	 in	 Queensland,	 further	 investigation	 conducted	 into	 rural	 or	 regional	
community	 attitudes	 could	 provide	 an	 insight	 into	 whether	 objection	 to	 such	 activity	 is	
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surveil	 the	 physical	 bodies	 of	citizens.	 Here,	 we	 consider	 the	 role	 of	 affect—that	 is,	 the	
visceral	 and	emotive	 forces	underpinning	 conscious	 forms	of	 knowing	 that	 can	drive	one’s	
thoughts,	feelings	and	movements.	Drawing	from	research	on	two	distinctly	different	groups	
of	 surveilled	 subjects,	 paroled	 sex	 offenders	 and	 elite	 athletes,	 this	 paper	 examines	 the	
mundane	practices	of	biosurveillance	 in	 their	 lives	and	how	their	 reflections	 reveal	unique	
insight	into	how	subjectivity,	citizenship,	harm	and	deviance	become	constructed	in	intimate	
and	 public	 ways	 vis‐à‐vis	 technologies	 of	 bodily	 regulation.	 ‘Ordinary	 affects’,	 we	 argue,	
reveal	 cultural	 conditions	 of	 biosurveillance,	 particularly	 how	 risk	 becomes	 embodied	 and	
internalised	in	subjective	ways.	This	paper	describes	affective	responses	to	biosurveillance	as	






The	 first	 discusses	 the	 efficacy	 of	 surveillance	 systems	 for	 crime	 prevention.	 The	 second	
examines	the	rapid	growth	of	surveillance	systems	within	criminal	justice	policy	as	reflective	of	
socio‐political	 changes	 in	 liberal	 democracies.	 Exploring	 the	 links	 between	 the	 emergence	 of	
neo‐liberal	policies	and	actuarial,	risk‐based	criminology,	scholars	have	analysed	them	through	
the	 lens	 of	 governmentality,	 suggesting	 that	 surveillance	 evidences	 a	 ‘new	 means	 to	 render	
populations	thinkable	and	measurable,	 through	categorisation,	differentiation	and	sorting	into	
hierarchies,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 government’	 (Stenson	 2001:	 22‐23).	 Here,	 our	 aim	 is	 to	




offenders	 on	 GPS	 under	 Jessica’s	 Law	 in	 California	 and	 elite	 athletes	 subjected	 various	
surveillance	 techniques	 under	 the	 World	 Anti‐Doping	 Code	 (WADC).	 This	 paper	 specifically	
addresses	 the	 effects	 and	 affects	 of	 biosurveillance,	 which	 entails	 technologies	 that	 track	 or	
detect	 individual	 bodily	 activities,	 including	 physical	 movement	 and	 internal	 functions.2	 The	
commonalities	 between	 these	 two	 seemingly	 divergent	 populations	 demonstrate	 how	
biosurveillance	 both	 relies	 upon	 and	 instills	 meanings	 of	 risk	 and	 risk	 management	 and	 its	
intimate	 implications.	 In	both	cases,	biosurveillance	renders	people	as	risk‐objects:	 that	 is,	not	
only	are	they	subjected	to	risk	management	strategies,	they	are	also	cast	as	the	source	of	risk.		
	
Administrative	 strategies	 of	 risk	 management	 have	 become	 central	 components	 of	 law	 and	




that	 transform	 ‘pervasive	 uncertainties	 and	 indeterminacies’	 into	 ‘calculable	 probabilities	 of	
harm	to	be	managed	by	rational	experts’.	Managing	risks	disregards	forms	of	resistance	outside	
of	 the	 governing	 risk	 frame	 as	 unnecessary	 and	 irrational,	 carrying	 far‐reaching	 effects.	 The	
emphasis	on	risk,	write	Norris	and	Armstrong	(1999:	24),	makes	each	person	a	legitimate	target	
for	surveillance	because	 ‘everyone	 is	assumed	guilty	until	 the	risk	profile	assumes	otherwise’.	
Given	the	various	‘risk	logics’	at	play	(Ericson	and	Doyle	2003),	we	embrace	recommendations	
to	 attend	 to	 risk	 as	 a	 ‘heterogenous’	 and	 ‘variable’	 technique	 of	 governance	 by	 examining	
particular	manifestations	in	two	contexts	(O’Malley	2004;	Valverde,	Levi	and	Moore	2005).		
	
This	 analysis	 of	 parolees	 and	 athletes	 gleans	 insight	 into	 the	 perspectives	 of	 persons‐as‐risk	





















as	 risk‐objects,	 these	 regulatory	 environments	 are	 distinct.	 Jessica’s	 Law,	 which	 mandated	
lifelong	surveillance	and	stringent	tracking	of	sex	offenders	on	parole,	was	originally	passed	by	
the	Florida	 legislature	 in	 2005	 (Fla.	 St.	 §	 775.21)	 and	has	 been	adopted	by	43	 additional	U.S.	
states.	Most	notably,	this	law	created	strict	residency	restrictions,	limiting	the	location	of	where	
sex	 offenders	may	 live	 or	 work	 and	 surveiling	 them	 for	 life.	 The	 anti‐doping	movement	 is	 a	
global	regulatory	regime	spearheaded	by	the	World	Anti‐Doping	Agency	(WADA),	governed	by	
the	 World	 Anti‐Doping	 Code	 and	 backed	 by	 an	 international	 legal	 convention.	 Since	 its	
establishment	 in	 1999,	 WADA	 has	 implemented	 a	 multifaceted	 approach	 crossing	 multiple	
geographic	areas	and	sports.	Random	drug	testing	in	and	out	of	competition,	monitoring	high‐
level	 athletes’	 whereabouts,	 and	 blood	 profiling	 have	 become	 common	 practice.	 WADA’s	




offenders	 after	 they	 have	 served	 their	 sentence	 for	 crimes	 committed,	 anti‐doping	 regulation	
aims	 to	 deter	 the	 use	 of	 prohibited	 substances	 and	methods	 in	 sport.3	 Put	 another	way,	 GPS	
monitors	 and	 delineates	 impure	 parolees	 from	 others	 in	 the	 community,	 while	 anti‐doping	
regulation	aims	to	preserve	the	purity	of	athletes.	The	composition	of	these	populations	is	thus	
vastly	different;	however,	their	experiences	are	analogous	in	the	surveillance	regimes	watching	
over	 them	retain	a	shared	tenet:	 their	 justification	 is	 to	prevent	 future	offending	behaviour.	A	
similar	 affective	 theme	 emerges:	 participants	 internalise	 regulatory	 messages	 by	 seeing	
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Parolees	and	athletes	 take	deeper	meanings	 from	 the	 forms	of	 surveillance	 to	which	 they	are	




The	 shame	 and	 anxiety	 of	 occupying	 the	 legal	 category	 of	 ‘Sexually	 Violent	 Predator’	 (SVP)	
brings	with	 it	 a	 heightened	 awareness	 of	 parolees’	 social	 exclusion	 and	 dehumanisation.	 Not	
only	do	they	speak	of	being	‘stalked	by	the	state’,	they	also	feel	like	they	are	deprived	of	human	
qualities.	To	borrow	the	words	of	one	interviewee,	 ‘It	 is	very	depressing.	It	robs	a	piece	of	my	




we	 are	 outcasts	 in	 our	 community	 and	we	 are	 shit	 in	 this	 society.	 That	makes	 a	 tremendous	
impact	 on	 us,	 our	 self‐esteem.	 It’s	 very	 hard’.	 Another	 explained,	 ‘We’re	 the	 worst	 thing	 in	
everybody’s	 eyes.	We’re	 looked	down	on.	We’re	 hated.	 People	kill	 a	 baby	 and	 it’s	 not	 as	bad.	
People	 shoot	 someone	 in	 the	 head,	 still,	 not	 as	 bad’.	 One	 participant	 expressed,	 ‘Now	 who’s	
America’s	most	wanted?’	to	which	another	parolee	answered,	‘We	are!’	All	parolees	articulated	





be	 tattoos’,	 while	 another	 explained,	 ‘You	 feel	 like	 you	 have	 the	 mark	 of	 Cain’.	 These	 were	
common	sentiments,	elaborated	upon	as	being	‘like,	[using	both	hands	to	point	to	himself],	I’m	
Freddy	 Kruger	 mother	 fucker!	 People	 perceive	 it	 like	 that.	 They	 see	 the	 monitor	 and	 they	
perceive	me	as	a	predator’.	Other	conversations	discussed	 feelings	of	 individual	shame	due	to	
wearing	 GPS	 and	 how	 that	 shame	 prompts	 fear,	 as	 the	 unit	 symbolises	 a	 perceived	 risk	 to	
reoffend.	One	participant	stated,	 ‘The	crime	you	commit	should	not	have	this	on	your	leg,	and	
then	 you	 show	 it,	 and	 people	 think,	 “Dude,	 this	 is	 a	 fucking	murderer,	 we	 should	 kill	 him!”’	
Another	agreed,	‘And	the	stigma	everybody	associates	because	they	made	such	a	big	issue	out	of	
it—the	whole	GPS	with	 child	molesters’	 thing.	 I	 don’t	 even	want	 to	 go	 through	 that	 hassle	 of	




This	 subjective	 interplay	 is	 so	 profound	 that	 it	 prevents	 parolees	 from	 enjoying	 the	 simplest	
pleasures.	As	explained	by	one	participant,	upon	being	released	from	prison:	
	
I	wanted	 to	go	 to	Carl’s	 Junior—they	had	been	advertising	 that	mushroom	burger	
for	three	years,	and	I	was	going	to	have	one	when	I	got	out.	That	day,	I	couldn’t	eat	it.	
I	was	stunned.	I	felt	so	bad.	I	can’t	remember	the	last	time	I	felt	that	bad—that	day	
was	 the	 worst	 day	 of	 my	 life.	 I	 was	 like,	 ‘Oh	 my	 God,	 they	 are	 looming	 over	 my	
shoulder	constantly’,	and	I’m	making	sure	my	pant	leg	was	down	[to	hide	the	GPS].		
	





Athletes	 are	 not	 compelled	 to	 physically	wear	monitoring	 technologies	 on	 an	 everyday	 basis,	
but	 they	 do	 live	 regimented	 lives,	 focusing	 on	 the	 pursuit	 of	modifying	 their	 bodies	 so	 as	 to	





call	 for	unannounced	sample	collections.	 If	an	athlete	tests	positive	 for	a	banned	substance	or	
fails	 to	comply	with	regulatory	conditions,	he	or	she	 is	 liable	 for	an	anti‐doping	rule	violation	
(ADRV).	
	
Many	 interviewees	acknowledged	 that	 regulation	shifted	 their	perspectives	 toward	what	 they	
ingested—and	 their	 bodies	more	generally.	As	 one	 rugby	 league	athlete	 reflected,	 ‘It	 changed	
the	way	 I	 look	 at	what	 I	 eat.	 I	 have	 to	 be	 smart	 about	what	 [supplements]	 I	 take...	 I	 can’t	 be	
smoking	 that	 shit	 [marijuana],	 either’.	 Like	many	 other	 athletes,	 he	 acknowledged	 that	 rules	










an	 ADRV	 could	 end	 their	 athletic	 careers	 and	 jeapordise	 their	 livelihoods.	 Regulation	 thus	
compelled	them	to	take	responsibility	for	these	risks	to	avoid	punishment.	Of	the	athletes	who	
shared	 these	anxieties,	none	expressed	a	 fear	of	others	cheating	or	 the	need	 to	 catch	athletes	








I	 still	 just	 want	 to	 know	 just	 how	 fast	 I	 could’ve	 been.	 So	 many	 of	 those	 guys	 I	
competed	against	went	on	to	the	next	level.	They	were	Olympians,	and	almost	all	of	





presume	 that	 the	most	 successful	 runners	 had	 as	 well,	 even	 though	 he	 admittedly	 relied	 on	
anecdotal	evidence.		
	
Other	 interviewees	 reflected	 competing	 in	 a	 sport	 ‘plagued	 by	 widespread	 doping’.	 One	
participant	felt	so	strongly	about	the	pervasiveness	of	doping	in	her	sport	that	she	competed	for	
another	 country.	 (She	 was	 born	 in	 another	 country	 and	 therefore	 eligible	 to	 do	 so.)	 She	
expressed	 frustration	 that	 she	 failed	 to	 qualify	 for	 the	 Olympics,	 stating	 that	 she	 could	 not	
believe	others	were	that	much	better	than	her—unless	they	were	doping.	Her	evidence?	Beyond	
her	 competitors’	 improved	 performances,	 she	 responded	 bluntly,	 ‘Well,	 I	 could	 tell	 just	 by	








You	 really	 can’t	 trust	 anyone’.	 This	 participant,	 among	 others	who	 did	 not	 share	 his	 opinion,	















it,	 paralleling	 it	 to	 other	 challenges	 they	 faced	 as	 immigrants	 (here,	 to	 New	 Zealand).	 As	








ankle,	 then	 told	 briefly	 how	 the	 technology	 works	 (that	 it	 ‘tracks’	 them),	 to	 charge	 the	 unit	
regularly,	 not	 to	 get	 it	 wet	 or	 tamper	 with	 it	 (otherwise	 a	 parole	 violation	 would	 ensue).	







to	 hide	 it.	 It’s	 a	 stigma.	 People	 look	 at	 you	 so	 you	 have	 to	 hide	 it’.	 Feeling	 physically	
uncomfortable	 in	 public,	 parolees	 often	 changed	 their	 outward	 appearance	 for	 two	 primary	
reasons:	First,	parolees	acknowledged	the	need	to	cover	and	safeguard	the	GPS	unit	so	as	to	not	
receive	 violations	 for	 tampering.	 Secondly,	 they	 hid	 the	 unit	 to	 safeguard	 themselves	 and	
minimise	 public	 shame.	 Several	 participants	 also	 commented	 on	 changes	 in	 physical	 activity,	
and	many	elucidated	that	their	feelings	of	freedom	and	mobility	changed	drastically:	‘You’re	not	
as	free	to	go	places	once	you’re	invited	to	do	different	things.	You	can’t	do	as	much…	It’s	a	big	
life	 stopper’.	Relationships	with	 personal	 GPS	 units	 directly	 informed	 the	 changing	 nature	 of	
parolees’	identity:	from	being	active,	social	individuals	to	inactive,	suspect	subjects.		
	
Being	 equipped	 with	 GPS	 prompted	 changes	 to	 daily	 hygiene	 routines	 and	 physical	 leisure	
activities	 as	 well	 as	 concerns	 about	 physical	 injuries/harm.	 One	 participant	 explained	 that	
parole	 agents	 ‘tell	 you	 that	you	can’t	 take	a	bath,	we	can’t	 go	 swimming,	we	can’t	 take	a	 long	















co‐dependence—so	 much	 so	 that	 it	 hindered	 parolees’	 personal	 physical	 and	 emotional	
preservation.		
	
Interviewees	 expressed	 intense	 frustration	 over	 not	 being	 able	 to	 appropriately	 cleanse	
themselves	or	engage	in	social	activities.	They	longed	for	normalcy.	One	said,	‘I	just	want	to	take	
a	 long	 soak	 in	 the	 bathtub!’	 Another	mentioned,	 ‘Since	 the	 first	 day	 they	 put	 that	 [GPS]	 on,	 I	
couldn’t	take	a	bath.	I	had	wanted	one	since	prison’.	Despite	attempts	to	preserve	devices,	units	




you	 know	 cell	 phones	 and	microwaves?	What	 affect	 do	 these	 have	 over	 the	 long	
term	with	 cellular	 structure	 and	microwaves?	 You’re	 being	 exposed	 to	 something	
you	don’t	want	to	be	exposed	to.		
	
One	 parolee	 even	 asked,	 ‘What	 does	 this	 button	 mean	 [pointing	 to	 his	 GPS]?	 It	 says,	 “Don’t	
touch.”	Does	it	blow	you	up?’	Their	remarks	highlighted	a	catch‐22:	though	promoted	as	a	safe	
and	 effective	 tool	 for	 the	 supervision	 of	 parolees,	 GPS,	 its	 limitations	 and	 physical	 hazards	
preoccupied	participants.		
	








Anti‐doping	 surveillance	 also	 exacerbated	 risks	 for	 athletes,	 prompting	 criticisms	 that	 such	
methods	 incentivise	more	dangerous	doping	products	 that	 evade	detection.	 For	 interviewees,	
risk	 gave	 way	 to	 fear	 of	 authorities,	 not	 doping.	 Many	 athletes	 characterised	 anti‐doping	
regulation	 as	 a	monitoring	 system	 in	 place	 to	 ‘catch’—not	 help—them.	 Even	more	 expressed	
resentment	 toward	 being	 monitored	 ‘like	 criminals’,	 rarely	 acknowledging	 that	 some	 anti‐
doping	agencies	try	to	help	them	avoid	inadvertent	ADRVs.	Instead,	on	more	than	one	occasion,	




requires	 athletes	 to	 provide	 information	 regarding	 where	 they	 are	 in	 or	 out	 of	 competition.	
Although	 surveillance	 was	 not	 always	 present	 (compared	 to	 how	 sex	 offenders	 endure	 GPS	
units),	anxieties	around	the	scope	and	power	of	surveillance	were	still	prevalent.	For	example,	




me’.	 Even	 though	 he	 did	 not	 think	 he	 was	 doing	 anything	 wrong,	 he	 became	 increasingly	
suspicious	of	sport	staff	when	high‐profile	doping	accusations	surfaced.	Other	athletes	shared	
this	 suspicion	 after	 being	 ‘treated	 like	 lab	 rats’	 for	 research	 studies	 and	 performance	




Gendered	distinctions	also	emerged,	particularly	 regarding	 resistance	 to	 surveillance.	For	 five	










The	 focus	on	affect	attests	how	these	surveiled	subjects	respond	to	 feeling	as	 though	they	are	
continuously	watched.	They	 internalise	messages	about	 themselves	and	others	seemingly	 like	
them	 as	 being	 ‘suspect’.	 Despite	 evident	 differences	 between	 paroled	 sex	 offenders	 and	 elite	
athletes,	they	emerge	as	‘at	risk’	for	future	offending	behavior,	thus	justifying	and	perpetuating	
surveillance.	 Though	 preventative	 in	 aim,	 biosurveillance	 exacerbates	 risk	 and	 risk‐taking	 in	
ways	that	subjects	both	internalise	viscerally	and	negotiate	actively.	This	analysis	reveals	some	




constitutive	 processes,	 complicating	 depictions	 of	 paroled	 sex	 offenders	 as	 undeserving	 and	
predatorial	subjects	and	those	of	elite	athletes	as	privileged	and	archetypal	subjects.	Everyday	
surveillance	practices	as	understood	through	an	affective	lens	demonstrate	that	such	regulatory	
tactics	 shift	 risk	 and	 responsibility	 onto	 individuals,	 carrying	 profound	 effects	 on	 embodied	
subjectivity.	 Not	 only	 do	 the	 boundaries	 between	 human	 and	 surveillance	 become	 blurred,	

















































of	 prisoners’	 return	 to	 the	 community.	 Whereas	 the	 analytic	 dimensions	 of	 the	 culture	
concept	 have	 been	 explored	 in	 anthropological	 circles,	 its	 criminological	 applications	 have	
been	 limited.	 While	 the	 growth	 of	 ‘cultural	 criminology’	 signifies	 a	 resurgent	 interest	 in	
ethnography,	subjectivity,	lived	experience	and	the	phenomenological,	for	instance,	it	can	be	
argued	that	its	concept	of	culture	lacks	explanatory	or	analytical	power.	This	paper	considers	
the	 analytic	 possibilities	 of	 ‘culture’	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 uncovering	 aspects	 of	 the	 post‐
imprisonment	experience.	 It	draws	on	 interviews	with	 released	prisoners	and	post‐release	
support	 workers,	 conducted	 for	 PhD	 research	 on	 the	 post‐release	 experience	 of	 men	 in	
Victoria,	to	illustrate	how	culture	applied	in	this	way	can	illuminate	processes	underpinning	




more	 broadly	 –	 towards	 reintegration	 and	 reduced	 reoffending.	 A	 cultural	 perspective	 can	






Offenders	 emerge	 from	 prison	 afraid	 to	 trust,	 fearful	 of	 the	 unknown,	 and	with	 a	
vision	of	the	world	shaped	by	the	meaning	that	behaviours	had	in	the	prison	context.	





resident	 at	 the	 newly	 opened	 transitional	 units	 at	 Risdon	 Prison,	makes	 plain	why	 prisoners	
need	help	to	adjust	to	life	on	the	outside:	‘You	want	people	to	go	out	better,	not	worse.’	Yet,	as	
Miller	 (2000)	observes,	prisoners	often	emerge	 from	prison	marked	by	 the	 very	qualities	 the	
correctional	 system	 is	 meant	 to	 ‘correct’,	 qualities	 that	 can	 make	 life	 in	 the	 community	
unsustainable	 and	 reimprisonment	 inevitable.	 Striking	 is	 that	 since	 the	 birth	 of	 the	 modern	
prison,	despite	two	hundred	years	of	penal	advancement	and	knowledge,	so	little	has	changed:	
in	 1831,	 in	 France,	 38%	 of	men	were	 reimprisoned	 following	 their	 release	 (Foucault	 1979);	
today,	in	Australia,	the	figure	is	almost	identical	(ABS	2010).		
	
The	 hardening,	 damaging	 effects	 of	 imprisonment	 and	 its	 endemic	 cultural	 codes	 are	 well	
established.	That	the	culture	of	the	prison	leaks	out	into	the	post‐prison	sphere	is	axiomatic.	Yet	




engages	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 culture	 as	 a	 useful	 tool	 for	 understanding	 men’s	 post‐release	
experience	and	how	and	why	so	many	become	ensnared	in	cycles	of	reimprisonment.	The	focus	
is	 on	men	 in	particular	 since	 they	 comprise	 the	majority	of	 prisoners	 released	and	hence	 the	
bulk	of	 the	 ‘post‐release	problem’.	 It	begins	with	 the	concept	of	 ‘culture’	which,	as	an	analytic	
device,	 has	 been	 embraced	 in	 anthropological	 circles	 yet	 remains	 underdeveloped	 in	
criminology.	A	distinction	is	drawn	between	‘culture’	as	a	socially	bounded	frame	and	‘culture’	
as	a	meaning‐making	‘toolkit’.	The	ensuing	section	explains	the	cultural	lens	applied	in	the	PhD	





its  earliest  anthropological  formulation  as  ‘that  complex  whole  which  includes  knowledge, 
belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member 
of  society’  (Tylor  1871	 in	Eagleton 2000: 34). Notwithstanding an ongoing  lack of consensus, 
the	anthropological	concept	of	culture	as	a	way	of	life	peculiar	to	a	social	group	–	the	collected	
ideas	 and	 habits	 learned,	 shared	 and	 transmitted;	 its	 material	 and	 symbolic	 aspects	 –	 has	




conceived  cultural  forms  narrowly,  if  at  all  (Garland  2006).  The  growth  of  ‘cultural 
criminology’ (e.g.	Ferrell	1999;	Hayward	and	Young	2004;	Ferrell,	Hayward	and	Young	2008)	
embodies	a	 resurgent	 interest	 in	ethnography,	 lived	experience,	 and	 the	phenomenological.	 It	
foregrounds	 ‘cultural’	 aspects	 of	 crime	 and	 its	 control:	 ‘the	 subjective,	 affective,	 embodied,	
aesthetic,	material,	performative,	 textual,	symbolic	and	visual	relations	of	space	…	recognising	
that	 the	settings	of	crime	are	…	relational,	 improvised,	contingent,	constructed	and	contested’	
(Campbell	 2012	 in	 Hayward	 2012:	 450).	 Yet	 O’Brien	 (2005)	 argues	 cultural	 criminology	
undertheorises	 its	 concept	 of	 culture	 and	 thus	 lacks	 explanatory	 or	 analytical	 power,	 indeed	
that	 it	 is	 political	 rather	 than	 analytical	 in	 orientation.	Cultural criminology  then, despite  its 
promise, offers little in the way of analytic tools.	
	
So	what	 are	 the	 analytical	 possibilities	 of	 ‘culture’	 as	 a	 concept?	 Critics	 argue	 that	 ‘culture	 is	
essentialised,	 reified,	 and	overhomogenised’	 (Brumann	2004:	199).	 It	 is	 either	 conceptualised	
so	 broadly	 as	 to	 render	 it	 meaningless,	 or	 so	 narrowly	 as	 to	 limit	 its	 theoretical	 validity;	 it	
appears	 ‘torn	between	an	empty	universalism	and	a	blind	particularism’	 (Eagleton	2000:	44).	
Rational	choice	 theorists	have	rejected	cultural	accounts	as	 ‘tautological,	untestable,	or	beside	
the	point’	 (Wedeen	2002:	714).	 Sewell	 (2004:	 202),	however,	 draws	an	 important	distinction	
between	 the	 use	 of	 the	 plural	 form	 (‘cultures’),	 describing	 ‘concrete	 and	 bounded	 worlds	 of	
beliefs	and	practices’,	and	the	singular	concept	denoting	a	‘semiotics	of	social	life’.	Sewell	argues	
that	 it	 is	 the	elision	of	 these	 two	distinct	meanings	of	 culture	 that	causes	confusion	and	gives	
rise	 to	 criticism	 of	 the	 latter	 concept	 based	 on	 the	 shortcomings	 inhering	 in	 the	 former.	 For	
instance,	Larmour	(2007:	228)	 refers	 to	 three	common	misuses	of	culture	as	a	concept:	as	an	
‘uncaused	cause’;	as	an	‘explanation	of	last	resort’;	and	as	a	‘veto	on	comparison’,	which	seem	to	
illustrate	 Sewell’s	 contention.	 Certainly	 culture	 used	 in	 this	 way	 appears	 ‘outmoded	 and	




norms	 are	 exaggerated	 into	 extreme	 models	 of	 hypermasculinity;	 where	 violence	 and	
intimidation	become	normalised,	legitimised.	The	ways	of	being	that	Miller	(2000)	describes	–	










Building	 on	 Sewell’s	 ‘semiotics	 of	 social	 life’	 definition,	 Wedeen	 (2002:	 720)	 argues	 for	 a	
conceptualisation	 of	 culture	 as	 ‘the	 practices	 of	meaning‐making	 through	which	 social	 actors	
attempt	to	make	their	world	coherent’.	Cultural	analysis	from	this	perspective	involves	studying	
the	 relations	 between	 peoples’	 practices	 and	 their	 signifying	 systems	 of	 language	 and	 other	
symbols,	an	approach	characterised	as	‘semiotic	practices’	(Wedeen	2002:	714).	Culture	in	these	
terms	 refers	 to	what	 people	 do,	 how	 those	 things	 are	 invested	with	meaning,	 and	how	 those	
meanings	 produce	 effects.	 Thus	 culture	 refers	 not	 to	 essential	 values	 or	 particular	 traits	
isolating	 one	 group	 from	another;	 rather,	 a	 cultural	 view	obliges	 ‘an	 account	of	 how	 symbols	
operate	 in	practice,	why	meanings	generate	action,	 and	why	actions	produce	meanings,	when	






(Swidler	 1986:	 277).	 Culture	 is	 causative	 in	 that	 it	 ‘shapes	 the	 capacities	 from	 which	 such	
strategies	 of	 action	 are	 constructed’	 (Swidler	 1986:	 277).	 Importantly	 in	 the	 context	 of	 post‐
prison	 experience,	 Swidler	 (1986:	 278)	 distinguishes	 between	 how	 culture	 affects	 action	 in	
‘settled	 lives’	 and	 ‘unsettled	 lives’	 in	 terms	 of	 sustaining	 continuities	 and	 constructing	 new	
patterns.	In	‘unsettled	lives’,	she	explains,	‘[p]eople	developing	new	strategies	of	action	depend	
on	 cultural	models	 to	 learn	 styles	 of	 self,	 relationship,	 cooperation	 [and]	 authority’,	 and	 that	
these	models	 ‘make	 explicit	demands	 in	a	 contested	 cultural	 arena’	 (Swidler	1986:	279).	 It	 is	
this	contested	space	that	emerges	so	palpably	in	sociological	accounts	of	the	prison	world.	The	
initial	experience	of	imprisonment	and	adaptation	to	prison	life	may	be	viewed	in	this	way,	as	a	
period	 during	 which	 competing	 ways	 of	 organising	 behaviours	 contend	 for	 dominance	 (the	
prison	regime,	officers’	culture,	prisoners’	social	hierarchies,	 individual	histories	and	identity),	
and	new	strategies	of	action	are	 constructed	 from	an	available	 repertoire	of	 ‘symbols,	 rituals,	
stories,	and	guides	to	action’	(Swidler	1986:	77).		
	 	




be	 seen	 as	 constraining	 future	 action,	 due	 to	 what	 Swidler	 calls	 the	 ‘high	 costs	 of	 cultural	
retooling’	(Swidler	1986:	284)	involved	in	crafting	new	ways	of	being,	particularly	when	post‐
release	cultural	resources	are	limited;	if	an	ex‐prisoner’s	friends	and	family	share	habits,	skills	







...	 an	 inter‐subjective	organising	mechanism	 that	 shapes	unfolding	 social	processes	
and	that	is	constitutive	of	social	structure	…	[C]ulture	is	simultaneously	an	emergent	






is	useful	because	 it	emphasises	 the	observable.	Further,	 it	enables	analysis	of	 the	relationship	
between	‘narratives	of	identification	and	everyday	activities’	(Wedeen	2002:	724)	which,	if	left	
uninterrogated,	 serve	 to	 perpetuate	 themselves.	 This	works	on	 a	micro	 (prisoner)	 and	macro	
(societal)	 level,	 in	what	Arrigo	 and	Milovanovic	 (2009:	 101)	 describe	 as	 ‘the	 coproduction	 of	
penological	reality’.	In	this	way	culture	is	seen	as	cause	(producer)	and	effect	(product)	of	the	
carceral	assemblage.	Taking	up	Garland’s	(2006:	438)	challenge	to	‘show	how	culture	relates	to	




This	 cultural	 approach	 forms	 a	 key	 theoretical	 component	of	 the	PhD	 research	 on	which	 this	
paper	 draws1.	 The	 study	 sought	 to	 qualitatively	 map	 men’s	 subjective	 experience	 of	 release	
from	prison	 in	Victoria,	by	 interviewing	released	prisoners	and	post‐release	support	workers.	
The	Victorian	Department	of	 Justice	 funds	 ‘Link	Out’,	 and	 its	 Indigenous	equivalent,	 ‘Konnect’,	
which	offer	 twelve	months	 intensive	post‐release	support	 to	prisoners	deemed	at	high	risk	of	
reoffending	post‐release.	The	agencies	delivering	these	programs	were	the	starting	point	for	the	
snowball	 sampling	 strategy	 employed.	 Link	Out	 and	Konnect	workers	were	briefed	 about	 the	
study	and	invited	to	recruit	voluntary	participants.	Other	services	identified	during	the	research	
process	 included	 WISE	 Employment’s	 Ex‐offender	 Program	 and	 Five8,	 a	 community‐based	
restorative	 approach	 to	 building	 ‘micro‐communities’	 of	 support	 around	 individual	prisoners.	
Workers	 in	 these	 programs	were	 included	 in	 the	 sample.	 Released	 prisoners	were	 recruited	
through	the	workers,	word	of	mouth,	and	flyers	in	local	employment	agencies.	Twelve	released	
prisoners	 and	 fourteen	 workers	 were	 interviewed.	 The	 ex‐prisoner	 participants	 (only)	 were	
offered	a	twenty	dollar	Coles	voucher	to	acknowledge	their	participation.	
	
Semi‐structured	 in‐depth	 interviews	were	conducted	 individually,	 face‐to‐face,	 in	settings	that	
were	 familiar	 and	 convenient	 to	 participants.	 Interviews	 were	 transcribed	 verbatim	 and	
analysed	phenomenographically.	This	involved	careful	reading	and	re‐reading	of	the	interviews	




to	 capture	 variation	 in	 the	 collective,	 rather	 than	 individual,	 experience	 of	 a	 phenomenon	
(Trigwell	2006),	and	to	portray	relationships	between	conceptions	and	experience.	Illustrative	



















The	men	 interviewed	attest	 to	 the	universality	of	 ‘Ox’	 as	prison	 tobacco,	and	how	it	 identifies	
people	as	having	been	inside.	As	well	as	its	strength	–	 ‘it’d	be	milder	smoking	tree	bark	…	and	
gum	leaves,	god	 it	nearly	knocked	me	out!’	 (RP21)	–	and	hence	 its	addictive	quality,	 cigarette	
smoking	 represents	 a	 punctuating	 rhythm	 in	 the	 daily	 routine	 of	 prison	 life,	 a	 physical	 and	










smoking	 Ox	 to	 prisoner	 ways	 of	 being	 which,	 despite	 ‘trying	 to	 move	 away	 from	 that’	 and	
admitting	‘cringing’,	is	a	hard	habit	to	break:		
	
I’m	 on	 the	 outside	 and	 I’m	 smoking	 whatever	 it	 is	 mild	 or	 something,	 all	 these	
people	smoking	Super	Mild,	Ultra	Mild,	and	they	go	to	prison	and	everyone’s	making	
these	 [thin	 ‘roll‐your‐owns’	with	Ox]	…	you	 can	 get	 [other	brands]	…	 [but	people]	
say	 if	 you	have	 this	 it’s	 stronger,	 and	 you	 get	used	 to	 it,	 and	 you	don’t	 even	want	
another	cigarette	as	quickly.	I	said	Christ	I	don’t	need	a	cigarette	for	six	hours	after	
that	one!	I	said	 I’d	be	 in	an	 iron	 lung	before	I	have	one	of	 these	again!	…	But	yeah	
that’s	about	the	only	thing	that	I’ve	got	a	prison	culture	on	me,	as	much	as	I	cringe	…	
yeah	 I	don’t	have	 to	buy	Ox,	 I	don’t	know	why	 I	 keep	buying	 it,	 I	 think	 just	out	of	
habit	…	
	
Though	RP21	 shielded	 himself	 from	 the	 absorption	 of	 prison	mores	 or	 the	 development	 of	 a	






...	when	 the	 guys	 come	out	of	prison	and	 they	meet	up	here	 for	 instance	 they	will	
often	pace	up	and	down	in	their	little	basketball	yard	at	the	back,	have	you	ever	seen	
men	 in	a	prison	walking	up	and	down	 just	doing	 laps?	They	will	 go	 this	way,	 and	
then	they	turn	right,	and	then	go	back	and	then	turn	left	and	go	that	way,	and	you	
see	 them	 pacing	 like	 that,	 and	 they	 won’t	 even	 know	 they’re	 doing	 it.	 They	 are	
conditioned	to	that	sort	of	way	of	communicating	with	one	another.	They’ll	pace	up	
and	 down;	 they’ll	 dress	 like	 they	 are	 still	 in	 prison.	 They’ll	 carry	 themselves	 like	
they’re	still	in	prison.		
	
Evoked	 is	 a	 robotic	 return	 to	 the	way	physical	 space	 is	 navigated	 and	 traversed	 in	 prison,	 as	






within	 the	prison	setting.	Violence	 is	normalised,	 indeed	honed	as	a	 skill.	 ‘Friends’	 are	prison	
‘associates’,	 ‘jailbirds’	 and	 ‘druggies’.	 Adapting	 to	 prison	 life	 clearly	 involves	 the	 forging	 of	 a	
prison	identity	–	‘you're	a	prisoner	and	you're	one	of	the	boys’	(SW12)	–	and	the	destabilising	of	




into	 post‐prison	 light:	 ‘when	 they	 get	 out	 they	 don’t	 have	 a	 [social]	 place	 …	 and	 they	 lose	
whatever	 sense	of	 self	 they	had	…	which	 can	 cause	 that	out	of	 control	 spiral’	 (SW09).	This	 is	
































limited.	And	 in	his	 ‘unsettled’	post‐release	 life,	where	cultural	models	compete	 in	a	 ‘contested	








These	 themes	 illustrate	how	meanings	and	behaviours	which	 function	 in	a	prison	context	can	
shape	and	 inflect	men’s	post‐prison	experience,	 their	 identity	and	 interactions.	 In	this	way,	as	
Sampson	and	Bean	 (2006)	contend,	 culture	can	 constitute	 social	 structure,	manifesting	 in	 the	
constraints	 which	militate	 against	 ex‐prisoners’	 post‐release	 integration.	Whether	 these	 take	
the	 form	of	 subtle	 cultural	 imprints	 that	are	hard	habits	 to	break,	and	which	shadow	a	man’s	
sense	of	self.	Or	habits,	skills	and	styles	–	such	as	prison	cultural	norms	of	violence	–	 learned,	

































































environmental	 justice	for	both	private	citizens	and	the	public	at	 large.	The	first	 jurisdiction	
considered	 is	China,	where	environmental	 liability	claims	brought	by	Chinese	citizens	have	
increased	 at	 an	 annual	 average	 of	 25%	 (Yang	 2011).	 Manufacturing	 is	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	
Chinese	economy	and	is	responsible	for	some	of	the	unprecedented	economic	growth	in	the	
region.	 Less	 discussed	 are	 the	 industry	 impacts	 on	 water	 and	 air	 pollution	 levels	 and	 the	
associated	implications	of	these	pollutants	on	local	communities.	China	introduced	the	Tort	




law	 in	 Australia	 where	 private	 citizens	 have	 made	 a	 claim	 in	 toxic	 torts.	 However,	 the	
framework	is	under‐developed	in	contrast	to	the	risk	presented	to	many	communities	by,	for	
example,	toxic	chemical	leakage	from	unconventional	gas	extraction.	Public	interest	litigation	
in	 Australia	 is	 supported	 by	 expansive	 legislative	 provisions,	 but	 systemic	 barriers	 are	
proving	 challenging.	 This	 paper	 traces	 the	 regulatory	 responses	 to	 the	 affects	 of	 major	








environmental	 justice	as	a	 frame	 for	distributional	 justice	 issues.	From	this	starting	point,	 the	
paper	 will	 compare	 and	 consider	 the	 Chinese	 and	 Australian	 legal	 responses	 to	 situations	
involving	 environmental	 justice	 issues.	 This	work	 concludes	 by	 advocating	 for	 environmental	











law,	 regulations,	 policies	 and	 decisions’	 (Slater	 and	 Pedersen	 2008).	 Consequently,	





be	 located	 in	 polluted	 neighbourhoods	 or	 in	 risk	 areas,	 and	 so	 these	 communities	 are	more	
likely	 to	 have	 health	 issues	 related	 to	 toxins	 exposure	 (e.g.	 Banzhaf	 2012:	 14).	 For	 instance,	






affected	 by	 an	 environmental	 burden’.	 For	 instance,	 studies	 suggest	 children	 in	 low‐income	
communities	are	often	more	vulnerable	to	air	pollution,	as	 illustrated	through	the	numbers	of	
asthma	attacks	 (Brown	 	 et	 al.2003).	 Importantly	 though,	 some	 scholars	 have	highlighted	 that	





all	 other	 institutions	 (e.g.	 Flores	 and	Himma	2012:	 23).	 It	 is	 acknowledged	 that,	while	 law	 at	
national	 and	 international	 levels	 can	 foster	 environmental	 justice,	 it	 has	 not	 reached	 its	 full	
potential	(UNEP	2013).		
	
Public	 law	 creates	 environmental	 protection	 legislation	 that	 is	 vital	 for	 addressing	
environmental	justice	objectives,	for	example,	through	requiring	by	law	pollution	control	tools.	
Arguably	 though,	 these	 legislative	 tools	have	not	been	designed	 to	meet	 distributional	 justice	
issues,	such	as	the	unequal	distribution	of	environmental	harms	(e.g.	Lazarus	1993:	787).		
	
Private	 law,	 such	 as	 litigation,	 provides	 a	 critical	medium	 for	 compensating	 victims,	 pursuing	






















towards	 a	 highly	 competitive	market	 economy.	 Over	 the	 past	 30	 years,	 China’s	 economy	 has	
doubled	in	size	every	seven	to	eight	years	and	accounts	for	15%	of	global	GDP	(The	Australian	
Treasury	2012).	Chinese	citizens	have	benefited	from	the	economic	growth	through	improved	
standards	 of	 living,	 for	 example,	 on	 average	 increases	 in	 food	 consumption	 and	 access	 to	
education	 (Nolan	 2007:	 5).	 It	 is	 estimated	 that	 this	 economic	 growth	 resulted	 in	 250	million	
Chinese	people	no	longer	living	in	poverty	(Stalley	2010:	1).		
	
But	 this	 accelerated	 rate	 of	 economic	 growth	 has	 also	 resulted	 in	 significant	 challenges	with	
regard	 to	 pollution.	 China’s	 industrialisation	 is	 a	 causal	 factor	 in	 a	 range	 of	 severe	
environmental	 damages	 to	 air,	 water	 and	 soil	 quality.	 It	 is	 also	 contributed	 to	 losses	 of	




The	 adverse	 impacts	 on	 health	 of	 Chinese	 citizens	 from	 environmental	 damage	 profoundly	
reveal	 the	 connection	 between	 humans	 and	 the	 natural	 world.	 The	 World	 Bank	 placed	 the	
number	 of	 Chinese	people	dying	prematurely	due	 to	 air	 and	water	pollution	 at	 760,000	 each	
year,	yet	some	scholars	have	estimated	that	the	figure	is	actually	two	million	(The	World	Bank	
2007;	Orts	2002:	555).	China’s	State	Environmental	Protection	Agency	(SEPA)	has	revealed	that	





China’s	 Government	 has	 a	 constitutional	 obligation	 to	 improve	 the	 living	 environment	 and	
control	 pollution	 (Article	 26).	 This	 commitment,	 coupled	 with	 international	 pressure,	 have	
resulted	 in	a	variety	of	measures	being	 taken,	which	aim	to	reduce	the	 impact	of	pollution	on	
health	 and	 environment.	 These	 measures	 are	 largely	 based	 on	 Five‐Year	 plans	 that	 involve	
environmental	 and	 resource	 conservation	 targets;	 improved	 pollution	 monitoring,	 and	
increased	 investment	 in	 green	 technology	 (e.g.	 Shen	 2013;	 National	 People’s	 Congress	 of	 the	




A	 key	 regulator	 of	 Government	 initiatives	 is	 the	 SEPA,	 which	 was	 established	 in	 2008	 as	 a	
ministry	 (Li	 2012:	 29).	 SEPA	 are	 involved	 with	 policy	 drafting	 and	 implementation	 and	




that	 has	 been	 largely	 developed	 over	 the	 last	 thirty	 years.	 It	 is	 observed	 that,	 ‘China's	
environmental	 protection	 regime	 ...	 is	 comprised	 of	 approximately	 twenty	 laws,	 forty	












Before	 the	 TLL,	 provisions	 in	 Chinese	 law	 potentially	 allowed	 citizens	 to	 seek	 compensation	
from	polluting	companies.	However,	 the	law	was	applied	inconsistently	and	created	confusion	
for	 both	 judiciary	 and	 those	 involved	 in	 a	 claim	 (Yang	 and	 Moster,	 2011).	 Main	 struggles	
experienced	 by	 pollution‐victims	 included	 meeting	 the	 standard	 of	 proof	 required	 and	
overcoming	 ambiguous	 provisions	 (Faure	 and	 Weiqiang	 2011).	 These	 struggles	 were	











environmental	harm,	but	also,	 for	example,	 those	damaged	by	 traffic	accidents.	 It	 is	explained	
that,	‘Torts	law	adoption	is	acclaimed	in	China	as	a	significant	modern	legislative	achievement	in	





punish’.	 By	 including	 punishment	 as	 an	 objective,	 the	 TLL	 is	 potentially	 creating	 a	 strong	




liable	 for	 pollution‐damage	 even	 if	 it	 does	 not	 breach	 an	 environmental	 standard.	 While	
negligence	imposes	liability	 for	a	 failure	to	exercise	reasonable	care,	strict	 liability	means	that	
the	 polluter	 defendant	 would	 have	 to	 pay	 the	 victim	 for	 any	 harm	 (Coman	 2012:	 145).	 This	





then	 it	 falls	 on	 the	 defendant	 polluter	 to	 disprove	 that	 their	 project	 caused	 the	 harm	 to	 the	







is	 very	 unlikely	 to	 be	 anywhere	 near	 as	 informed,	 influential	 or	 wealthy	 as	 the	 polluter	
defendant.	 By	 requiring	 the	 polluter	 defendant	 to	 produce	 evidence,	 the	 pressure	 and	
responsibility	is	placed	on	the	party	who	has	better	access	to	information	and	other	resources	















a	 defendant	 polluter	 has	 the	 burden	 of	 proof	 they	 are	more	motivated	 to	 reduce	 the	 threats	
posed	by	their	activities	(Crannor	1999:	81).		
	
Australia	 places	 the	 burden	 of	 proof	 on	 the	 alleged	 pollution‐victim	 to	 prove	 complex	 legal	




While	 the	 TLL	 in	 theory	 provides	 effective	 justice	 for	 pollution‐victims,	 in	 practice	 China’s	
systemic	barriers	to	justice	continue	to	hinder	progress.	A	key	barrier	is	that	enforcement	of	the	
TLL.	 This	 issue	 reflects	 the	 overall	 weakness	 in	 China’s	 governance	 system,	 in	 which	
enforceability	 is	 limited	 by	 corruption	 and	 an	 overriding	 desire	 for	 economic	 growth	 (Gang	







trained	 judges	 and	 legal	 professionals	 to	 assist	 in	 resolving	disputes.	 For	 example,	 it	was	not	
until	mid‐2005	that	50%	of	judges	in	China	held	Bachelor	Degrees	(Liebman	2007:	625).		
	
In	 addition,	 corruption	 is	 generally	 regarded	 as	 influential	 in	 civil	 court	 decisions.	 Courts	 are	
accountable	to	the	section	of	government	that	created	them,	and	are	thus	subject	to	supervision	
by	 Party	 Committee	 and	 Party	 organisations	 (Peerenboom	 2002:	 280).	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 the	
funding	 system	 impacts	 on	 the	 independence	 of	 courts.	 Local	 courts	 are	 funded	 by	 and	
dependent	 on	 local	 governments	 for	 all	 expenses,	 including	 salaries	 and	 insurance	 for	 judges	
(Peerenboom	 2002:	 281;	 Kelley	 2012:	 539).	 This	 increases	 the	 likelihood	 of	 judges	 being	
influenced	by	the	desires	of	others.		
	
Moreover,	 lack	 of	 enforcement	 of	 court	 decisions	 is	 a	 major,	 persisting	 issue	 due	 to	 the	 ‘...	
continued	intervention	by	party‐state	officials	and	administrative	departments,	an	undeveloped	






to	 protect	 local	 economic	 growth	 and	 to	 provide	 favouritism	 to	 enterprises	with	 government	
connections	 (e.g.	 Wang	 2011:	 10895).	 Local	 leader’s	 job	 performance	 and	 future	 promotion	
potential	 is	 measured	 according	 to	 economic	 growth	 of	 the	 region,	 and	 this	 creates	 a	




























example,	 local	 environmental	 protection	 agencies	 have	 websites	 that	 contain	 information	
relating	 to	 the	 relevant	 region.	 Additionally,	 mainstream	 media	 and	 activist	 groups	 are	
increasingly	 drawing	 attention	 to	 climate	 change	 and	 the	 need	 for	 environmental	 protection	
(Gang	 2009:	 158).	 However,	 there	 are	widespread	 instances	 of	 environmental	 activists	 being	
arrested	 for	 reasons	 such	 as,	 being	 a	 threat	 to	 national	 security	 (e.g.	 Watts	 2010).	 As	 an	
example,	 Chinese	 activist	 Liu	 Futang	 was	 arrested	 last	 October	 for	 publishing	 information	
without	a	license	when	he	distributed	books	about	environmental	protection	(Richburg	2012).	
Additionally,	transparency	and	accountability	is	severely	hampered	by	the	de‐centralised	nature	
of	 China’s	 system	 of	 governance.	 A	 small,	 central	 government	 creates	 policy,	 and	 the	












social	 or	 personal	 interests’	 (Mingde	 2011:	 218).	 It	 differs	 from	 cases	 that	 involve	 a	 specific	
victim,	 for	example,	a	person	who	 is	 ill.	Accordingly,	Tang	and	Sun	(2012:	186)	comment	that	
this	 avenue	 provides	 the	 ‘...	 means	 of	 achieving	 environmental	 justice	 and	 environmental	





A	 number	 of	 China’s	 environmental	 courts	 have	 allowed	 organisations	 and	 government	
agencies	 to	bring	a	 claim	 in	 the	public	 interest	 (Wang	 	et	al.2011:	10899).	Non‐governmental	
organisations	(‘NGO’s’)	in	China	have	a	particular	advantage	over	pollution‐victims	in	terms	of	
their	 finance	and	knowledge.	However,	unlike	provisions	 for	government	bodies,	 there	are	no	
provisions	granting	NGOs	or	concerned	citizens	 the	right	 to	bring	an	action	against	a	polluter	
(Mingde	 and	Fengyuan	et	 al.	 2011:	 230).	Accordingly,	 in	2010,	 of	 the	 very	 limited	number	of	
public	 interest	 cases	 brought	 to	 the	 environmental	 courts,	 all	 were	 brought	 by	 agencies	
affiliated	 with	 the	 government	 as	 opposed	 to	 independent	 bodies	 (Yang	 and	 Moser	 2011:	
10900).	As	an	example,	members	of	the	Law	School	of	Peking	University	filed	a	lawsuit	when	a	
factory	 explosion	 resulted	 in	 large	 quantities	 of	 carcinogenic	 materials	 leaking	 into	 a	 river;	















particularly	 in	 Queensland	 where	 40,000	 new	 wells	 are	 forecasted	 for	 the	 next	 30	 years.	
Unconventional	gas	includes	coal	seam	gas	(CSG)	and	shale	gas.	To	extract	unconventional	gas,	
drilling	 into	 the	 ground	 to	 loosen	 pressure	 and	 release	 gas	 is	 required,	 and	 stimulation	
techniques,	 like	 hydraulic	 fracturing	 (fraccing)	 can	 be	 used.	 Fraccing,	 a	 process	 increasingly	








in	 the	 extraction	 process	 that	 can	 contaminate	water	 used	 for	 both	 drinking	 and	 agriculture	
(Hunter	2011:	10).	 In	 fact,	 there	has	been	a	string	of	contaminations	 in	Queensland	 from	CSG	
industries.	As	an	example,	in	2010	the	Queensland	Government	gave	environmental	approval	to	
a	 CSG	 company	 operating	 near	 Chinchilla	 to	 discharge	 the	 equivalent	 of	 eight	 Olympic	 sized	
swimming	pools	of	‘treated	water’	into	the	nearby	Condamine	River.	It	has	been	established	that	




The	 impact	 of	 unconventional	 gas	 extraction	 on	 air	 quality	 is	 also	 becoming	 a	 concern,	
particularly	after	the	findings	of	a	Colarado	School	of	Public	Health	Study	(McKenzie	2012).	The	
data,	 based	 on	 three	 years	 of	 examinations,	 revealed	 that	 fraccing	 released	 potentially	 toxic	







In	 contrast	 to	 China,	 Australia	 does	 not	 have	 a	 constitutional	 right	 for	 state	 protection	 of	
environment;	 nor	 do	 Australian	 pollution‐victims	 have	 a	 legislative	 avenue	 to	 bring	 a	 claim	
against	 a	 polluting	 company	 causing	 harm.	 Moreover,	 no	 common	 law	 action	 exists	 for	 a	
concerned	 citizen	 or	 NGO	 to	 prevent	 or	 remedy	 actions	 from	 a	 polluter	 that	 harm	 the	
environment.	It	seems	then	that	Australian	laws	may	lack	clarity,	uniformity	and	participation	












An	 often	 undefeatable	 issue	 pollution‐plaintiffs	 face	 across	 these	 torts	 is	 establishing	 legal	
causation	 (Rychlak	 1989:	 681).	 As	 a	 result,	 Lindgren	 (2010:	 24)	 points	 out	 that	 pollution‐
victims	 ‘may	 be	 denied	 judicial	 redress	 due	 to	 the	 complex	 and	 controversial	 nature	 of	 their	
claims’.	Proving	causation	can	be	problematic	both	 in	making	out	an	action	and	 in	calculating	





With	 this	 in	 mind,	 let’s	 consider	 the	 industrial	 town	 of	 Gladstone,	 where	 CSG	 projects	 are	
underway	 and	 the	 rate	 of	 leukaemia	 is	 108%	 higher	 than	 the	 whole	 of	 Queensland	 (Moran	
2010).	Could	a	person	with	leukaemia	seek	redress	from	the	nearby	industries?	The	answer	is:	




been	 observed	 that,	 while	 medical	 science	 can	 confirm	 that	 exposure	 to	 particular	 toxins	




Finally,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	Gladstone	 resident	would	have	been	 exposed	 to	 other	 intervening	
factors,	such	as,	living	with	a	partner	who	smoked	or	having	a	family	history	of	cancer.	Collins	
(2008)	outlined	difficulties	of	proof	experienced	 in	toxic	 tort	and	these	 included	that	sickness	
often	 has	 multiple	 factors	 and	 there	 is	 potential	 for	 a	 long	 period	 between	 exposure	 and	





caused	harm	into	one	of	 the	specific	 toxic	 torts.	For	example,	 the	elements	of	 trespass	to	 land	
require	an	interference	with	an	owner’s	rights;	however,	the	quality	of	groundwater	or	air	has	
















public	 legal	mechanisms	 (e.g.	Lee	2002;	Rosenberg	1984).	This	approach	would	provide	 legal	





bring	 legal	 challenges	 against	 polluting	 companies.	 The	 types	 of	 plaintiffs	 who	 can	 bring	 an	
action	 have	 been	 broadened.	 As	 an	 example,	 a	 decision	 of	 the	 High	 Court	 allowed	 an	
Environment	 Council	 to	 bring	 an	 action	 against	 developers.	 Additionally,	 specific	 legislative	




to	 a	 person	 seeking	 to	 remedy	 or	 restrain	 an	 offence	 or	 anticipated	 offence	 against	 the	 EPA.	
Importantly,	it	is	an	offence	under	the	EPA	to	cause	environmental	harm,	but	the	polluter	need	
not	be	the	sole	cause.	On	this	basis,	Green	and	Ruddock	(2008:	6)	have	suggested	that	Torres	




However,	 significant	 barriers	 exist	 for	 NGOs	 or	 concerned	 citizens	 seeking	 to	 implement	
environmental	 laws	 (e.g.	 Marseille	 and	 Jan	 2010).	 A	 key	 barrier	 is	 the	 cost	 of	 litigation,	 and	
particularly	 the	 risk	 of	 having	 to	 also	 pay	 the	 polluter’s	 legal	 fees	 if	 the	 NGO	 loses	 the	 case.	
Recently,	an	environmental	organisation,	Blue	Wedges	lost	a	case	they	brought	to	obtain	judicial	
review	 of	 a	 Minister’s	 decision	 to	 allowing	 dredging	 in	 Port	 Phillip	 Bay.	 The	 Government	
pursued	a	substantial	cost	order	against	Blue	Wedges,	even	though	the	community	group	had	
only	$2700	in	its	bank	account	(Gregory,	2008).	Godden	et	al.	(2008:199)	commented	that,	 ‘In	
view	 of	 the	 necessity	 of	 engaging	 the	 public	 in	 a	 more	 meaningful	 way	 in	 an	 era	 of	 strong	




The	 major	 industries	 in	 Australia	 and	 China	 are	 impacting	 on	 the	 health	 and	 well‐being	 of	
citizens.	As	a	result,	environmental	justice	issues	are	likely	to	become	a	focus	of	both	countries	
in	the	future.	In	terms	of	clear	legal	rules	and	addressing	power	imbalances,	China	has	a	highly	
developed	 legal	 response	 to	 environmental	 justice	 issues.	 However,	 this	 progress	 is	 perhaps	
limited	 by	 systemic	 issues	 in	 China’s	 governance	 that	 reflect	 a	 weakness	 in	 rule	 of	 law	
principles.	The	failing	in	Australia’s	legal	response	lies	not	so	much	in	enforcement,	but	more	so	
in	the	clarity	of	 laws	and	accessibility	to	courts.	These	problems	emphasise	the	 importance	of	

























































































































































































































The	 Oceania	 region	 is	 an	 area	 particularly	 prone	 to	 natural	 disasters	 such	 as	 cyclones,	
tsunamis,	 floods,	 droughts,	 earthquakes	and	volcanic	eruptions.	Many	of	 the	nations	 in	 the	
region	 are	 Small	 Island	 Developing	 States	 (SIDS),	 yet	 even	 within	 wealthy	 states	 such	 as	
Australia	and	New	Zealand	there	are	groups	which	are	vulnerable	to	disaster.	Vulnerability	to	
natural	disaster	can	be	understood	in	human	rights	terms,	as	natural	disasters	threaten	the	
enjoyment	 of	 a	 number	 of	 rights	which	 are	 guaranteed	 under	 international	 law,	 including	
rights	to	health,	housing,	food,	water	and	even	the	right	to	life	itself.	The	impacts	of	climate	
change	threaten	to	exacerbate	these	vulnerabilities,	yet,	despite	the	foreseeability	of	further	
natural	 disasters	 as	 a	 result	 of	 climate	 change,	 there	 currently	 exists	 no	 comprehensive	
international	 framework	 for	 disaster	 response	 offering	 practical	 and/or	 legally	 reliable	
mechanisms	 to	 assist	 at‐risk	 states	 and	 communities.	 This	 paper	 sets	 out	 to	 explore	 the	







floods,	 droughts,	 earthquakes	 and	 volcanic	 eruptions.	 Many	 of	 the	 nations	 in	 the	 region	 are	
Small	Island	Developing	States	(SIDS),	which	are	geographically	vulnerable	to	natural	disasters,	
being	 low‐lying	 and	 often	 reliant	 on	 the	 natural	 environment	 for	 subsistence.	 Even	 within	
wealthy	 states	 such	 as	 Australia	 and	 New	 Zealand	 there	 are	 groups	 which	 are	 vulnerable	 to	
disaster,	 including	indigenous	peoples	and	communities	which	lack	the	economic	resources	to	
prepare	 for	 or	 respond	 adequately	 to	 such	 disasters.	 Further,	 there	 are	 often	 strong	 cultural	




threaten	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 a	 number	 of	 rights	which	 are	 guaranteed	 under	 international	 law,	
including	rights	 to	health,	housing,	 food,	water	and	even	the	right	 to	 life	 itself.	The	 impacts	of	
climate	 change	 threaten	 to	 exacerbate	 these	 vulnerabilities,	 yet,	 despite	 the	 foreseeability	 of	
further	natural	disasters	as	a	result	of	climate	change,	there	currently	exists	no	comprehensive	
international	 framework	 for	 disaster	 response	 offering	 practical	 and/or	 legally	 reliable	
mechanisms	to	assist	at‐risk	states	and	communities.	
	




the	 international,	 regional	and	national	 levels.	The	paper	will	begin	by	outlining	 the	extent	of	
vulnerability	 to	 natural	 disaster	 in	 the	 Oceania	 region,	 including	 the	 predicted	 influence	 of	
climate	change.	 It	will	 then	seek	 to	elaborate	on	 the	human	 rights	 issues	associated	with	 this	







assist	 in	 responding	 to	natural	 disaster	 in	 the	 region,	 including	 the	 roles	 of	 various	 state	 and	
non‐state	 actors,	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 gaps,	 overlaps	 and	 ambiguities	 within	 the	 current	
framework.	 It	will	also	assess	various	response	mechanisms	in	terms	of	their	potential	impact	
on	 human	 rights,	 noting	 that	 human	 rights	 issues	 can	 arise	 in	 the	 deployment	 of	 disaster	
responses	 as	 well	 as	 during	 the	 disaster	 itself.	 The	 paper	 will	 conclude	 by	 making	 some	








in	380	different	disasters	 in	 the	Oceania	 region,	while	nearly	20	million	people	were	affected	
(Prevention	 Web	 2013).	 The	 most	 common	 forms	 of	 disaster	 in	 the	 region	 are	 storms	 and	
floods,	followed	by	earthquakes	and	bushfires.		
	





Recent	 examples	which	highlight	 the	particularly	destructive	 character	 of	 natural	 disasters	 in	
the	 Pacific	 include	 tropical	 cyclones	 Ofa	 and	 Val	 which	 struck	 Samoa	 in	 1990	 and	 1991	
respectively,	resulting	in	damage	equivalent	to	four	times	GDP.	The	Samoan	earthquake	in	2009	
led	 to	 a	 tsunami	which	devastated	 Samoa,	 Tonga	 and	American	 Samoa,	 causing	 the	deaths	of	
over	200	people	and	widespread	damage	to	infrastructure.	Widespread	flooding	in	Fiji	 in2009	
and	 2012	 caused	 a	 number	 of	 deaths	 and	 cost	millions	 in	 damage	 and	 lost	 tourism	 revenue	
(Gero,	Meheux	and	Dominey‐Howes	2011a).	 In	Australia,	 floods,	 droughts	 and	bushfires	have	
caused	extensive	damage	and	economic	loss	(Prevention	Web	2013).	
	
While	 the	 exact	 nature	 of	 environmental	 hazards,	 their	 frequency	 and	 seasonality	may	 differ	
from	one	country	to	the	next,	all	countries	in	the	region	are	impacted	to	some	extent	(Mearns	
2007).	The	regional	climate	generally	exhibits	tropical	characteristics,	with	countries	vulnerable	
to	 tropical	 cyclones,	high	 swell	 events,	 floods	and	droughts,	 often	driven	by	El	Nino	Southern	
Oscillation	patterns	(Gero,	Meheux	and	Dominey‐Howes	2011a).	Many	countries	 in	the	region	




A	 number	 of	 factors	 determine	 the	 degree	 of	 vulnerability	 for	 each	 state.	 These	 include	 the	
extent	 to	 which	 island	 economies	 are	 dependent	 on	 environmental	 assets	 or	 are	 resilient	 to	











domestic	markets	 and	 heavy	 dependence	 on	 a	 few	 external	 and	 remote	markets;	
high	costs	 for	energy,	 infrastructure,	 transportation,	communication	and	servicing;	
long	 distances	 from	 export	 markets	 and	 import	 resources;	 low	 and	 irregular	
international	 traffic	 volumes;	 little	 resilience	 to	 natural	 disasters;	 growing	
populations;	 high	 volatility	 of	 economic	 growth;	 limited	 opportunities	 for	 the	
private	 sector	 and	 a	 proportionately	 large	 reliance	 of	 their	 economies	 on	 their	
public	sector;	and	fragile	natural	resources	(UNOHRLLS).	
	
Further,	 a	 number	 of	 these	 states	 are	 also	 listed	 by	 the	 United	 Nations	 as	 Least	 Developed	
Countries	(LDCs),	such	as	Kiribati,	Samoa,	Solomon	Islands,	Tuvalu	and	Vanuatu.	
	
The	 dependence	 of	many	 nations	 in	 the	 region	 on	 highly	 vulnerable	 primary	 resources	 from	
land	 and	 seas	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 economies	 means	 that	 natural	 disasters	 can	 impact	 on	
societies	 at	 a	 very	basic	 level	 and	 cause	 damage	 to	 a	 range	of	 sectors.	 The	 financial	 costs	 for	




As	well	 as	 assessing	 vulnerability	 at	 the	 national	 level,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 the	 particular	





by	 the	 effects	 of	 climate	 change.	 Already	prone	 to	natural	 disasters	 due	 to	 their	 geographical	
and	meteorological	profiles,	many	countries	in	Oceania	also	possess	characteristics	which	make	
them	 especially	 vulnerable	 to	 the	 effects	 of	 climate.	 These	 characteristics	 include	 their	 small	
size,	low	adaptive	capacity	and	high	adaptation	cost‐to‐GDP	ratio.	There	are	a	number	of	effects	
of	 climate	 change	 which	 threaten	 to	 expose	 these	 countries	 to	 greater	 harm	 from	 natural	








natural	 coastal	 defences	 such	 as	 mangroves	 and	 coral	 reefs	 (IPCC	 2007;	 Mearns	 2007).	
Depletion	 of	 natural	 coast	 defences	 exacerbates	 effect	 of	 storm	 surges	 and	 threatens	 human	
settlements	 (Mearns	 2007).	 The	 Inter‐Governmental	 Panel	 on	 Climate	 Change	 has	 predicted	
that	‘port	facilities	at	Suva,	Fiji	and	Apia,	Samoa,	are	likely	to	experience	overtopping,	damage	to	
wharves	and	flooding	of	the	hinterland	following	a	0.5m	rise	in	sea‐level	combined	with	waves	
associated	 with	 a	 1	 in	 50‐year	 cyclone’	 (Mimura	 et	 al.	 2007:	 6.4.7).	 They	 have	 also	 forecast	
significant	 impacts	 on	 transportation,	 as	 international	 airports	 and	 road	networks	 tend	 to	 be	






Rising	 sea‐levels	 combined	with	 increased	 storm	 surges	 are	 likely	 to	 cause	 contamination	 of	






on	 tourism	 (IPCC	 2007).	 These	 economic	 impacts	 will	 exacerbate	 states’	 vulnerabilities	 to	
natural	 disasters,	 hampering	 efforts	 to	 prepare	 for	 or	 respond	 to	 disasters.	 Other	 forms	 of	
environmental	 degradation,	 including	 deforestation	 or	 erosion	 can	 aggravate	 the	 effects	 of	 a	






the	Oceania	 region	contribute	among	 the	 lowest	 levels	of	 greenhouse	gas	emissions	 (UNFCCC	
2005).	 This	 discrepancy	 between	 cause	 and	 effect	 raises	 concerning	 questions	 of	 justice,	 as	






the	 application	 of	 the	 international	 environmental	 principle	 of	 ‘common	 but	 differentiated	
responsibilities’	and	how	this	principle	should	inform	emission	reduction	commitments.	While	










the	 International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	 (ICCPR)	and	the	 International	Covenant	
on	Economic	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	(ICESCR).	They	include	the	right	to	an	adequate	standard	









levels	 of	 obligation:	 the	 duties	 to	 respect,	 protect	 and	 fulfil	 human	 rights.	 While	 national	







Human	 rights	 considerations	 are	 not	 only	 relevant	 in	 examining	 the	 impacts	 of	 natural	
disasters.	 They	 are	 also	 crucial	 in	 the	 development	 of	 appropriate	 responses	 to	 disaster.	
Fundamental	is	the	recognition	that	even	in	the	worst	case	of	disaster	or	displacement,	people	
remain	 entitled	 to	 the	 fundamental	 human	 rights	 which	 are	 guaranteed	 to	 them	 under	
international	law	(Ferris	2010).	Furthermore,	in	the	fulfilment	of	these	rights	they	are	entitled	
to	 assistance	 which	 does	 not	 discriminate	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 aid,	 sex,	 disability,	 religion,	
ethnicity	 or	 social	 status	 (Inter‐Agency	 Standing	 Committee	 2011;	 Lewis	 2006).	 Non‐





The	 Inter‐Agency	 Standing	 Committee	 (IASC),	 the	 key	 organisation	 for	 coordination	 of	
humanitarian	 responses	 involving	 both	 UN	 and	 non‐UN	 agencies,	 released	 a	 set	 of	 Guiding	
Principles	 in	 2011	 in	 recognition	 of	 the	 need	 to	 protect	 human	 rights	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 a	
natural	disaster	and	in	the	response	and	rebuilding	phase.	It	makes	the	point	that,	while	human	
rights	must	be	protected,	for	practical	reasons	it	may	be	difficult	to	simultaneously	guarantee	all	






 Rights	 related	 to	 more	 long‐term	 economic	 and	 social	 needs,	 such	 as	 housing,	 land,	
property	and	livelihoods;	and		
 Rights	 related	 to	 other	 civil	 and	 political	 protection	 needs	 (such	 as	 documentation,	




but	 the	 Guidelines	 make	 clear	 that	 all	 four	 categories	 are	 essential	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	
human	rights	are	adequately	protected	for	all	those	affected	by	natural	disaster	(IASC	2011:	10).		
	
As	noted	above,	 the	obligation	 for	protecting	and	 fulfilling	human	rights	 rests	with	 the	nation	
state,	pursuant	to	international	treaties	and	customary	international	law.	However,	states	which	
provide	aid	or	assistance,	be	it	economic	or	practical,	should	still	ensure	that	such	assistance	is	





The	 IASC	 Guidelines	 referred	 to	 above	 are	 one	 instrument	 designed	 to	 provide	 practical	
guidance	for	the	implementation	of	disaster	response	in	a	manner	which	ensures	protection	of	
human	 rights.	 There	 are	 however	 no	 comprehensive	 and	 binding	 international	 agreements	
which	 formalise	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 affected	 and	 assisting	 states	 in	 responding	 to	 natural	
disasters.	 Instead,	a	number	of	 international,	regional	and	bi‐lateral	 instruments,	both	treaties	
and	soft‐law,	have	been	developed	by	a	range	of	international	actors	which	attempt	to	address	






of	 international	 law	but	 have	 so	 far	 fallen	 short	 of	 establishing	 a	binding	 and	 comprehensive	
framework	of	international	disaster	response	law	(IDRL).		
	




‘anarchic	 accumulation’	 of	 instruments,	 where	 mechanisms	 have	 been	 drafted	 without	
reference	to	each	other,	resulting	in	many	inconsistencies,	contradictions	and	overlaps	between	
the	various	 instruments	 (2012:	3).	He	points	 to	 instances	where	multilateral,	 regional	and	bi‐
lateral	agreements	purport	to	regulate	identical	issues,	resulting	in	contradictory	rules	relating	
to	matters	 such	 as	 the	 status	of	 personnel,	 sharing	of	 costs,	 access	 to	 affected	 territories	 and	
claims	for	compensation	(2012:	40).	This	inconsistency	and	incoherence	has	been	compounded	




Despite	 the	plethora	of	 instruments,	 two	major	contributions	can	be	 identified	 in	 the	work	of	
the	 International	 Federation	 of	 Red	 Cross	 and	 Red	 Crescent	 Societies	 (IFRC)	 and	 the	 recent	
work	of	 the	International	Law	Commission	(ILC).	 In	2001	the	IFRC	 launched	the	International	
Disaster	 Response	 Laws,	 Rules	 and	 Principles	 Programme,	 investigating	 the	 role	 of	 legal	
frameworks	 in	 improving	 disaster	 response	 (IFRC	 2011).	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 work	 of	 the	
Programme,	 in	 November	 2007	 at	 the	 30th	 International	 Conference	 the	 IFRC	 adopted	 the	
‘Guidelines	 for	 the	 Domestic	 Facilitation	 and	 Regulation	 of	 International	 Disaster	 Relief	 and	
Initial	Recovery	Assistance’	(IFRC	2011).	Subsequently,	the	UN	General	Assembly	passed	three	




Whilst	 expressly	 non‐binding	 the	 guidelines	 nonetheless	 suggest	 a	 framework	 for	 domestic	
disaster	 relief,	 and	 have	 been	 widely	 incorporated	 into	 regional	 and	 national	 disaster	 relief	
plans	 and	 frameworks.	 The	 guidelines	 address	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 actors	 in	 immediate	
disaster	 response	 (Part	 I)	 and	 suggest	 legal,	 policy	 and	 institutions	 frameworks	 for	 effective	
early‐warning	 and	 preparedness	 (Part	 II)	 (IFRC	 2011).	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 primary	
purpose	of	the	guidelines	is	to	‘contribute	to	legal	preparedness	by	providing	guidance	to	states	







international	disaster	relief	 for	 the	purposes	of	protection	of	persons	 in	the	event	of	disasters	
(Heath	 2010).	 The	 ILC	 handed	 down	 its	 Preliminary	Report	 on	 the	 Protection	 in	 the	Event	 of	
Disasters	 in	 2008,	 thereafter	 reporting	 annually	 on	 the	 development	 of	 draft	 articles	 for	 a	
proposed	 set	 of	 disaster	 response	 laws	 or	 principles	 to	 the	 UN	 General	 Assembly	 (Valencia‐
Ospina	2008).	Notably,	 the	 ILC	made	efforts	 to	distinguish	 its	work	 from	 the	 IFRC	guidelines,	
recognising	 that	 it	 was	 pertinent	 to	 avoid	 encroaching	 upon	 an	 instrument	 that	 had	 already	







(‘purpose’)	 situates	 IDRL	 within	 a	 human	 rights	 context,	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 rights	 of	
individual	 persons	 (ILC	 2009).	 This	 marks	 a	 departure	 from	 traditional	 conceptions	 of	 IDRL	
which	 tend	 to	 avoid	 any	 such	 contextualisation.	 Further,	 Articles	 6,	 7	 and	 8,	 expressly	 bring	
humanitarian	principles	and	human	rights	 into	the	draft.	Second,	 in	defining	 ‘disaster’	 the	ILC	
has	 omitted	 to	 distinguish	 between	 slow‐	 and	 sudden‐	 onset	 disaster	 or	 between	 natural	 or	




(ILC	 2011).	 These	 obligations	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 duties	 imposed	 on	 states	 under	
international	 human	 rights	 law,	 and	 their	 articulation	 by	 the	 ILC	 sets	 the	 draft	 articles	 apart	
from	existing	guidelines	(IFRC	2011).	It	remains	to	be	seen	whether	the	work	of	the	ILC	will	be	
adopted	 in	any	 formal	way	by	 the	 international	 community,	but	 it	nonetheless	represents	 the	




exist	 which	 have	 some	 application	 to	 disaster	 response,	 although	 none	 which	 provides	
comprehensive	 coverage	 (Valencia‐Ospina	 2008).	 Two	 multilateral	 treaties	 provide	 rules	 for	
international	assistance	in	specific	areas	in	the	event	of	disaster.	The	Framework	Convention	on	
Civil	 Defence	 Assistance	 and	 the	 Tampere	 Convention	 on	 the	 Provision	 of	 Telecommunication	
Resources	 for	Disaster	Mitigation	and	Relief	Operation	 (the	 ‘Tampere	Convention’).	The	 former	
addresses	the	coordination	between	national	civil	defence	entities	and	is	not	largely	considered	
an	 exemplar	 of	 IDRL	 development.	 The	 latter	 is	 a	 comprehensive	 legal	 framework	 for	 the	
provision	of	 telecommunications	assistance	during	disaster	 relief	operations	 (Valencia‐Ospina	
2008).		
	
The	 Tampere	 Convention,	 despite	 having	 limited	 scope,	 is	 regularly	 cited	 as	 an	 example	 of	 a	
working	IDRL‐related	treaty,	despite	having	proved	ineffective	in	the	field	and	having	failed	to	
attract	 wide	 participation.	 The	 Convention	 has	 garnered	 such	 attention	 largely	 because	 it	
provides	a	comprehensive	legal	framework	for	providing	telecommunications	assistance	during	
natural	 disaster,	 focussing	on	 the	 reduction	of	 regulatory	barriers	 including	 those	 regulations	
that	 restrict	 import	 or	 export,	 movement	 of	 personnel,	 and	 delays	 in	 administration	 of	 such	
regulations	 (art	 9).	Whilst	 the	Tampere	 Convention	 certainly	 provides	 an	 example	 of	 how	 an	
IDRL	treaty	could	work,	its	specific	scope	and	unproven	efficacy	undermine	its	applicability.	
	
In	 addition	 to	 these	 two	multilateral	 treaties,	 a	 number	 of	 regional	 treaties	 exist	which	 have	
some	application	in	the	event	of	natural	disaster.	These	mostly	focus	however	on	planning	and	
disaster	risk	reduction,	rather	than	on	disaster	response.	Further,	there	are	no	regional	treaties	
which	 apply	 in	 the	 Oceania	 region.	 There	 are	 some	 soft‐law	 instruments,	 such	 as	 the	 Pacific	
Disaster	 Risk	 Management	 Partnership	 Network’s	 Framework	 for	 Action	 2005‐2015.	 The	
Association	of	Small	Island	States	has	also	contributed	guidelines	which	are	applicable	to	island	
nations	within	Oceania.	These	instruments	focus	primarily	on	planning,	disaster	risk	reduction	
and	capacity	building,	with	a	particular	 interest	 in	addressing	 the	problems	of	climate	change	




that	 there	 is	 currently	 no	 accepted	 definition	 of	 what	 a	 natural	 disaster	 is	 or	 how	 natural	
disaster	 should	 be	 contextualised	 within	 international	 law.	 Particularly	 problematic	 is	 the	
distinction	between	slow‐	and	sudden‐onset	disasters.	Given	that	climate	change	will	result	 in	
increasingly	 severe	 effects	 on	 vulnerable	 states,	 the	 problem	 of	 how	 to	 address	 slow‐onset	
disasters	is	becoming	one	of	increasing	visibility	and	urgency	(Schipper	and	Pelling	2006).	This	
challenge	 is	 most	 obviously	 related	 to	 the	 framework	 for	 disaster	 risk	 and	 reduction,	 as	 it	
Addressing	Vulnerability	and	Human	Rights	in	Disaster	Response	Mechanisms	in	Oceania	
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involves	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	 steps	 states	 should	 take	 in	 preventing	 and	 preparing	 for	










will	 remain	 questions	 about	 who	 can	 provide	 disaster	 relief.	 The	 primary	 obligation	 for	
providing	assistance	in	the	case	of	natural	disaster	rests	with	the	home	state.	This	is	consistent	
with	 human	 rights	 law,	which	 imposes	 obligations	 on	 States	 to	 respect,	 protect	 and	 fulfil	 the	
human	rights	of	those	persons	within	their	territory	or	under	their	control	(McCorquodale	and	
Simons	 2007:	 601).	 It	 is	 also	 largely	 dictated	 by	 the	 principles	 of	 State	 sovereignty	 which	
requires	that	States	not	intervene	following	a	disaster	unless	their	assistance	is	requested	by	the	
affected	state	(Eburn	2011;	Miller	2012).	These	principles	impose	limitations	on	the	likelihood	




With	 respect	 to	 addressing	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 affected	 individuals	 and	 communities,	 human	










It	 is	 less	 clear	 however	 that	 human	 rights	 law	 imposes	 any	 obligation	 on	 States	 to	 provide	
assistance	to	another	country	which	is	affected	by	disaster,	especially	where	the	affected	state	
has	not	sought	help	from	the	international	community	(Heath	2010;	Eburn	2011;	Miller	2012).	







In	 conclusion,	 and	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 a	 new	 legally	 binding	 and	
comprehensive	international	 instrument	is	required	in	the	area	of	natural	disaster	response,	a	
number	 of	 points	 should	 be	made.	 First,	 natural	 disasters	 are	 largely	 unpredictable,	 and	 the	
extent	of	 their	 impact	 is	determined	by	 a	number	of	 variables,	 as	outlined	above.	 Similarly,	 a	
State’s	capacity	to	respond	to	a	disaster	and	the	nature	of	any	cooperative	assistance	from	other	
States	 will	 also	 depend	 on	 a	 range	 of	 factors,	 including	 the	 financial	 capacity	 of	 the	 States	
concerned,	relevant	regional	agreements	or	relationships	and	domestic	aid	mechanisms.	In	such	







It	 is	 questionable	whether	 it	would	 be	 possible	 to	 develop	 a	 single	 instrument	which	 is	 both	
comprehensive	and	legally	binding.	States	generally	consider	their	responsibilities	towards	each	
other	in	times	of	disaster	as	being	humanitarian	or	moral	in	nature,	not	legal.	It	is	unlikely	that	
States	 would	 consent	 to	 be	 legally	 bound	 by	 a	 new	 treaty	 which	 would	 impose	 greater	
obligations	to	provide	assistance	in	times	of	disaster	(Eburn	2012).	Further,	Fidler	(2005)	has	
noted	 that	 the	significant	contribution	which	 is	made	by	NGOs	and	 IGOs	 in	providing	disaster	
response	assistance	may	indicate	that	no	international	legal	instrument	is	required.		
	
The	 current	 framework,	 comprised	 of	 instruments	 such	 as	 the	 IASC	 and	 IFRC	 guidelines,	
provides	 detailed	 guidance	 on	 the	 way	 to	 provide	 disaster	 response	 assistance	 in	 a	 manner	
which	is	consistent	with	human	rights	law.	Those	instruments	rely	on	existing	legal	obligations	
to	guarantee	certain	minimum	standards	and	make	clear	 that	whenever	a	State	 is	engaged	 in	
disaster	 response	activities,	 those	activities	are	 subject	 to	 existing	 international	human	rights	
law.	 It	 is	submitted	 that,	while	 there	are	some	limitations	 to	 the	applicability	of	human	rights	
principles,	given	that	a	new	legally	binding	instrument	is	unlikely	to	gain	the	support	of	States,	
utilising	existing	human	rights	law	to	help	address	vulnerability	in	situations	of	natural	disaster	








definition	 used	 by	 the	 United	 Nations,	 which	 includes	 Australia	 as	 well	 as	 the	 regions	 known	 as	 Micronesia,	
Melanesia	and	Polynesia.	As	such,	it	comprises	the	following	states	and	dependent	territories:	American	Samoa,	
Australia,	Cook	 Islands,	Fiji,	 French	Polynesia,	Guam,	Kiribati,	Marshall	 Islands,	Federated	States	of	Micronesia,	
Nauru,	New	Caledonia,	New	Zealand,	Niue,	Norfolk	Island,	Northern	Mariana	Islands,	Palau,	Papua	New	Guinea,	
Samoa,	Solomon	Islands,	Tokelau,	Tonga,	Tuvalu,	Vanuatu	and	Wallis	and	Futuna	Islands.		



















































































































new	 salience.	 One	 consequence	 of	 these	 two	 interrelated	 trends	 is	 the	 now	 apparently	
universal	disgust	for,	and	repudiation	of,	child	sex	offenders.	This	is	evidenced	through	more	
and	more	punitive	responses	to	these	offenders,	as	well	as	new	legislative	regimes	that	seek	
to	 ameliorate	 the	 apparent	 risk	 they	 are	 said	 to	 pose.	 Both	 post‐sentence	 preventative	
detention	and	supervision	regimes	are	now	a	feature	of	several	Australian	states.	This	signals	
an	 increased	 willingness	 on	 the	 part	 of	 legislators	 to	 pre‐emptively	 engage	 with	 possible	
recidivism	 by	 this	 class	 of	 offenders.	 This	 paper	 uses	 such	 legislative	 regimes	 as	 a	





paper	 investigates	 the	 contemporary	 disgust	 for	 paedophilia,	 and	 the	 political	 dimensions	













to	 legislate	 a	 new	 regime	 enabling	 the	 supervision	 and	 control	 of	 so‐called	 ‘serious	 sex	
offenders’	beyond	the	period	of	their	sentence.1	Newspapers	devoted	pages	and	columns	to	his	
release,	 citing	 the	 excessive	 risk	 that	 he	 was	 said	 to	 constitute.	 Described	 variously	 as	 a	
‘monster’	 (Buttler	 and	 Anderson	 2005a:	 2),	 a	 ‘sex	 fiend’	 (Hodgson	 2005:	 2),	 a	 ‘pervert’	 (Bolt	
2005:	 23),	 and	 ‘scum’	 (Buttler	 and	 Anderson	 2005b:	 3),	 the	Herald	 Sun’s	 editorial	 asked	 ‘all	
Victorian	parents:	Where	will	your	children	play	now?’	(Editorial	2005:	84).	
	
Twenty‐four	 hours	 after	 his	 release	 from	 prison	 on	 13	 July	 2005,	 the	 address	 nominated	 by	
correctional	staff	 for	him	to	reside	at	was	publicly	identified	(Buttler	and	Anderson	2005c:	1).	
Following	 this,	 he	 was	 moved	 to	 another	 secret	 location,	 leading	 to	 persistent	 rumour	 and	








‘justice’,	 Brian	 Keith	 Jones’	 experience	 is	 in	 many	 respects	 not	 unique.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 this	
episode	 bears	 striking	 similarities	 to	 the	 response	 to	 other	 so‐called	monstrous	 paedophiles	
elsewhere.	Events	 surrounding	 the	United	Kingdom’s	News	of	 the	World	campaign	 in	2000	 in	
which	paedophiles’	names	and	addresses	were	published,	attests	to	this,	as	does	a	burgeoning	
body	of	literature	demonstrating	the	potential	consequences	of	‘naming	and	shaming’	laws.3	On	
one	 level	 this	 demonstrates	 the	 contemporary	 and	 seemingly	 universal	 disgust	 paedophilia	




as	 monstrous	 and	 disgusting.	 While	 appearing	 to	 be	 universal	 and	 ahistorical,	 child	 sexual	
assault	 has	 previously	 been	 understood	 in	 quite	 distinct	 terms	 to	 today’s	manifestation.	 The	
paper	 uses	 this	 trajectory	 to	 contextualise	 a	 2007	 case	 brought	 before	 the	New	 South	Wales	
Court	of	Criminal	Appeal	where	a	judge	was	required	to	consider	whether	paedophilia	may	give	






recent	historical	 shifts	 influencing	how	child	 sexual	assault	has	been	conceived.	While	 figures	
such	 as	 ‘Mr	 Baldy’	 tend	 to	 suggest	 the	 innateness	 of	 paedophilia’s	 monstrosity,	 this	
configuration	 has	 not	 always	 occupied	 such	 a	 central	 position	 within	 public	 and	 legal	
consciousness.	Scott	(1998:	65)	writes	that	‘the	appearance	of	a	new	identity	is	not	inevitable	or	
determined,	 not	 something	 that	 was	 always	 there	 simply	 waiting	 to	 be	 expressed’.	 Instead,	
categories	 of	 identity	 (such	 as	 the	 paedophile)	 are	 contingent	 upon	 particular	 political	 or	
historical	movements.	
	
In	 her	 critique	 of	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 child	 pornography,	 Adler	 anchors	 her	 argument	 by	
reference	to	the	‘explosion’	of	child	pornography	in	the	1970s	and	80s.	As	she	demonstrates,	the	
social	 concern	 or	 panic	 about	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 ‘is	 a	 modern	 phenomenon	 that	 has	 grown	
significantly	just	over	the	last	two	decades’	(2001:	217‐8).	Scholars,	child	advocates	and	others	
now	routinely	talk	of	the	‘recent	discovery’	of	child	sexual	assault.	As	Adler	writes,	 ‘declared	a	
“national	emergency”	 in	 [the	United	States]	 in	1990,	 the	crisis	over	child	 sex	abuse	has	 taken	
centre	 stage	 in	 our	 culture	 and	 politics,	 as	 the	worst	 of	 all	 possible	 evils’	 (2001:	 218).	 These	
relatively	 recent	 developments	 substantiate	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 ‘problem’	 of	 child	 sexual	 assault	
has	been	malleable	or	contingent	over	time.	Putting	to	one	side	the	fact	that	debates	about	the	
incidence	 of	 this	 problem	 are	 indelibly	 fraught,	 for	Adler	 one	 thing	 remains	 clear:	 ‘There	has	
been	 a	 dramatic	 explosion	 in	discussion	 about	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 in	 the	 last	 [three]	 decades’,	
whereas	 prior	 to	 this,	 ‘it	 was	 barely	 recognised	 as	 a	 problem’	 (Adler	 2001:	 220;	 original	
emphasis).		
	




previously	 it	 has	 been	 conceived	 as	 a	 problem	 of	 overstatement	 or	 infrequency,	 the	 current	
widespread	 acceptance	 of	 child	 sexual	 assault	 as	 a	 problem	 is	 marked	 by	 its	 statistical	









this	assists	 in	understanding	how	concern	about	 child	molestation	has	 fluctuated	widely	over	
the	 twentieth	 century.	For	him,	 these	 changes	 reflect	 the	 shifting	 role	of	 interest	 groups	over	
time,	 such	 as	 child	 protection	 movements,	 feminists,	 psychiatrists	 and	 therapists,	 as	 well	 as	







example,	 historicises	 a	 comparatively	 recent	 movement	 away	 from	 penal	 welfare	 and	




1995,	 2007).	These	penal	 shifts	 can	be	witnessed	 in	 an	Australian	 context	by	 a	 range	of	 new	
mechanisms	 for	 dealing	 with	 sex	 offenders	 in	 general,	 and	 child	 sex	 offenders	 in	 particular.	
Mechanisms	such	as	 ‘Working	With	Children	Checks’	and	sex	offender	registries	have	become	
standard.5	 In	 a	 custodial	 context,	 several	 Australian	 states	 have	 also	 enacted	 post‐sentence	
preventative	 detention	 and	 supervision	 schemes	 enabling	 the	 continued	 detention	 of	 eligible	
sex	offenders	at	the	conclusion	of	a	custodial	sentence.	
	
Post‐sentence	preventative	 detention	 and	 supervision	 schemes	have	 generally	 been	met	with	
little	political	or	public	resistance.	This	is	 in	spite	of	the	fact	that	they	suspend	long‐held	 legal	
protections	 such	 as	 principles	 of	 double	 jeopardy,	 retrospective	 punishment,	 finality	 of	
sentencing,	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 (Douglas	 2008;	 Keyzer	 and	 Blay	 2006;	 Keyzer,	 Pereira	 and	
Southwood	 2004;	 Keyzer	 and	 O’Toole	 2006;	 McSherry	 2005,	 2007).	 In	 the	 context	 of	
community‐based	 initiatives	 such	 as	 sex	 offender	 registries	 and	 the	 move	 toward	 public	
accessibility	of	such	information,	such	measures	exist	in	spite	of	the	risk	of	retributive	violence	
that	 public	 notification	 can	 pose	 (Ashenden	 2002;	 Critcher	 2002;	 Cross	 2005;	 Evans	 2003;	
Lawler	 2002;	 McAlinden	 2005).	 The	 relative	 lack	 of	 concern	 about	 this,	 I	 would	 suggest,	 is	
explained	by	the	trajectory	of	disgust	identified	above.	While	the	‘new	punitiveness’	and	penal	




















the	prisoner.	 The	police	 informant	 gave	 evidence	 that,	 three	days	 after	 the	 second	 fire,	Dunn	
stated	that	he	had	lit	the	fire	because	Arja	was	a	‘rock	spider’.7	This	term	is	used	predominantly	




While	Dunn’s	 belief	 that	Arja	was	 a	 paedophile	was	 found	 to	 be	wrong,	 the	 sentencing	 judge	
held	 that	 a	 significant	 factor	 motivating	 Dunn	 was	 his	 ‘feelings	 of	 antipathy	 towards	 his	
neighbour	 Mr	 Arja	 who	 he	 believed	 without	 justification	 at	 all,	 was	 a	 paedophile’.9	 These	
findings,	the	judge	ruled,	constituted	a	significant	aggravating	factor	in	line	with	s	21A(2)(h)	of	
the	Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	(NSW)	1999.	This	section	provides	that	sentencing	judges	
may	 have	 regard	 to	 whether	 an	 offence	 was	 motivated	 by	 hatred	 for	 or	 prejudice	 against	 a	
group	of	people	to	which	the	offender	believed	the	victim	belonged.	Specifically,	 it	constitutes	
the	 means	 by	 which	 New	 South	 Wales	 courts	 distinguish	 hate	 crimes	 from	 other	 forms	 of	
offending	behaviour.		
	
















response	 to	 this	 case,	Mason	writes	 ‘this	 decision	 appears	 to	 be	 a	world	 first.	 The	protection	
offered	by	hate	crime	laws	has	never	before	been	extended	to	paedophiles	as	a	group’	(2009a:	
254).	 Elsewhere	 she	 describes	 it	 as	 a	 ‘provocative	 and	 unique	 decision’	 (2009b:	 337).	
Considering	 the	 recent	 history	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 hate	 crime,	 Mason	 emphasises	 how	 it	 has	
typically	 been	 deployed	 in	 order	 to	 place	 ‘discriminatory	 violence	 on	 the	 public	 agenda	 as	 a	
recognisable	social	problem’	(2009a:	254).	Hate	crime	 laws,	she	argues,	aim	to	 ‘make	a	broad	
moral	 claim	 that	 prejudice	 is	 wrong	 and	 thereby	 reinforce	 prosocial	 values	 of	 tolerance	 and	
respect	 for	 marginalised	 and	 disadvantaged	 groups’	 (Mason	 2009a:	 254).	 Because	 of	 their	






this	 prejudice	 must	 be	 irrational	 or	 unjustifiable:	 ‘prejudice	 by	 very	 definition	 denotes	 an	
irrational	 or	 unjustifiably	 negative	 attitude	 towards	 members	 of	 a	 particular	 group’	 (2009a:	
255).	However,	 she	 regards	paedophilia	 as	 something	of	 a	 limit	when	 it	 comes	 to	hate	 crime.	





Adults	who	 engage	 in	 sex	with	 children	 inflict	 a	 clear	 and	 identifiable	 harm	upon	












homosexuals	and	paedophiles	was	 the	primary	 (albeit	not	 exclusive)	motive	 for	 these	deaths,	
because	 of	 the	 broader	 moral	 judgment	 that	 is	 socially	 ascribed	 to	 homosexuality	 and	
paedophilia,	this	case	has	rarely	if	ever	been	properly	labelled	as	a	hate	crime.	
	
Returning	 to	 the	 case	 of	 Dunn,	 for	 Mason	 prejudice	 against	 paedophilia	 is	 not	 irrational	 or	
unjustified,	therein	precluding	such	violence	from	being	understood	as	a	category	of	hate	crime.	
While	I	am	broadly	indebted	to	Mason’s	extensive	and	insightful	work	on	hate	crime,	I	take	issue	
with	 two	 particular	 consequences	 of	 her	 argument	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 paedophilia:	 first,	 the	
assumption	that	hatred	of	paedophilia	is	neither	irrational	nor	unjustified;	and	second,	the	need,	





for	 child	 sex	 offending	 is	 to	 be	welcomed,	 this	 should	 not	 preclude	 critique	 of	 the	manner	 in	
which	 paedophilia	 has	 come	 to	 constitute	 monstrosity	 and	 hatred	 par	 excellence.	 Following	
Jenkins’	(1998)	identification	of	a	moral	panic	surrounding	paedophilia,	this	panic	itself	may	be	
misplaced	or	out	of	proportion.	By	delegitimising	 the	potential	 for	paedophilia	 to	constitute	a	
category	 of	 hate	 crime,	 recognition	 of	 the	 irrational	 or	 unjustified	 moral	 panic	 surrounding	
paedophilia	 is	 foreclosed.	 Indeed,	 growing	 vigilantism	 against	 paedophiles	 is	 one	 key	






My	 second	 point	 of	 departure	 from	 Mason’s	 argument	 is	 borne	 from	 need	 to	 distinguish	
between	 paedophilia	 and	 child	 sexual	 assault.	 Throughout	 this	 paper	 I	 have	 used	 the	 terms	
‘child	 sexual	 assault’	 and	 ‘paedophilia’	 deliberately.	 One	 consequence	 of	 the	 moral	 panic	
surrounding	 the	 paedophile	 is	 to	 cast	 this	 category	 or	 type	 of	 person	 as	 emblematic	 for,	 and	
synonymous	 with,	 child	 sexual	 assault.	 The	 alarming	 prevalence	 from	 child	 sexual	 assault	
however	 demands	 that	 the	 category	 of	 the	 paedophile	 cannot	 stand	 in	 for	 this	 troubling	
phenomenon.	 Through	 our	 aversion	 for	 the	 paedophile,	 we	 lose	 sight	 of	 the	 more	 routine,	
normative	reality	of	child	sexual	assault.	In	this	respect	my	argument	parallels	Hannah	Arendt’s	
in	the	context	of	Adolph	Eichmann	trial	(1963).	For	Arendt,	what	characterised	Eichmann	was	
not	 monstrosity	 or	 extraordinary	 exceptionality.	 Instead,	 it	 was	 his	 very	 ordinariness,	 his	
banality.	For	her,	this	made	his	crimes	much	more	terrifying.	In	the	same	way,	I	would	suggest	
that	 our	 increased	 fixation	 on	 ‘the	 paedophile’	 functions	 to	 disavow	 the	 routine	 or	 prevalent	






In	 this	 respect,	what	 is	often	 left	unspoken	within	 the	cultural	aversion	 for	paedophilia	 is	 the	
complex	relation	of	self	and	other	that	underpins	this	disgust.	Broadly	speaking	debates	about	
criminal	 justice	 tend	 by	 their	 nature	 to	 construct	 community.	 As	 Young	 observes,	 ‘the	 mere	
existence	 of	 an	 offender	 is	 set	 up	 as	 turning	 everyone	 (else)	 into	 victims.	 Thus	 the	 lines	 are	
rigidly	drawn	between	those	who	belong	to	the	law	(and	the	community)	and	those	who	do	not:	
the	 outlaws’	 (1996:	 9).	 Hate	 crime	 itself	 has	 been	 examined	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 complex	
manifestation	 of	 this	 dichotomy	 between	 self	 and	 other,	 offering	 a	 complex	 insight	 into	 the	
construction	 of	 identity	 (and	 community)	 through	 the	 infliction	 of	 retributive	 violence.	











By	 foreclosing	 paedophilia	 from	 legal	 definitions	 of	 hate	 crime,	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 we	 re‐




serves	 to	de‐legitimise	 the	motivation	 that	underpins	such	acts.	 In	 the	case	of	 racism,	sexism,	
homophobia	and	so	on,	the	import	of	this	is	obvious.	However,	in	a	context	in	which	paedophilia	









Earlier	 in	this	paper	 I	quoted	Scott,	who	speaks	of	 the	way	 in	which	 the	appearance	of	a	new	
identity	 is	 neither	 inevitable	 nor	 predetermined.	 By	 chronically	 a	 trajectory	 of	 disgust	
associated	with	paedophilia,	I	have	sought	to	offer	a	context	through	which	to	make	meaningful	
the	 contemporary	 aversion	 for	 paedophilia.	 Since	 the	 1970s,	 during	 which	 time	 child	 sexual	
assault	was	 all	 too	often	 silenced	or	 trivialised,	 the	 child	protection	 lobby	and	 feminists	have	
made	 important	 strides	 in	 bringing	 to	 light	 the	 all‐too‐prevalent	 nature	 of	 this	 form	 of	
victimisation	 (Angelides	 2004).	 One	 consequence	 of	 this	 has	 been	 an	 increased	 aversion	 for	
those	 who	 have	 been	 responsible	 for	 such	 conduct.	 However,	 while	 denunciation	 for	
paedophilia	 is	 both	 important	 and	 necessary,	 a	 growing	moral	 panic	 surrounding	 this	 is	 not	
without	consequence.	This	can	be	witnessed	via	retributive	violence	that	many	convicted	child	
sexual	offenders	experience	upon	their	release	from	prison,	as	with	the	misdirected	actions	by	
people	 such	 as	 Darren	 Brian	Dunn.	 Further,	 increased	 hysteria	 regarding	 convicted	 child	 sex	
offenders	 is	 often	 itself	misplaced,	 instilling	 a	 false	 sense	 of	 security	 to	 the	 public:	 as	 Barnes	
notes,	 this	diverts	attention	 from	 the	 ‘individual	who	presents	 as	a	decent	 law‐abiding	 family	
man’	 (cited	 in	 Ardill	 and	Wardle	 2009:	 258).	My	 argument	 is	 not	 that	 paedophilia	 should	 be	







1  See	McDonald	(2012)	for	an	analysis	of	 the	enactment	of	post‐sentence	preventative	detention	and	supervision	
regimes	relating	to	so‐called	‘serious	sex	offenders’.	




















































































































In	 recent	 events,	 notions	 of	 political	 protest,	 civil	 disobedience,	 extremism,	 and	 criminal	
action	have	become	increasingly	blurred.	The	London	Riots,	the	Occupy	movement,	and	the	
actions	 of	 hacking	 group	 Anonymous	 have	 all	 sparked	 heated	 debate	 about	 the	 limits	 of	
legitimate	protest,	and	the	distinction	between	an	acceptable	action	and	a	criminal	offence.	
Long	 before	 these	 events,	 environmental	 activists	 were	 challenging	 convention	 in	 protest	
actions,	with	several	groups	engaging	in	politically	motivated	 law‐breaking.	The	emergence	
of	 the	 term	 ‘eco‐tage’	 (the	 sabotage	 of	 equipment	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 the	 environment)	












Politically	motivated	 lawbreaking	 has	 long	 been	 a	 protest	 tactic	 across	many	movements	 for	
social	 justice.	On	a	continuum	between	civil	disobedience	and	 terrorism	exists	many	 forms	of	
action	 that	 defy	 laws,	 and	 labels.	 For	 instance,	 terms	 such	 as	 eco‐tage	 (the	 sabotage	 of	





enforcement,	 as	 well	 as	 condemnation	 from	 the	 public.	 This	 is	 despite	 ongoing	 protest	 from	




and	 policy	 makers	 in	 attempts	 to	 define	 terrorist	 acts,	 and	 distinguish	 between	 legitimate	
protest	and	illegitimate	actions.	This	paper	examines	the	ways	in	which	the	lawbreaking	actions	
of	 environmentalist	 and	 animal	 rights	 groups	 are	 positioned	 and	 justified.	 The	 first	 section	
provides	an	examination	of	efforts	 to	 categorise	politically	motivated	 lawbreaking	 in	order	 to	
identify	the	key	factors	that	establish	the	borderlines	between	civil	disobedience,	terrorism,	and	
acts	in	between.	The	second	section	is	an	examination	of	justifications	offered	by	groups	for	acts	
of	 lawbreaking	 via	 a	 content	 analysis	 of	 press	 releases	 from	 five	 activist	 groups.	 These	
justifications	 for	 illegal	 behaviour	 offer	 some	 insight	 into	 how	 activist	 groups	 self‐define	 and	
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categorise	 their	own	behaviour	on	a	 continuum	between	 legal	protest	 and	violent	extremism.	
The	data	analysed	includes	press	statements	put	out	by	Trident	Ploughshares,	Greenpeace,	Sea	
Shepherd	Conservation	Society,	Stop	Huntingdon	Animal	Cruelty	(and	associated	group	Smash	
HLS),	 and	 Rising	 Tide	 between	 January	 2010	 and	December	 2012.	 The	 analysis	 involved	 the	
coding	of	each	statement	to	identify	recurring	themes	in	the	justifications	provided	for	actions.	
This	method	is	informed,	in	part,	by	Liddick’s	(2013)	analysis	of	individual	statements	from	the	
Animal	 Liberation	 Front.	 Liddick	 sought	 to	 identify	 evidence	 of	 neutralisation	 strategies	
employed	by	activists	to	assuage	feelings	of	guilt	for	committing	socially	deviant	acts.	This	study	
uses	 a	 similar	 content	 analysis	 approach	 to	 identify	 thematic	 justifications	 for	 criminal	 acts	
based	 on	 traditional	 justifications	 for	 political	 lawbreaking	 found	 in	 the	 literature,	 as	well	 as	
allowing	 for	 the	 coding	 to	 be	 driven	 by	 the	 data	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 new	 or	 alternative	
justifications.		
	







Much	 of	 the	 debate	 about	 the	 definition	 of	 terrorism	 revolves	 around	 three	 key	 factors:	 the	
actor,	the	target,	and	the	act.	Of	these	categories,	the	actor	appears	to	be	the	least	determinant	
factor	 in	 justifying	a	 label	of	 terrorism.	The	State	Department	of	 the	USA	defines	 terrorism	as	
acts	perpetrated	by	‘sub‐national	groups	or	clandestine	agents’	(US	Department	of	State	1998:	
vi),	 however	 some	 argue	 that	 this	 definition	 is	 too	 limiting,	 and	 does	not	 take	 account	 of	 the	






the	political	 and	ethical	 rationale	 for	 the	act	 that	 turns	a	 garden‐variety	 crime	 like	vandalism	
into	a	purported	act	of	ecoterrorism’	(Amster	2006:	299).	This	 is	evident	 in	 the	definitions	of	
terrorism	 adopted	 by	 a	 number	 of	 nation‐states,	 particularly	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America,	
which	 has	 imposed	 harsher	 penalties	 for	 crimes	 such	 as	 vandalism	 and	 arson	 through	
‘terrorism	enhancements’	(Gibson	2010:	142).	It	is,	however,	not	the	actor,	but	rather	the	target	
of	 the	 act	 (human	 or	 non‐human),	 and	 the	 act	 itself	 (violent	 or	 non‐violent)	 which	 most	




The	 targets	 of	 terrorist	 acts	 are	 both	primary	 and	 secondary	 (Vanderheiden	 2005:	 428).	 The	
primary	 target	 is	 the	 person,	 or	 object,	 on	 which	 the	 act,	 or	 attack,	 is	 directly	 inflicted.	 The	
secondary	 target	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 more	 important	 target,	 the	 ‘real’	 audience	 for	 the	
attack.	It	is	typically	the	populace,	government	or	institution	intended	to	experience	‘terror’	at	
the	prospect	of	 future	actions.	There	are	several	ways	 in	which	the	selection	of	 these	primary	
and	 secondary	 targets	 can	 serve	 to	 distinguish	 acts	 of	 terrorism	 from	 other	 forms	 of	 illegal	
political	action	for	environmental	reasons.	Firstly,	acts	of	terrorism	are	broadly	considered	to	be	
especially	evil	because	they	do	not	discriminate	between	‘innocent’	and	‘non‐innocent’	victims.	
While	 the	 terrorists	 responsible	 for	 the	 attack	 on	 the	 World	 Trade	 Centre	 in	 2001	 chose	 a	
symbolic	 target	 for	destruction,	 they	killed	 thousands	of	people	 indiscriminately.	By	 contrast,	
environmental	activists	are	very	discriminating	 in	 selecting	 targets	 for	 their	actions,	 choosing	
individuals	 and	 organisations	 that	 they	 believe	 to	 be	 directly	 responsible	 for	 environmental	
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attacks	 is	 in	 the	 intended	 secondary	 target	 for	 their	 actions.	Radical	 enviromentalists	 tend	 to	
favour	 more	 direct	 tactics,	 with	 actions	 taken	 against	 the	 secondary	 target,	 or	 audience,	
themselves.	For	example,	the	Environmental	Liberation	Front	has	claimed	responsibility	for	acts	





the	most	 important	 target,	 the	 impact	on	a	secondary	 target	 cannot	be	discounted	altogether.	
Those	responsible	 for	 these	acts	often	publicise	their	activities,	which	 indicates	that	while	 the	
primary	aim	may	be	to	disrupt	environmentally	damaging	activities	such	as	logging,	a	secondary	
aim	may	be	to	dissuade	other	companies	from	engaging	in	such	activities.	This	would	certainly	
be	 true	 of	 several	 of	 the	 actions	 taken	 by	 members	 of	 animal	 rights	 activist	 group	 Stop	











The	 vast	majority	 of	 radical	 environmental	 or	 animal	 rights	 groups	 engaging	 in	 direct	 action	
target	 corporations	 as	 both	 their	 primary	 and	 secondary	 targets,	 rather	 than	 governments,	
which	could	preclude	them	from	the	label	of	terrorism	under	some	definitions.	For	instance,	the	
definition	of	 terrorism	under	US	 law	 is	an	act	 ‘calculated	 to	 influence	or	affect	 the	conduct	of	
government	 by	 intimidation	 or	 coercion,	 or	 to	 retaliate	 against	 government	 conduct’	 (Anti‐
Terrorism	and	Effective	Death	Penalty	Act	1996).	Despite	this	guiding	principle	that	an	act	should	
be	directed	at	 the	state	 (whether	as	primary	or	secondary	 target),	perpetrated	by	a	non‐state	
actor	in	order	to	be	classified	as	terrorism,	many	acts	directed	at	corporate	interests	have	been	
declared	to	be	eco‐terrorism.	For	example,	the	burning	of	buildings	and	ski	lifts	at	Vail	Colorado	
in	 1998	 was	 an	 act	 clearly	 directed	 against	 the	 property	 developers	 and	 resort	 owners.	







muddies	 the	definitional	waters.	 This	 ethical	 boundary	 is	 the	one	most	 frequently	 erected	by	
radical	 environmentalists	 in	 setting	 parameters	 on	 their	 protest	 activities.	 Dave	 Foreman,	
environmentalist	 leader,	 advocates	 the	 use	 of	 ‘monkeywrenching’	 (typically	 the	 sabotage,	 or	
eco‐tage,	of	industrial	equipment	used	in	environmentally	damaging	acts	such	as	bulldozers	or	
timber	 saws)	 as	 a	 form	 of	 ‘non‐violent	 resistance	 to	 the	 destruction	 of	 natural	 diversity	 and	






include	 actions	 against	 non‐human	 targets.	 Following	 the	 terrorist	 attacks	 of	 September	 11	
2001,	the	definition	of	terrorism	was	effectively	expanded	under	the	Patriot	Act	to	include	acts	
that	 destroy	 or	 attempt	 to	 destroy,	 ‘any	 building,	 vehicle,	 or	 other	 real	 or	 personal	 property	




threshold	 for	 an	 act	 to	 be	 defined	 as	 terrorism	 specifying	 that	 acts	 such	 as	 causing	 ‘physical	
disruption	to	the	functioning	of	an	animal	enterprise’	would	also	be	considered	terroristic,	and	
thus	 subject	 to	 enhancement	 penalties.	 Several	 scholars	 and	 activists	 have	 argued	 that	 these	
expansions	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 terrorism	were	 intended	 to	 capitalise	on	 the	 increased	 fear	of	





Definitions	 of	 terrorism	 based	 on	 the	 target	 of	 an	 act	 are	 inherently	 linked	 to	 the	 act	 itself.	
Attempts	 to	 categorise	 the	 illegal	 actions	 of	 environmentalist	 and	 animal	 rights	 activists	 on	 a	
continuum	between	civil	disobedience	and	terrorism	have	centred	on	these	two	main	variables,	
largely	 disregarding	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 actor.	 Miller,	 Rivera	 and	 Yelin	 suggest	 that	 illegal	
actions	by	environmentalist	 groups	 can	 fall	within	 three	 categories.	 Firstly,	 civil	disobedience	
‘would	 encompass	 actions	 of	 peaceful	 protest	 and	 speech’	 and	 would	 be	 distinguished	 from	
other	 acts	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 ‘significant	 security	 threat’	 posed	 by	 the	 protest.	 Secondly	
‘antagonistic	disobedience’	 is	 defined	 as	 ‘actions	 that	 are	 semiviolent	 or	 violent’	 such	 as	 ‘tree	
spiking,	 individual	 acts	 of	 violence	 or	 assault,	 and	 minor	 destruction	 of	 property	 and/or	




primarily	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 use	 of	 violence.	 The	 middle‐ground	 category	 of	 ‘antagonistic	
disobedience’,	 however,	 creates	 significant	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 basis	 on	 which	 distinctions	 are	
made.	 In	 this	 casting	 both	 ‘antagonistic	 disobedience’	 and	 ‘terrorism’	 are	 violent	 actions,	 and	
both	result	in	harm	to	people	and	property.	The	distinction	between	the	two,	therefore,	seems	
























rejects	 the	 idea	implicit	 in	Miller	et	al.’s	categories	that	targeting	humans	always	causes	more	
harm	than	targeting	property.	He	argues	that,	‘Legal	statutes,	and	most	persons	with	an	opinion	
on	 the	 topic,	would	not	consider	 throwing	a	 tofu	pie	 in	someone’s	 face’	 (Type	 III)	 to	be	more	









to	 identify	 where	 actions	 by	 radical	 environmental	 and	 animal	 rights	 activists	may	 fit	 in	 the	
spectrum	 between	 civil	 disobedience	 and	 terrorism.	 In	 so	 doing,	 more	 questions	 have	 been	









the	 target	 of	 the	 groups,	 and	 the	 impact	 the	 action	 had	 (i.e.	 the	 success,	 or	 achievement).	 As	
such,	 the	 justifications	provided	 for	actions	rarely	explicitly	appeal	 to	 traditional	 justifications	







structures	 to	 achieve	 change.	Martin	Luther	King	 Jr.,	 in	his	 landmark	Letter	 from	Birmingham	
Jail	 justifies	 the	 breaking	 of	 laws	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 ‘the	 city’s	 white	 power	 structure	 left	 the	
Negro	 community	 with	 little	 alternative’	 (King	 1964:	 77‐99).	 While	 the	 challenge	 for	
environmental	and	animal	rights	activists	is	distinctly	different	to	the	civil	rights	movement	of	
the	 1960s,	 Gibson	 argues	 that	 some	 activists	 have	 rejected	 institutionalised	 structures	 for	
change	 due	 to	 a	 belief	 that	 ‘questions	 of	 environmental	 degradation	 could	 no	 longer	 be	
separated	from	critiques	of	state	power,	corporate	overreach	and	neoliberal	capitalism’	(Gibson	
2010:	 136).	 This	may	 be	 compounded	 by	 the	 diminishing	 traditional	 avenues	 through	which	
dissent	 can	 be	 expressed,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 restrictive	 permit	 regimes	 governing	mass	public	
protests,	 and	 the	 dominance	 of	 corporate	 interests	 in	 government	 decision‐making	 (White	
2009:	56).	
	





said	 Almonte,	 one	 of	 the	 protestors	 now	 inside	 the	 pipeline.	 ‘This	 multinational	
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corporation	 has	 bullied	 landowners	 and	 expropriated	 homes	 to	 fatten	 its	 bottom	
line’.	(Rising	Tide	3	December	2012)		
	
A	 Rising	 Tide	 activist	 declared	 in	 one	 statement,	 ‘I	 climbed	 this	 tree	 in	 honor	 of	 all	 the	
landowners	who	have	been	bullied	mercilessly	 into	signing	easement	contracts	and	who	were	





‘In	 failing	 to	 completely	 block	 new	 “forest	 code”	 legislation	 yesterday,	 President	 Dilma	 has	
turned	 a	 blind	 eye	 to	 the	 destruction	 of	 the	 Amazon	 and	 a	 deaf	 ear	 to	 the	 people	 of	 Brazil’	
(Greenpeace	26	May	2012).		
	











the	 failing	of	established	processes	 for	 change,	but	also	 in	 the	 lack	of	 ability	or	willingness	of	
those	in	power	to	fulfil	their	roles.	For	instance,	Vanderheiden	(2005)	poses	several	case	studies	
of	 ecotage	 questioning	whether	 illegal	 action	might	 be	 justified	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 failure	 of	
governments	 to	 enforce	 laws	 against	 illegal	 logging	 and	 development,	 thus	 making	 them	
complicit	 with	 environmental	 degradation	 (Vanderheiden	 2005:	 442‐443).	 Nagtzaam	 and	
Lentini	 (2008)	 also	 consider	 a	 version	 of	 this	 justification	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 actions	 by	 the	 Sea	
Shepherd	Conservation	Society,	 labelling	 them	as	 ‘vigilantes’	 acting	 to	enforce	a	 law	 that	 they	
believe	should	be	enacted	(Nagtzaam	and	Lentini	2008).		
	
Captain	Paul	Watson	 from	 the	 Sea	 Shepherd	Conservation	 Society	has	 said	 they	 are	 acting	 to	
prevent	 ‘illegal	whaling	 activities’	 (SSCS	 5	 July	 2012).	 Trident	 Ploughshares	 also	 declare	 that	
they	are	acting	 to	prevent	 illegal	 action.	 In	many	of	 their	press	 releases	 they	characterise	 the	
existence	 of	 the	 Trident	 nuclear	weapons	 programme	 as	 illegal	 and	 in	 breach	 of	 the	Nuclear	
Non‐Proliferation	 Treaty.	 They	 say,	 ‘As	 long	 as	 the	 UK	 government	 threatens	 the	 peace	with	





A	second	 justification	offered	for	 illegal	acts	by	organisations	 is	on	 the	basis	of	morality	–	 the	
moral	 justification	 for	 action	 being	 that	 to	 fail	 to	 act	 is	 immoral.	 Liddick’s	 recent	 study	 of	
statements	 by	 the	 Animal	 Liberation	 Front	 also	 found	 that	 an	 ‘appeal	 to	 a	 higher	 moral	
principle’	 was	 frequently	 invoked	 to	 justify	 illegal	 actions.	 Statements	 from	 Trident	
Ploughshares	activists	regularly	reflected	 this	 theme.	A	press	release	 from	2011	declared	that	









Activists	 from	 Rising	 Tide	 also	 explained	 their	 lawbreaking	 activists	 as	 an	 exercise	 of	 moral	
responsibility.	Activist	Benjamin	Franklin	said:	
	
As	 someone	who	has	a	 religious	dedication	 to	nonviolence,	 I	 have	 a	duty	 to	 assist	
nonviolent	 tactics.	 This	 is	 a	 path	 to	 change	 that	 works.	 Despite	 everything	 that	
happened	 at	 the	 direction	 of	 TransCanada,	 I	 don’t	 regret	my	 involvement	 at	 all.	 I	
encourage	everyone	to	persevere	in	the	fact	of	this	type	of	sheer	brutality.	To	follow	




able	 to	 tell	my	children	 that	 I	did	 something	when	 the	 time	 came’	 (19	September	2012).	One	
statement	 from	 the	 group	 Smash	 HLS	 (associated	 with	 the	 Stop	 Huntingdon	 Animal	 Cruelty	






Environmentalist	 leader	Steven	Best	coined	the	term	‘extensional	self‐defence’	 to	describe	 the	
justification	for	illegal	actions	such	as	sabotage	and	violence.	He	argued	that:	
	
If	 animals	 are	 under	 violent	 attack	 and	 cannot	 defend	 themselves,	 if	 the	 state	
protects	only	their	oppressors,	and	if	animal	rights	activists	are	the	only	ones	who	
can	defend	animals,	 do	 they	not	have	 the	 right	 to	use	 sabotage	 and	 even	violence	




disobedience.	 Rawls	 (1971:	 383)	 argues	 that	 the	 primary	 aim	 of	 civil	 disobedience	 is	 not	 to	
effect	change	in	and	of	itself,	but	to	mobilise	mass	support	as	a	catalyst	for	change.	Generating	
public	 support	 is	 certainly	 one	 priority	 of	 the	 organisations	 examined	 here	 (especially	
Greenpeace	which	 engages	 in	many	 legal	protests	 as	well	 as	public	 theatre	designed	 to	bring	
attention	 to	 environmental	 issues),	 but	 this	 justification	 for	 illegal	 acts	 serves	 to	 circumvent	
processes	of	legal	change	in	favour	of	more	immediate	change.		
	
The	 justification	 for	 illegal	 actions	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 protection	 of	 others,	 and	 extensional	 self‐
defence	 of	 animals,	 is	 a	 frequently	 used	 elements	 in	 several	 of	 the	 organisations’	 statements	
about	their	actions.	None	of	the	statements	explicitly	invoke	a	right	to	extensional	self‐defence.	
They	do,	however,	 imply	 this	 justification	 through	declarations	 that	 they	are	breaking	 laws	 in	
order	to	protect	animals	or	the	environment.		
	
Protection	 of	 animal	 life	 was	 a	 frequent	 feature	 of	 statements	 from	 the	 Sea	 Shepherd	
Conservation	Society	about	their	anti‐whaling	activities.	For	example,	Captain	Paul	Watson	said,	
‘It	 has	 been	 a	 successful	 campaign.	 There	 are	 hundreds	 of	 whales	 swimming	 free	 in	 the	
Southern	Ocean	Whale	Sanctuary	that	would	now	be	dead	if	we	had	not	been	down	there	for	the	
last	three	months’	(8	March	2012).	In	the	same	press	release	Watson	declared,	‘If	the	Japanese	
whalers	 return,	 Sea	 Shepherd	 will	 return.	We	 are	 committed	 to	 the	 defense	 of	 the	 Southern	













Smash	HLS	release	declaring,	 ‘It	 is	our	right	to	make	our	voices	heard	for	all	 those	who	suffer	
inside.	Their	lives	depend	on	us.	This	corrupt	“justice”	system	will	not	protect	them’	(26	January	




The	 justifications	offered	by	 the	environmental	 rights	 groups	 analysed	here	demonstrate	 that	
while	 there	 is	 some	 adherence	 to	 the	 parameters	 in	 which	 civil	 disobedience	 is	 acceptable,	
activists	 are	 going	 beyond	 political	 performance	 aimed	 at	 garnering	 public	 support.	 This	












In	 moving	 forward,	 the	 challenge	 is	 to	 attempt	 to	 understand	 why	 the	 label	 of	 terrorism	 is	
applied	to	some	actions	and	not	others.	Is	the	actor,	act,	or	target	the	most	important	variable?	
Do	the	 justifications	offered	by	activists	mitigate	 the	seriousness	of	their	 illegal	actions?	What	
are	the	preconditions	for	social	acceptance	of	some	politically	motivated	lawbreaking	activities	
and	 not	 others?	 In	 asking	 these	 questions,	 perhaps	 the	 boundaries	 of	 terrorism	 can	 be	 re‐


































































































objectives	 of	 criminal	 justice,	when	 each	warrants	 separate	 consideration.	 This	 confluence	
has	 come	 to	a	head	particularly	 in	 recent	debates	about	violence	against	women.	Recently,	
sex	discrimination	Commissioner	Elizabeth	Broderick	has	called	 for	 tougher	sentencing	 for	
people	 convicted	 of	 intimate	 partner	 violence.	 Commissioner	 Broderick	 argues	 that	 these	
incidents	should	not	be	treated	as	 ‘just	a	domestic’,	but	should	attract	 ‘a	premium	penalty.’	
This	 call	 has	 been	 echoed	 simultaneously	 by	 other	mainstream	 feminist	writers	who	 have	
expressed	 frustration	 over	 the	 apparent	 failure	 of	 the	 judiciary	 to	 address	 this	 problem	
seriously,	 using	 key	 high	 profile	 examples.	 These	 are	 dangerous	 trends	which	 are	 gaining	
momentum	in	mainstream	discourse.	Calls	for	tougher	sentencing	gloss	over	the	complexities	
of	this	criminal	behaviour	and	ignore	the	rigidity	of	the	process	established	to	address	it.	 It	
belies	 a	 simplistic	 attitude	 to	 the	 law	 that	 does	 little	 to	 advance	 the	 cause	 of	 the	
disempowered	and	oppressed.	It	also	resets	mainstream	opinion	about	criminal	conduct	and	
contributes	 to	 a	 culture	 of	 pre‐emptive	 guilt	 and	 minimal	 sympathy	 for	 the	 accused.	
Commentary	which	demonises	offenders	leaves	little	room	for	analysis	of	the	social	causes	of	
crime	 and	 fails	 to	 recognise	 the	 role	 of	 prison	 in	 marginalising	 certain	 sections	 of	 the	
population.	These	attitudes	add	feminist	fuel	to	the	fire	of	contempt	for	criminals;	an	inferno	
which	 hardly	 needs	 stoking.	 There	 are	 plenty	 of	 useful	 alternative	 theoretical	 frameworks	
that	 are	worth	 considering	 in	 this	 context.	 Restorative	 justice	 and	 therapeutic	 justice	 both	
have	much	to	offer;	both	in	respect	of	returning	the	victim	to	the	centre	of	the	process	and	
providing	 flexibility	 that	has	 the	potential	 to	provide	better	outcomes	 for	 the	accused.	The	





Mainstream	 opinion	writers	 have	 always	had	 a	 difficult	 relationship	with	 the	 criminal	 justice	
system.	Much	commentary	discusses	the	social	and	political	issues	raised	by	crime	in	a	manner	
which	 conflates	 several	 objectives	 of	 criminal	 justice,	 including	 deterrence,	 public	 safety	 and	
punishment.	 Each	 of	 these	 objectives	 warrant	 separate	 consideration,	 particularly	 with	 an	
understanding	 of	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 to	 deliver	 them.	 This	 is	 not	 a	
quandary	 unique	 to	 commentators;	 judges	 also	 contend	 with	 complex	 and	 sometimes	
competing	 objectives.	 But	 the	 judiciary	 does	 this	 in	 a	 structured	 and	 transparent	way,	 using	
methods	established	by	statute	and	common	law.	The	mainstream	media	is	not	similarly	bound	
by	such	authorities;	 it	 represents	an	alternative	set	of	 interests	 in	the	discussion	about	public	
policy	in	respect	of	crime.	As	the	traditional	interface	between	the	justice	system	and	the	public,	












the	 Federal	 Sex	 Discrimination	 Commissioner	 Elizabeth	 Broderick	 has	 recently	 called	 for	
tougher	sentencing	for	people	convicted	of	intimate	partner	violence.	Commissioner	Broderick	




This	 call	 for	 punitive	 justice	 has	 been	 echoed	 simultaneously	 by	 other	 mainstream	 feminist	
writers.	 In	 Australia,	 writers	 have	 expressed	 frustration	 over	 the	 apparent	 failure	 of	 the	
judiciary	 to	 address	 the	 problem	 of	 violence	 against	women	 seriously,	 using	 key	 high	 profile	
examples	 (Ford	 2013b).	 There	 is	 a	 basis	 in	 truth	 for	 these	 concerns:	 in	 Australia,	 it	 is	
statistically	 easier	 to	 be	 acquitted	 of	 rape	 than	 other	 violent	 offences	 (ABS	 2004).	 These	










circumstances	 are	 unknown,	 is	 fraught.	 Valenti	 clearly	 assumes	 that	 Pistorius	 is	 guilty	 (or	
perhaps	she	simply	harbours	an	indifference	to	the	matter)	–	so	much	so	that	if	he	is	acquitted,	
the	result	will	be	perceived	as	the	yet	another	example	of	society’s	tolerance	for	violence	against	
women.	 The	 allegations	 of	 lenient	 sentencing	 and	 selective	 justice	 are	 cited	 as	 yet	 further	
examples	 of	 public	 institutions	 failing	 women	 by	 allowing	 their	 misogynistic	 tendencies	 to	





These	 are	 particularly	 dangerous	 trends	 which	 are	 gaining	 momentum	 in	 mainstream	
discourse.	Such	deficiencies	in	public	commentary	are	hardly	new;	but	significantly,	these	calls	
are	coming	 from	 traditionally	progressive	voices.	These	are	 individuals	who	have	a	history	of	
setting	 trends	 in	public	 discourse	 in	 favour	 of	 the	oppressed	or,	 in	 the	 case	of	 Commissioner	
Broderick,	 are	 the	 regulator	 of	 human	 rights	 legislation	 designed	 to	 protect	 the	 vulnerable.	





too	 lenient	 is	 illusory.	 Research	 indicates	 that	 the	 more	 people	 know	 about	 the	 facts	 of	 a	





frameworks	 or	 judges	 decisions	 are	 out	 of	 line	 with	 community	 expectations.	 These	 false	
assumptions	are	no	doubt	easier	to	maintain	given	the	treatment	of	these	crimes	by	journalists.	
The	sound	bite	nature	of	 this	reporting	and	 its	reflection	of	 traditional	gender	stereotypes	do	
little	 to	 ameliorate	 this	problem	(VicHealth	2012).	The	complexity	of	 the	problem	of	 intimate	
partner	violence	in	a	context	of	a	simplistic	public	debate	makes	unpicking	these	issues	difficult.	
But	conflating	the	desire	to	treat	the	problem	seriously	with	assumptions	about	the	failures	of	
the	 judicial	 process	 add	 feminist	 fuel	 to	 the	 fire	 of	 contempt	 for	 criminals;	 an	 inferno	which	
hardly	needs	stoking.	
	
Moreover,	 this	 kind	 of	 feminist	 approach	 to	 criminal	 justice	 ignores	 the	 very	 significant	
problems	presented	by	the	legal	processes	set	up	to	deal	with	intimate	partner	violence	which	
affect	 all	 parties.	 Feminist	 legal	 critiques	 of	 the	 treatment	 of	 intimate	 partner	 violence	 have	
traditionally	 focused	 on	 the	 failure	 to	 prioritise	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 victim.	 But	 on	 further	
examination,	 this	objective	 is	 sidelined	 in	 the	politics	of	 law	and	order:	 the	 inflexibility	of	 the	
legal	process	 is	 likely	 to	give	 little	comfort	 to	victims,	who	often	 find	adversarial	 treatment	of	
these	crimes	confronting,	or	may	have	specific	needs,	like	maintaining	an	ongoing	relationship	
with	 the	 accused	 (Gentleman	 2013).	 Ford	 does	 seem	 to	 accept	 this,	 albeit	 somewhat	
superficially,	saying:	 ‘perhaps	a	rehabilitation	of	 the	system	itself	 is	 in	order,	one	 in	which	we	
remind	 legal	 practitioners	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 victims’	 (Ford	 2013b).	 But	 this	 in	 turn	 seems	 to	
misunderstand	 the	 role	of	 lawyers	 in	 the	current	system,	which	 is	 to	advocate	 for	 their	 client	
against	the	full	might	of	the	state	apparatus	seeking	to	punish	them.	Tellingly,	Ford	also	claims	
that:	‘[incarceration]	may	do	nothing	to	eradicate	the	pain	caused	to	the	victims	–	but	I'd	wager	





This	 commentary	 is	 obviously	 the	 product	 of	 a	 laudable	 desire	 to	 ameliorate	 the	 problem	 of	
intimate	 partner	 violence	 and	 restructure	 public	 attitudes	 symbolically	 about	 victims	 of	








has	 been	 well	 documentary,	 prison	 acts	 as	 a	 gateway	 to	 further	 social	 marginalisation	 and	
disenfranchisement	of	 the	offender	and	can	 lead	 to	 recidivism	rather	 than	 rehabilitation.	 In	 a	
piece	discussing	a	recent	criminal	trial,	Ford	describes	frustration	at	reporting	which	focused	on	
the	 ‘effect	 the	 judicial	 outcome	would	have	 on	 the	perpetrators’	 lives’,	 something	 she	 sees	 as	
‘the	least	relevant	part	of	any	case	involving	rape	and	sexual	abuse’	(Ford	2013a).	While	Ford	






contribute	 to	 a	 culture	 of	 pre‐emptive	 guilt	 and	 minimal	 sympathy	 for	 the	 accused,	 with	
problematic	results.	The	attitude	of	zero	sympathy	for	the	accused	ignores	a	key	potential	of	the	
criminal	 justice	 system:	 to	 operate	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 social	 control.	 Michelle	 Alexander	 eloquently	
describes	 how	mass	 incarceration	 is	 a	 practical	 contradiction	 of	 the	 American	myth	 of	 social	
mobility	 (Alexander	2010).	Alexander	suggests	we	 imagine	 the	criminal	 justice	system	 ‘not	as	
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an	 independent	 system	 but	 rather	 as	 a	 gateway	 into	 a	 much	 larger	 system	 of	 racial	
stigmatisation	 and	 permanent	marginalisation’	 (Alexander	 2010:	 12).	 Alexander’s	 research	 is	
focused	 on	 the	 experience	 of	 African	 Americans,	 but	 her	 conclusions	 arguably	 extend	 to	 the	
poor	 in	 general.	There	 is	 little	doubt	 that	 grinding	poverty	and	 ceaseless	oppression	 can	give	
rise	 to	 reprehensible	behaviour.	But	 to	 suggest	 that	an	efficient	 criminal	 justice	 system	and	a	




to	 the	 law	 and	 does	 little	 to	 advance	 the	 cause	 of	 the	 disempowered	 and	 oppressed.	 The	
attention	directed	at	the	problem	of	 intimate	partner	violence	may	be	welcome,	but	there	is	a	
clear	 lack	 of	 theoretical	 analysis	 behind	 both	 the	 critique	 and	 the	 solutions	 posed.	 Equally,	
simply	 dismissing	 the	 court	 system	 as	 a	 patriarchal	 mess	 promotes	 cynicism	 and	 risks	




Calls	 for	 tougher	sentencing	gloss	over	 the	complexities	of	 this	criminal	behaviour	and	 ignore	
the	 rigidity	 of	 the	 process	 established	 to	 address	 it.	 There	 are	 obvious	 structural	 reasons	 for	
why	 the	 legal	 system	 is	not	 always	 the	best	 structure	 for	 addressing	 the	problem	of	 intimate	
partner	 violence.	 Legal	 processes	 are	 often	 awkward	 and	 inappropriate	 in	 such	 situations.	
Probability	suggests	that	the	two	people	at	the	centre	of	this	violence	will	share	a	life,	a	home,	or	




Nonetheless,	 there	 are	 plenty	 of	 useful	 alternative	 theoretical	 frameworks	 that	 are	 worth	
considering	 in	 this	 context	 and	 deserve	 consideration.	 Restorative	 justice	 and	 therapeutic	
justice	 both	 have	much	 to	 offer;	 both	 in	 respect	 of	 returning	 the	 victim	 to	 the	 centre	 of	 the	
process	 and	 providing	 flexibility	 that	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 provide	 better	 outcomes	 for	 the	
accused.	 The	 process	 is	 not	 right	 for	 all	 cases,	 but	 policy	 makers	 should	 be	 encouraged	 to	
provide	alternative	processes,	with	appropriate	safeguards.	
	
There	 are	more	 imaginative	 and	 logical	ways	 for	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 to	play	 a	 role	 in	
ending	violence	against	women.	Bronwyn	Naylor,	from	Monash	University	explains	the	problem	
succinctly:	 ‘the	 key	 to	 making	 the	 trial	 process	 meaningful	 to	 victims	 is	 the	 early	
acknowledgement	of	guilt	by	defendants	who	are	in	fact	guilty.	All	of	the	current	features	of	the	
trial	militate	against	this’	(Naylor	2010).	As	an	alternative,	Naylor	advocates	a	therapeutic	and	
restorative	 approach	 to	 justice,	 which	 involves	 conferencing	 with	 support	 people,	 with	 a	








of	 both	 parties.	 In	 appropriate	 situations,	 according	 to	 expert	 criminologist	 Professor	 John	




interests	 beyond	 simply	 vengeance.	While	 harm	may	 have	 occurred	 and	must	 be	 addressed,	
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restorative	 justice	 approaches	 appreciate	 that	 this	 may	 not	 always	 have	 been	 intended	 or	













feminist	 legal	 theory	 for	decades.	Placing	 too	much	emphasis	 on	 law	and	 its	 ability	 to	punish	




There	 are	 plenty	 of	 other	 ways	 to	 send	 a	 message	 to	 the	 community	 that	 intimate	 partner	
violence	 is	 unacceptable.	 A	 primary	 objective	 should	 be	 to	 empower	 the	 victims	 of	 such	
violence.	 Therefore,	 the	 policy	 response	 to	 this	 issue	 should	 focus	 on	 early	 intervention	





with	 family	 disputes	 will	 no	 longer	 be	 represented	 at	 hearings,	 unless	 the	 other	 side	 has	 a	








2011:	 3).	 These	 protections	 should	 be	 available	 to	 all	 Australian	 workers	 as	 standard.	 This	
recognition	 of	 the	 problem,	 without	 judgment,	 provides	 dignity	 for	 victims	 and	 practical	







of	 social	 values.	 VicHealth	 has	 identified	 ‘a	 cultural	 ethos	 condoning	 violence	 as	 a	 means	 of	
settling	disputes’	as	one	key	social	or	structural	contributing	factors	to	violence	against	women	
(VicHealth	 2011:	 8).	 Violence	 that	 is	 punitive	 or	 vengeful	 is	 not	 something	 that	 is	 just	
experienced	on	an	 individual	 level,	 it	 is	often	practiced	 in	the	highest	political	echelons	of	our	





Importantly,	 however,	 VicHealth	 also	 found	 that	 the	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	
Australians	do	not	condone	violence	against	women,	do	not	think	it	should	be	dealt	with	




This	 not	 to	 suggest	 there	 is	 a	 simple	 guide	 to	 ‘solve’	 these	 problems.	 The	 causes	 and	
effects	 of	 gendered	 violence	 are	 multiple	 and	 complex;	 but	 the	 problem	 itself	 is	 a	




The	 law	has	 traditionally	done	 a	poor	 job	 of	 protecting	 vulnerable	 sections	of	 society;	 in	 this	
case,	 women	 who	 are	 subject	 of	 domestic	 violence.	 This	 has	 generated	 a	 call	 from	 modern	
feminism	 for	 more	 muscular	 protection	 for	 these	 women	 by	 the	 law.1	 But	 the	 call	 for	 the	
criminal	justice	system	to	treat	intimate	partner	violence	with	the	same	seriousness	as	the	other	
crimes	 in	 the	 system	measures	 justice	with	 the	wrong	yardstick.	 It	 relies	on	 the	progressives	
adopting	the	politics	of	law	and	order:	a	high	stakes,	toxic	political	game,	which	is	rarely	focused	
on	 the	needs	of	 the	victims	and	 is	 indifferent	 to	 the	effect	on	 the	offender.	 It	glosses	over	 the	
problems	 inherent	 in	 the	 system	 and	 ignores	 other	 more	 compelling	 and	 creative	 ways	 of	
achieving	 justice	 for	 the	 vulnerable.	 The	 scale	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 intimate	 partner	 violence	



































































The	 available	 research	 literature	 on	 intimate	 partner	 violence	 is	 often	 centred	 around	 a	
heteronormative	 understanding	 of	 gender,	 relationships	 and	 violence.	 When	 it	 comes	 to	
intimate	 partner	 violence	 in	 the	 transgender	 community,	 the	 research	 is	 limited	 or	 non‐
existent	due	in	part	to	the	methodological	issues	of	visibility	and	access	by	those	outside	this	
community.	 Drawing	 from	 Renzetti	 (1992,	 1995),	 McClennen	 (2003),	 and	 the	 feminist	
participatory	 research	 model,	 this	 paper	 examines	 the	 techniques	 for	 overcoming	 the	
methodological	barriers	 as	 a	 cisgender	or	 'normatively	 gendered'	woman	 in	 a	 transgender	
community.	 Throughout	 the	 research	 with	 the	 transgender	 community,	 five	 strategies	 for	
overcoming	methodological	barriers	were	developed:	Cultural	Immersion,	Commitment	and	
Visibility,	Sensitivity	and	Acceptance,	Honesty,	and	Communication.	This	paper	explores	how	





Research	 into	 intimate	 partner	 violence	 (also	 called	 domestic	 violence)	 is	 often	 focused	 on	
heteronormative	 understandings	 of	 violence,	 whereby	 women	 are	 victims	 and	 men	 are	
perpetrators	 (Ball	 and	 Hayes	 2010:	 163).	 	 These	 commonsense	 understandings	 of	 intimate	
partner	violence	often	exclude	or	deny	the	experiences	of	others.	Violence	does	not	discriminate	
and	 intimate	 partner	 violence	 can	 be	 experienced	 irrespective	 of	 sexuality	 or	 gender.	 Most	
research	 literature	 focuses	 on	 the	 experiences	 of	 cisgender	 women	 (Carrington	 and	 Phillips	
2003);	however	research	regarding	intimate	partner	violence	within	GLBTI1	relationships	treats	




The	 term	 transgender	 refers	 to	 a	 diverse	 group	 of	 individuals	whose	 biological	 sex	 does	 not	
match	 their	 gender.	The	meaning	of	 the	 term	 transgender	 has	developed	over	 time	 and	 is	 an	
umbrella	 term	 that	 refers	 to	 a	wide	 range	 of	 sex	 and	 gender	 diverse	 groups	 and	 individuals.	
Transgender	can	refer	to	an	individual	who	is	at	any	stage	of	a	transition;	however	also	includes	
many	different	groups	including	cross‐dressers,	 transsexuals,	 intersex	individuals,	androgynes	
and	 genderqueers	 (Tauches	 2009;	 Papoulias,	 2006).	 The	 term	 cisgender	 (sometimes	 called	
cissexual)	 is	 used	 when	 a	 person’s	 biological	 sex	 matches	 or	 is	 aligned	 with	 their	 gender	
identity.	 People	 who	 are	 not	 transgender	 may	 identify	 as	 cisgender,	 as	 the	 sex	 they	 were	










part	of	 the	 transgender	community.	The	purpose	of	 this	article	 is	 to	discuss	my	strategies	 for	
overcoming	the	methodological	challenges	in	accessing	the	transgender	community	for	research	
purposes.	Drawing	from	Renzetti	(1992,	1995)	and	McClennen	(2003)	and	utilising	the	feminist	





research	 available	 on	 transgender	 communities	 and	 even	 less	 on	 intimate	 partner	 violence	
within	transgender	communities.	The	existing	literature	and	quantitative	research	available	on	
the	topic	of	intimate	partner	violence	within	same‐sex	relationships	briefly	reports	on	intimate	
partner	 violence	 within	 transgender	 relationships.	 However,	 major	 limitations	 include	 an	
amalgamation	of	results	with	those	who	identify	as	gay,	lesbian	and	bisexual	(Pitts	et	al.	2006;	
Leonard	 et	 al.	 2008).	 These	 studies	 focus	on	 sexual	orientation	and	not	 gender	 identification,	
which	is	another	flaw	within	the	available	literature.	To	date,	no	in‐depth	qualitative	interviews	
have	 taken	 place	 in	Australia	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 the	 experiences	 of	 violence	 among	 those	
who	identify	as	transgender.		
	
At	 first	 I	 was	 apprehensive	 about	 research	 in	 this	 area	 as	 I	 am	 not	 transgender,	 nor	 have	 I	
experienced	 intimate	 partner	 violence.	 I	 feared	 I	 would	 be	 rejected	 because	 of	 my	 gender	
identity	(cisgender).	I	had	assumed	I	would	not	be	accepted	by	the	community	and	I	would	not	
be	able	to	research	this	topic.	Accessing	the	community	was	my	first	challenge,	in	which	I	had	no	
previous	 connections	 or	 networks.	 Due	 to	 limited	 visibility	 of	 the	 community	 and	 societal	
transphobia,	 creating	 a	means	 to	 access	 the	 community	was	 vital.	 Another	 challenge	was	 the	
assumption	 that	 transgender	 people	 may	 not	 want	 to	 discuss	 transgender	 intimate	 partner	






than	 ‘study’	 them	 (Rice	 and	 Ezzy	 1999:	 157).	 Participatory	 research	 (also	 referred	 to	 as	
participatory	 action	 research)	 differs	 from	 other	 research	 methods	 in	 that	 I	 participate	 and	
involve	 myself	 in	 the	 community	 (Jones	 2006:	 318).	 Participatory	 research	 ‘challenges	 a	
scientific	 method	 of	 inquiry	 based	 on	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 outside	 “observer”	 and	 the	
“independent”	 experimenter,	 and	 it	 claims	 to	 reconstruct	 both	 the	 practical	 expertise	 and	
theoretical	 insights	on	 a	different	basis	of	 its	own	 inquiry	procedures’	 (Winter	1989:	2).	This	
research	model	 through	 its	participatory	nature	moves	 away	 from	 the	notion	of	 an	 ‘outsider’	
coming	 in	 to	 examine	 and	 theorise	 (Jones	 2006:	 320).	 Where	 a	 research	 project	 presents	
various	methodological	challenges	(such	as	access,	ethics	and	theories),	participatory	research	





(such	 as	 the	 transgender	 community)	 to	 voice	 their	 experiences.	 This	 method	 allows	 the	
researcher	 to	 share	 their	 professional	 skills	 and	 also	 learn	 during	 the	 research	 process,	
improving	 the	quality	 of	 the	 research	 (Renzetti	 1995:	29).	 In	 contrast	 to	 traditional	positivist	
social	science	research,	 the	 feminist	participatory	research	model	allows	researchers	to	reject	
the	 dichotomy	 of	 researcher/subject	 and	 see	 the	 research	 process	 as	 a	 collaborative	 effort	
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between	 humans.	 This	 relationship	 is	 reciprocal	 rather	 than	 hierarchical	 (Renzetti	 1995:	 32‐
33).		
	
As	Renzetti	 (1992,	1995)	was	one	of	 the	 first	 researchers	 to	utilise	 the	 feminist	participatory	
research	model	within	 the	 context	 of	 lesbian	 intimate	partner	 violence,	my	 research	 adopted	
her	 guiding	 principles.	 These	 principles	 include:	 (1)	 a	 critical	 examination	 of	 cultural	
insensitivity	within	the	research	process;	(2)	giving	voice	to	the	members	of	 the	marginalised	
population;	 (3)	 rejecting	 the	 hierarchical	 relationship	 between	 the	 researcher	 and	 the	
researched	 in	 favour	 of	 acting	 in	 mutual	 relationship;	 (4)	 making	 a	 political	 and	 moral	
commitment	to	reducing	social	 inequality;	and	(5)	 taking	action	on	this	commitment	(Cancian	
1992	as	 cited	 in	Renzetti	1995).	Drawing	upon	Renzetti’s	 (1992,	1995)	guiding	principles	 (as	
defined	above)	and	the	 feminist	participatory	research	model,	 I	developed	 five	strategies	 that	




In	 her	 essay	 Researching	 Gay	 and	 Lesbian	 Domestic	 Violence:	 The	 Journey	 of	 a	 Non‐LGBT	
Researcher,	McClennen	 (2003)	 discusses	 her	 experiences	 as	 a	 cisgender	 heterosexual	woman	
and	 as	 an	 ‘outsider’.	 McClennen	 (2003)	 details	 eight	 strategies	 to	 overcome	 methodological	
barriers	when	 researching	GLBTI	 issues:	 (1)	 becoming	 educated	 about	 the	 culture	 (including	
forming	 an	 advisory	 committee);	 (2)	 preparing	 for	 objections;	 (3)	 incorporating	 instruments	
designed	 by	 those	 being	 researched;	 (4)	 implementing	 various	 sampling	 techniques;	 (5)	
engaging	 affiliated	 members	 for	 assistance;	 (6)	 becoming	 immersed	 in	 the	 culture;	 (7)	
collaborating	 with	 scholars	 and	 other	 professionals;	 and	 (8)	 triangulation	 in	 data	 collection	




five	 strategies	 in	 order	 to	 access	 the	 transgender	 community	 and	 overcome	 methodological	
barriers.	 These	 five	 strategies	 were	 effective	 in	 accessing	 the	 transgender	 community	 and	





Cultural	 immersion	 first	 began	with	 education.	 For	my	 research,	 this	meant	 educating	myself	
about	 transgender	 culture.	 Definitions,	 historical	 context	 and	 appropriate	 language	 were	 all	
vital	parts	of	cultural	 immersion.	Without	educating	myself	on	 issues	regarding	or	concerning	










Becoming	 known	 and	 subsequently	 trusted	 within	 the	 transgender	 community	 was	 of	 great	
importance.	Renowned	for	being	very	closed	and	private,	becoming	known	in	the	transgender	
community	was	 the	 next	 step	 in	my	 cultural	 immersion.	 	 Cultural	 immersion	 began	with	my	
affiliation	with	agencies	that	offer	support	to	transgender	people,	such	as	Healthy	Communities	




group	 Many	 Genders	 One	 Voice,	 a	 collective	 of	 people	 who	 identify	 as	 transgender,	 sex	 and	
gender	diverse	or	their	allies.	I	began	to	network	with	people	via	this	group	and	also	volunteer	
for	 various	 events,	 such	 as	Brisbane	 Pride	 Festival	 and	Big	 Gay	Day.	 At	 these	 events	 I	would	
fundraise	for	the	organisation	and	also	spread	awareness	of	the	support	groups	available.	Being	
affiliated	 with	 other	 groups	 such	 as	 PFLAG	 was	 also	 beneficial	 in	 the	 cultural	 immersion.	
Launches,	 conferences,	 equal	 rights	 marches	 were	 all	 part	 of	 cultural	 immersion.	 Here	 my	







Commitment	and	visibility	 follow	on	 from	cultural	 immersion.	Commitment	refers	 to	 the	 long	
term	 dedication	 it	 takes	 when	 participating	 in	 the	 transgender	 community	 (Cancian	 1992;	
Renzetti	1995).	Cultural	immersion	is	a	role	that	is	carried	out	over	a	long	period	of	time	and	it	
was	 necessary	 to	 follow	 through	with	 these	 commitments.	 Attending	 events,	 fundraising	 and	
volunteering	were	obligations	that	must	be	tended	to.	Showing	commitment	to	these	activities	
is	a	means	of	proving	that	you	are	willing	to	work	with	the	community.	I	continued	to	show	my	
commitment	 through	 regularly	 volunteering	 via	 fundraising	 and	 safe‐sex	 outreach	within	 the	
transgender	community.	
	
Visibility	 refers	 to	 having	 and	 maintaining	 a	 visible	 presence	 within	 the	 community.	 This	
visibility	 included	 talking	 to	 new	 people,	 maintaining	 friendships	 and	 actively	 participating	
within	 the	 community	 (Cancian	1992;	Renzetti	1995).	This	 strategy	 is	about	establishing	 that	
you	are	trustworthy,	reliable	and	a	committed	ally	to	the	transgender	community.	I	maintained	




It	 is	 of	 great	 importance	 in	 the	 transgender	 community	 that	 those	 who	 are	 considered	
‘outsiders’	are	educated	on	transgender	 issues	and	more	 importantly,	 respectful	of	 the	people	
within	the	community.	It	is	expected	that	you	will	make	mistakes	and	the	appropriate	course	of	
action	 is	 to	acknowledge	your	mistakes,	apologise	and	move	on.	Making	an	active	effort	 to	be	
respectful	and	sensitive	of	preferred	pronouns	was	one	key	area	of	importance.	I	would	never	




Acceptance	 refers	 to	 being	 accountable	 of	 social	 privileges	 (such	 as	 white	 and	 cisgender	
privilege)	 (Cancian	 1992;	 Renzetti	 1995).	 I	 acknowledge	 that	 I	 am	 aware	 of	 these	 social	
privileges	 and	 that	 I	 cannot	 truly	 empathise	 with	 transgender	 experiences,	 however	 I	
endeavour	 to	be	a	supportive	ally.	Some	people	 in	 the	transgender	community	may	not	agree	
with	my	research	or	research	methods	and	an	open	dialog	is	 important.	People	are	entitled	to	
express	 their	 opinions	 and	having	 these	opinions	 voiced	 is	 an	 important	 part	 of	my	 research	
process	 (McClennen	2003).	 It	 is	 important	 that	 I	 am	open	 to	other	 ideas	 and	 suggestions	 are	










and	 being	 honest	 about	 my	 research	 aims	 ensured	 that	 no	 one	 was	 misled	 about	 my	
involvement	 within	 the	 community	 (McClennen	 2003).	 My	 research	 served	 the	 purpose	 of	
achieving	 mutual	 goals,	 not	 selfish	 desires	 to	 exploit	 and	 ‘study’	 the	 community	 through	 a	
pathological	lens.	Honesty	also	refers	to	being	honest	with	myself.	As	the	feminist	participatory	
research	model	 can	 span	across	many	years,	 I	 had	 to	 genuinely	hold	 a	passion	 in	 the	 area	 of	





(McClennen	2003).	 Firstly,	 I	 openly	 communicated	with	 those	around	me,	whether	 they	were	







had	networks	 that	were	 useful	 to	my	 research.	 Communicating	with	my	 supervisors	 ensured	
that	my	 research	was	 on	 track	 and	 had	 focus	 and	 direction.	 Finally,	 communicating	with	my	














injustices	 and	 bring	 visibility	 to	 issues	 concerning	 the	 transgender	 community.	 Often	 the	
transgender	community	is	invisible	and	not	given	sufficient	attention	and	using	what	little	social	
power	I	have	may	benefit	the	transgender	community	in	the	future.	Another	benefit	of	being	a	
non‐affiliated	 member	 is	 that	 I	 can	 distance	 myself	 from	 personal	 conflicts	 within	 the	
community,	 be	 objective	 and	 provide	 non‐bias	 opinions.	 I	 am	 able	 to	 connect	 with	 various	
different	people	and	groups	without	intruding	on	personal	relations.	Being	an	‘outsider’	is	also	




These	 five	 strategies	were	 effective	 in	 gaining	 access	 to	 the	 transgender	 community.	To	date,	
there	 is	 no	 literature	 that	 specifically	 discusses	 successful	 strategies	 to	 gaining	 access	 to	 the	
transgender	community	or	the	methodologies	they	have	employed.		Due	to	the	lack	of	visibility	
of	 the	 transgender	 community,	 it	was	necessary	 to	 develop	 and	 implement	 strategies	 to	 gain	





long	 term	 presence	 I	 must	 maintain	 within	 the	 transgender	 community.	 Sensitivity	 and	
acceptance	 includes	 an	 overall	 respect	 for	 transgender	 people	 and	 their	 preferences	 and	
boundaries.	 Honesty	 refers	 to	 being	 truthful	 about	 my	 aims,	 intentions	 and	 my	 research.	
Honesty	 is	 also	 about	 being	 truthful	 with	 myself,	 my	 beliefs	 and	 objectives.	 Finally,	
communication	 involves	 an	 open	 dialogue	 with	 community	 members,	 colleagues	 and	
supervisors	 as	 a	 means	 of	 increasing	 productivity.	 Communication	 also	 refers	 to	 discussing	
personal	 pressures	 as	 a	 way	 to	 alleviate	 personal	 mental	 health	 issues.	 Overall,	 these	 five	









































































from	 urban	 communities	 of	 Kunming,	 Yunnan	 using	 stratified	 sampling	 methods,	 were	
individually	 interviewed.	 In	 the	 sample,	 more	 than	 half	 of	 participants	 (57.0%,	 n	 =	 258)	
reported	 fear	 of	 crime	 and	 the	 majority	 of	 them	 (87.6%,	 n	 =	 397)	 reported	 avoidance	
behaviours.	The	results	of	path	analysis	showed	that	fear	of	crime	predicted	more	avoidance	
behaviours	 (β	 =	 .168,	p	 <	 .001)	when	gender,	 age,	 education,	 household	 finance,	perceived	
neighbourhood	disorder	 and	direct	 and	 indirect	 victimisation	 by	 crime	were	 controlled	 as	
covariates.	Fear	of	crime	mediated	the	effect	on	avoidance	behaviour	of	gender	(β	=	.031,	p	=	
.007),	age	(β	=	‐.021,	p	=	.028),	direct	victimisation	by	crime	(β	=.019,	p	=	.039)	and	indirect	
victimisation	 by	 crime	 (β	 =	 .020,	 p	 =	 .037).	 It	 was	 concluded	 that	 fear	 of	 crime	 provoked	
avoidance	 behaviour	 among	 older	 Chinese	which	might	 have	 detrimental	 impacts	 on	 their	
physical	and	social	functioning.	This	study	provided	a	rational	basis	for	service	planning	and	






Research	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 older	 people	 report	 disproportionately	 high	 levels	 of	 fear	 of	
crime	 (Oh	 and	 Kim	 2009;	 Powell	 and	 Wahidin	 2008;	 Quann	 and	 Hung	 2002).	 As	 a	 coping	
strategy,	 old	 people	 tend	 to	 constrain	 their	 daily	 activity,	 keep	 housebound,	 avoid	 places	
(Yodanis	2002),	withdraw	from	social	activities	(Abbott	and	Sapsford	2005),	refuse	home	visits	
and	reduced	community	 involvement	 (Moore	and	Trojanowicz	1988).	Though	helpful	 to	keep	
criminals	at	bay	to	some	extent,	this	lifestyle	is	especially	detrimental	for	older	persons	which	
could	 impair	 their	 physical	 health	 due	 to	 lessened	 outdoor	 physical	 activities	 (Lorenc	 et	 al.	
2012;	Jackson	and	Stafford	2009),	impaired	mental	health	(Abbott	and	Sapsford,	2005,	Beaulieu	
et	al.,	2002),	decrease	social	support	because	of	reduced	interpersonal	 interaction	(Estina	and	
Neal	 1998;	 Ditton	 and	 Innes	 2005;	 Jackson	 and	 Stafford	 2009)	 and	 ultimately	 intensify	 their	
social	isolation	(Warr	2000).		
	







a	sharp	rise	 in	crime,	especially	 in	 its	urban	regions	(Liu	and	Messner	2001).	The	unbalanced	
economic	 development	 leads	 a	 large	 number	 of	 rural	 populations	 to	 migrate	 into	 cities	 for	
Nan	Qin,	Elsie	CW	Yan	
156	 Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	2nd	International	Conference,	2013	





urbanites	 about	 public	 security	 (Nielsen	 and	 Smyth	 2009).	 Along	 with	 this	 change	 in	
demographic	 composition	 of	 urban	 population,	 the	 social	 disorganisation	 caused	 by	
urbanisation	 (De	 Donder	 et	 al.,	 2005)	 and	 the	 decline	 of	 informal	 social	 control	 of	 tradition	
culture	 with	 modernisation	 (Nielsen	 and	 Smyth	 2009)	 have	 constituted	 the	 major	 social	





(Warr	 2000),	 old	 population	 fast	 expanding	 in	 China	 deserve	 special	 attention	 of	 academia,	
practitioner	 and	 policy	 maker	 for	 their	 fear	 of	 crime	 and	 the	 subsequent	 impact	 on	 their	
physical	and	social	functioning.		
	
The	 present	 study	 defined	 fear	 of	 crime	 as	 a	 daily	 non‐pathological	 emotional	 state	 (Ferraro	
1995)	 and	 aimed	 to	 investigate	 the	 prevalence	 of	 fear	 of	 crime	 and	 the	 resulting	 avoidance	








12.1%	of	 its	 total	resident	population	(6.43	million).	At	 the	end	of	2009,	Kunming	ranked	 the	
9th	 in	 population	 ageing	 rate	 among	 all	 31	 capital	 cities	 in	 Mainland	 China	 (Min	 2010).	 A	
representative	sample	of	453	older	Chinese	aged	60	years	or	over	were	recruited	 from	urban	
communities	of	Kunming	during	 June	 to	August,	2011	using	 the	multi‐stage	 sampling	method	
from	the	district,	city‐street	office	and	neighbourhood	committee.	The	total	response	rate	was	

















Neighborhood	 Disorder	 Scale	 (Ross	 and	 Mirowsky	 1999).	 This	 15‐item	 scale	 measures	 four	
domains,	 namely	 physical	 order	 and	 disorder,	 social	 order	 and	 disorder.	 The	 internal	








Eight	 types	 of	 crimes	 were	 included,	 i.e.	 cheat,	 theft,	 burglary,	 snatching,	 robbery,	 attack,	
rape/sexual	assault	and	murder.	For	direct	victimisation	by	crime,	participants	were	asked	to	
































More	 than	half	 of	 participants	 (n	 =	258,	 57.0%)	 reported	 fear	of	 crime	at	 the	 total	 level,	 that	







safety.	 The	 prevalence	 of	 specific	 avoidance	 behaviour	 ranged	 from	 77.9%	 to	 42.2%	 with	







Presented	 in	Figure	1	 is	 the	path	model	proposed	 in	 this	 study	which	 reflects	 the	hypotheses	
that	 1)	 the	 exogenous	 variables,	 gender,	 age,	 education,	 household	 finance,	 neighbourhood	
disorder,	direct	and	indirect	victimisation	experience	of	crime	are	associated	with	fear	of	crime;	
2)	Higher	 levels	of	 fear	of	 crime	along	with	older	age	and	more	perception	of	neighbourhood	
disorder	 would	 provoke	 avoidance	 behaviour;	 and	 3)	 the	 exogenous	 variables	 have	 indirect	
effects	on	avoidance	behaviour	through	fear	of	crime.		
Figure	 1:	 Standardised	 maximum	 likelihood	 parameter	 estimates	 for	 a	 recursive	 path	 model	 of	 the	
impacts	 of	 fear	 of	 crime	 on	 avoidance	 behaviour	 and	 physical	 health.	 The	 standardised	 estimates	 and	





The	 recursive	 model	 is	 identified	 with	 degrees	 of	 freedom	 greater	 than	 zero	 (dfM	 =	 5).	 A	
correlation	matrix	is	shown	in	Table	1.	The	ML	estimation	of	Mplus	7	was	used	to	fit	the	model.	
The	analysis	converged	to	an	admissible	solution.	The	values	of	the	model	fit	statistics	indicate	
the	 data	 provided	 an	 acceptable	 overall	 fit.	 Selected	 fit	 statistics	 is	 reported	 as	 follows.	 The	





Variable	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	
Gender		 ─	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Age	 ‐.08	 ─	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Education		 ‐.29***	 ‐.10*	 ─	 	 	 	 	 	
Household	finance		 .03	 ‐.08	 ‐.09	 ─	 	 	 	 	
Neighbourhood	disorder		 ‐.02	 ‐.19**	 ‐.04	 .16***	 ─	 	 	 	
Direct	victimisation	by	crime	 .00	 ‐.02	 .01	 .01	 .13**	 ─	 	 	
Indirect	victimisation	by	crime		 ‐.02	 ‐.14**	 ‐.03	 .01	 .20***	 .32***	 ─	 	
Fear	of	crime	 .17***	 ‐.19***	 .02	 .09*	 .16***	 .17***	 .19***	 ─	









experience	 of	 crime	 either	 direct	 or	 indirect	 were	 found	 to	 be	 significant	 but	 education	 and	
household	finance	were	not.	Fear	of	crime,	gender	and	neighbourhood	disorder	accounted	for	
9.3%	 of	 variance	 in	 avoidance	 behaviours	 but	 the	 effect	 of	 gender	 was	 not	 significant	 as	
hypothesised.	Fear	of	 crime	mediated	 the	 effects	 of	 gender,	 age,	 direct	 victimisation	by	 crime	
and	indirect	victimisation	by	crime	on	avoidance	behaviour.		
	
Table	2:	Maximum	 likelihood	estimates	 for	a	path	model	of	 the	effects	of	 fear	of	
crime	on	avoidance	behaviour	
Parameter	 Unst.	 SE	 p	 St.	
	 Direct	effect	
On	fear	of	crime	 	 	 	 	
Gender		 0.779	 0.198	 <.001	 .183	
Age		 ‐0.032	 0.012	 .006	 ‐.125	
Education		 0.157	 0.102	 .125	 .072	
Household	finance	 0.283	 0.188	 .134	 .067	
Neighorhood	disorder	 0.693	 0.325	 .033	 .099	
Direct	victimisation	by	crime	 0.195	 0.079	 .013	 .116	
Indirect	victimisation	by	crime	 0.110	 0.044	 .012	 .120	
On	Avoidance	behaviour	 	 	 	 	
Gender		 0.535	 0.278	 .055	 .087	
Neighbourhood	disorder	 2.049	 0.465	 <.001	 .204	
Fear	of	crime	 0.242	 0.066	 <.001	 .168	
	 Disturbance	variances	
Fear	of	crime	 3.940	 0.262	 <.001	 .879	
Avoidance	behaviour	 8.362	 0.556	 <.001	 .907	
	 Indirect	effect	
On	avoidance	behaviour	through	fear	of	crime	 	 	 	
Gender		 0.188	 0.070	 .007	 .031	
Age		 ‐0.008	 0.004	 .029	 ‐.021	
Education	 0.038	 0.027	 .157	 .012	
Household	finance	 0.068	 0.049	 .165	 .011	
Neighbourhood	disorder	 0.168	 0.091	 .065	 .017	
Direct	victimistion	by	crime		 0.047	 0.023	 .040	 .019	




The	 crime‐specific	 prevalence	 rates	 revealed	 that	 property	 crime	 such	 as	 theft,	 cheat	 or	
burglary	was	more	prevalent	among	respondents	than	personal	crime	such	as	attack,	murder	or	
rape/sexual	assault.	It	was	noted	that	the	ranking	pattern	of	these	crimes	in	the	prevalence	for	
fear	 was	 analogous	 to	 that	 for	 direct	 victimisation	 and	 indirect	 victimisation.	 This	 study	





This	 study	 further	 evidenced	 that	 fear	 of	 crime	 was	 a	 gendered	 phenomenon	 with	 females	
expressing	higher	levels	of	fear	than	males.	Disadvantage	in	physical	strength	(Killias	and	Clerici	





























This	study	provided	evidence	 for	 the	assumption	that	direct	or	 indirect	victimisation	of	crime	
has	a	positive	impact	on	higher	levels	of	fear	of	crime.	As	prior	research	demonstrated,	personal	
experience	of	victimisation	 increases	one’s	 feeling	of	vulnerability,	 lack	of	 confidence	 for	 self‐
protection,	risk	perception	of	victimisation	and	consequent	fear	of	crime	(Dull	and	Wint	1997;	
Lawton	 and	 Yaffe	 1980;	 Skogan	 and	Maxfield	 1981;	Wittebrood	 2002;	Weinrath	 and	Gartrell	
1996).	Vicarious	experience	of	victimisation	is	deemed	to	intensify	one’s	sense	of	vulnerability	







behaviour	at	a	 total	 level	 though	 females	were	more	vigilant	as	 for	opening	door	 for,	 chatting	
with	 or	 offering	 help	 to	 strangers	 than	 males.	 Considering	 outdoor	 activities,	 physical	
vulnerability	 to	deal	with	 the	 complicated	 situations	 and	possible	 threats	 in	 the	 environment	
might	worry	 both	 genders	 equally.	 The	 disorder	 clues	 in	 the	 neighbourhood	 could	 cause	 old	
people	 to	 perceive	 higher	 risk	 of	 being	 victimised	 so	 as	 to	 reduce	 their	 mobility	 and	
interpersonal	 interaction.	Females	at	a	younger	age	and	having	experienced	direct	or	 indirect	




This	 study	 was	 among	 the	 first	 attempts	 to	 explore	 the	 fear	 of	 crime	 experienced	 by	 older	
Chinese	and	examine	its	impacts	on	their	daily	life	through	addressing	avoidance	behaviour.	It	is	
suggested	that	if	old	people	internalise	this	behavioural	pattern	as	a	life	style,	it	will	have	long‐
run	negative	 impacts	 on	 their	wellbeing	 through	 impairing	physical	 health,	 social	 functioning	
and	finally	mental	health.	For	the	purpose	of	prevention,	efforts	should	be	made	to	improve	the	
neighbourhood	 environment	 by	 reducing	 physical	 and	 social	 disorder	 signs	 and	 crime	
incidence.	 Females,	 the	 ‘young	 old’	 and	 victims	 who	 have	 experienced	 crime	 directly	 or	
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indirectly	 should	 be	 the	 special	 targets	 for	 the	 intervention	 on	 fear	 of	 crime.	More	 proactive	
strategies	 and	 skills	 for	 self‐defence	 should	 be	 advocated	 among	 them	 to	 replace	 the	 passive	
avoidance	 behaviour.	 The	 current	 study	 limited	 in	 neglecting	 participants’	 worries	 about	
financial	 security	 and	 physical	 health	 which	might	 be	 of	 greater	 importance	 for	 most	 of	 old	







































































































It	 is	well	 established	 that	 there	 are	 inherent	 difficulties	 involved	 in	 communicating	 across	
cultural	 boundaries.	When	 these	 difficulties	 are	 encountered	within	 the	 justice	 system	 the	
innocent	can	be	convicted	and	witnesses	undermined.	A	large	amount	of	research	has	been	
undertaken	 regarding	 the	 implications	 of	miscommunication	within	 the	 courtroom	but	 far	
less	 has	 been	 carried	 out	 on	 language	 and	 interactions	 between	 police	 and	 Indigenous	

















long	 proven	 to	 be	 a	 difficult	 exercise	 (Balsmeier	 and	Heck	 1994).	 These	 difficulties	 can	 have	
serious	consequences	when	the	miscommunication	happens	in	the	justice	system;	the	innocent	
can	be	convicted	and	witnesses	undermined.	Much	work	has	been	carried	out	on	the	need	for	
better	 communication	 in	 the	 courtroom	 (Eades	 1993;	 Lauchs	 2010;	 Supreme	 Court	 of	
Queensland	 2010;	 Supreme	 Court	 of	Western	 Australia	 2008),	 including	 the	 development	 of	
educational	packages	to	promote	cultural	awareness	within	the	courts	(Lauchs	2010).	Far	less	
work	 has	 been	 conducted	 on	 language	 and	 interaction	 between	 police	 and	 Indigenous	
Australians	 (Powell	2000).	 It	 is	necessary	 that	officers	of	 the	 law	be	made	aware	of	 linguistic	
issues	 to	 ensure	 they	 conduct	 their	 investigations	 in	 a	 fair,	 effective	 and	 therefore	 ethical	
manner.	Despite	years	of	awareness	raising,	clashes	between	police	and	Indigenous	peoples	are	




Within	 each	 culture	 there	 are	 established	 values	 and	 behavioural	 patterns.	 Learning	 to	
understand	these,	and,	in	the	process,	accepting	that	one’s	own	culture	may	differ	from	another,	
is	 a	 vital	 ingredient	 in	 effective	 cross‐cultural	 communication.	 An	 important	 aspect	 of	 cross‐
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cultural	 communication	 is	 the	 understanding	 that	 there	 may	 be	 barriers	 to	 effective	
communication	due	to	cultural	difference	(Balsmeier	and	Heck	1994).	Keeping	an	open	mind	in	
regards	to	these	differences	is	an	important	step	in	preventing	the	development	of	stereotypical	
attitudes	 and	 prejudiced	 opinions.	 Basic	 awareness	 of	 difference	 may	 not	 make	 the	 cross‐
cultural	communication	process	easy,	but	it	has	the	potential	to	reduce	conflict.		
	
The	multi‐cultural	 nature	of	Australian	 society	brings	 to	 the	 fore	 issues	 surrounding	 effective	
cross‐cultural	 communication	 (Balsmeier	 and	 Heck	 1994).	 Miscommunication	 between	 the	
speakers	 of	 Australian	 Aboriginal	 English	 (AAE)	 and	 Australian	 Standard	 English	 (ASE)	
(Sharifian	 2009)	 has	 been	 given	 less	 attention.	 It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 the	 majority	 of	







Queensland	 (McConvell	 and	 Thieberger	 2001).	 For	 the	 50,000	 years	 prior	 to	 colonisation,	





Strait	 Islander	 and	 the	 remainder	 identified	 as	 both	 of	 Aboriginal	 and	 Torres	 Strait	 Islander	
origin	 (ABS	2006:	16).	Almost	one	quarter	(22%)	of	 Indigenous	Queenslanders	were	 living	 in	





1991).	 Although	 there	 are	 variations	 in	 the	 varieties	 of	 AAE,	with	 ‘heavier’	 varieties	 drawing	
strongly	on	native	 language	and	meaning	spoken	 in	remote	areas,	and	 ‘lighter’	varieties	more	
similar	to	ASE	in	suburban	areas;	AAE	should	not	be	mistaken	as	a	form	of	Pidgin	English	(Eades	






Issues	 with	 miscommunication	 arise	 due	 to	 the	 similarities	 between	 AAE	 and	 ASE	 (Eades,	
1988).	 Even	 when	 grammatical	 differences	 are	 not	 great	 between	 AAE	 and	 ASE,	 pragmatic	






Linguistic	 research	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 AAE	 has	 used	 the	 term	 ‘cultural	 conceptualisations’	 as	 a	
collective	term	to	describe	‘schemas’	and	‘categories’	which	embody	one’s	cultural	experiences	
(Sharifian	 2008).	 These	 cultural	 conceptualisations	 are	 not	 static,	 but	 are	 ‘negotiated’	 and	
‘renegotiated’	by	members	of	a	culture	through	their	 interpersonal	experiences.	 In	the	case	of	
Aboriginal	 culture,	 these	 cultural	 conceptualisations	 are	 not	 only	 found	 in	 language,	 but	 also	
through	 cultural	 practices	 such	 as	 dance,	 painting	 and	 rituals	 (Sharifian	 2010).	 AAE	 is	
influenced	 by	 all	 of	 these	 cultural	 conceptualisations	 that	 are	 derived	 from	 the	 beliefs	 and	
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experiences	 specific	 to	 Aboriginal	 people	 (Malcolm	 and	 Rochecouste	 2000;	 Malcolm	 and	
Sharifian	 2002;	 Sharifian	 2010).	 For	 example,	 the	 complexity	 of	 Aboriginal	 kinship	 could	
influence	 the	meanings	of	words	such	as	 family,	home	 and	brother	 to	 include	meanings	which	
reach	far	beyond	the	simplistic	meanings	which	ASE	would	credit	them	with	(Sharifian	2006).	
For	example,	to	an	AAE	speaker	‘family’	could	encompass	a	wide	variety	of	people,	who	may	or	










to	 interpret,	 predict	 and	 organise	 experience	 (Rumelhart	 1980).	 Many	 disciplines	 have	 used	
schema	 theory	 to	 explain	 human	 cognition.	 These	 include	 psychology,	 artificial	 intelligence,	
linguistics	 and	 anthropology	 (Sharifian	 2001).	 Palmer	 (1996:	 63)	 applies	 this	 theory	 in	 a	
cultural	 context	 by	 suggesting	 ‘it	 is	 likely	 that	 all	 native	 knowledge	 of	 language	 and	 culture	
belongs	 to	 cultural	 schemas	 and	 the	 living	 of	 culture	 and	 the	 speaking	 of	 language	 consist	 of	
schemas	 in	 action’.	 Cultural	 Schema	 Theory	 regards	 schemas	 as	 largely	 dwelling	 in	 cultural	
experience,	 influenced	 by	 such	 factors	 as	 innately	 programmed	 behaviour	 or	 people’s	 own	
distinct	worldview	 (Sharifian	 et	 al.	 2004).	 Put	 simply,	 personal	 experience	 and	 knowledge	 of	
culture	 form	 cultural	 schemas	 which	 are	 consequently	 organised	 and	 employed	 to	 interpret	
future	 interactions.	 In	 regards	 to	 Aboriginal	 English,	 this	 involves	 Aboriginal	 people	 taking	
traditionally	English	words	and	applying	their	own	culturally	influenced	schemas	to	them.	This	




In	 this	 model,	 cultural	 schemas	 are	 not	 equally	 shared	 between	 cultural	 groups	 but	 are	
distributed	 across	 the	 group	 depending	 on	 each	 individual’s	 personal	 experience	 (Sharifian	
2003).	 This	 model	 supports	 findings	 from	 a	 study	 of	 Aboriginal	 words	 and	 concepts	 in	
Australian	 English,	 conducted	 by	 Leitner	 and	 Sieloff	 (1998)	 which	 found	 that	 younger	
Aboriginal	people	were	 less	aware	of	meanings	of	such	terms	as	 land	rights,	woman’s	business	
and	dreaming	 than	 their	 older	 counterparts.	 Therefore,	 cultural	 schemas	 are	 said	 to	 exist	 on	
somewhat	of	a	continuum,	rather	than	on	an	‘all	or	none’	basis	with	factors	such	as	age,	gender	
and	 education	 responsible	 for	 such	 knowledge	 distribution	 (Sharifian	 2003).	 Although	
originally	 an	 anthropological	 theory,	 the	 relevance	 of	 Cultural	 Schema	 Theory	 to	 the	






Trends	 in	 sociolinguistics,	 discourse	 analysis,	 applied	 linguistics	 and	 pragmatics	 dominated	
research	 on	 Australian	 Aboriginal	 English	 prior	 to	 the	 1990s	 (Harkins	 1994;	 Malcolm	 2000;	
Sharifian	2006).	 Early	 research	 into	 AAE	 conducted	by	 Eagleson,	Kaldor	 and	Malcolm	 (1982)	
and	 Malcolm	 (1977)	 explored	 AAE	 in	 a	 descriptive	 sense	 as	 well	 as	 drawing	 on	 trends	 in	
sociolinguistics.	More	 recently,	 Aboriginal	 English	 studies	 have	 looked	 at	 discourse	 strategies	
employed	 by	 its	 speakers	 (Malcolm	 1994)	 as	 well	 as	 the	 pragmatic	 norms	 which	 govern	
communication	in	AAE	(Eades	1982,	1992,	1993,	1994,	1995,	1996).	Two	dominant	applications	
have	 emerged	 from	 previous	 research	 into	 AAE,	 one	 being	 the	 practical	 implications	 in	 the	
Antonia	Randles,	Mark	Lauchs	
166	 Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	2nd	International	Conference,	2013	
classroom,	 which	 predominately	 draws	 on	 schema‐based	 theory	 (Lowell	 and	 Devlin	 1998;	
Malcolm	1994;	Oliver,	Rochecouste,	Vanderford,	and	Grote	2011;	Sharifian	2001,	2008)	and	the	
second	 being	 implications	 of	 miscommunication	 in	 a	 legal	 setting,	 which	 draws	 more	 on	
criminological	 theories	 of	 power	 and	post‐colonialism	 (Cooke	1995,	 1996,	 2002;	Eades	1993,	
1994,	1996).	Research	exploring	the	implications	of	linguistic	difference	between	AAE	and	ASE	
predominately	involves	the	collection	and	analysis	of	oral	narratives	from	Aboriginal	people	to	




All	 research	 which	 explores	 the	 implications	 of	 Aboriginal	 English	 in	 the	 classroom	
acknowledges	that	Aboriginal	students	are	at	a	disadvantage	(Lowell	and	Devlin	1998;	Malcolm	
1994;	Oliver	et	al.	2011;	Sharifian	2001).	Communicative	difficulties	exist	between	Aboriginal	
students	 and	 their	 non‐Indigenous	 teachers	 arising	 from	 a	 lack	 of	 shared	 communicative	
assumptions,	 cultural	discontinuity	between	 the	home	environment	and	school,	differences	 in	
perspectives,	 expectations,	 understandings	 and	 interpretations,	 differences	 in	 pragmatics,	
differences	 in	 length	 of	 pause	 time	 and	 listening	 and	 attention	 patterns	 (Christie	 and	 Harris	
1985;	Harris	1977;	McConvell	1991).	Lowell	and	Devlin	(1998),	Oliver	et	al.	(2011),	Sharifian	et	
al.	 (2004)	 and	 Sharifian	 (2008)	 all	 highlight	 that	 effective,	 culturally	 competent	 educational	
programs	should	rely	on	understanding	Aboriginal	cultural	schemas.		
	
Malcolm	 (1994:	150)	 found	 that	 speech	 is	 ‘always	associated	with	 the	presence	of	Aboriginal	
communicators	 in	 a	 setting	 or	 speech	 event	which	 is	 defined	 by	 non‐Aboriginals.	 The	 key,	 if	
there	 is	 a	key,	 to	 how	Aboriginal	people	 communicate,	 seems	 to	me	 to	 lie	 in	who	defines	 the	
setting	 and	 determines	 the	 discourse	 pattern’.	 Lowell	 and	 Devlin	 (1998)	 recommend	 that	
Aboriginal	perspectives	be	privileged,	in	the	hope	of	creating	a	dominant	framework	which	will	
inform	the	educational	needs	of	Aboriginal	children	in	the	future.	Most	studies	involving	AAE	in	
the	 classroom	 conclude	 that	 awareness	 of	 cultural	 and	 linguistic	 difference	 is	 the	 most	
important	 ingredient	 in	 ‘developing	 and	 implementing	 more	 inclusive	 and	 accommodating	
educational	 programmes’	 (Sharifian	2001:	132).	 Teachers	 in	 urban	areas	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 be	
aware	of	the	dialect	of	AAE	as	opposed	to	teachers	in	rural	areas,	which	demonstrates	the	need	
for	ongoing	professional	development	about	AAE	(Oliver	et	al.	2011).	This	could	be	applicable	to	
not	 only	 the	 classroom,	 but	 law	 courts,	 government	 offices,	 or	 in	 fact	 anywhere	 which	
communication	 takes	 place	 in	 which	 the	 non‐Aboriginal	 participant	 defines	 the	 terms	 of	
communication	(Malcolm	1994).	
	
Eades	 studies	 of	 Indigenous	 experiences	 in	 the	 courtroom	 have	 shown	 that	 ‘even	where	 the	
grammatical	 differences	 between	 ASE	 and	 AAE	 are	 not	 great,	 there	 are	 significant	 pragmatic	
differences	 which	 have	 implications	 for	 intercultural	 communication’	 (D	 Eades	 2004:	 492).	
Specific	implications	for	the	legal	setting	include	the	different	ways	in	which	Aboriginal	people	
seek	 information,	 usually	 avoiding	 direct	 questioning,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 positive	 value	 which	
Aboriginal	 people	 place	 on	 silence;	 silence	 being	 found	 as	 an	 important	 contribution	 to	
conversation,	 rather	 than	 failure	 to	 communicate	 (Eades	 2004).	 Although	 communication	
difficulties	 involving	 Aboriginal	 people	 in	 the	 legal	 setting	 has	 been	 noted	 for	many	 decades	
(Elkin	1947;	 Strehlow	1936),	 Eades	 has	 addressed	 the	widespread	 ignorance	 to	 the	 language	
variety	used	by	Aboriginal	people	and	shown	how	this	linguistic	diversity	has	an	overflow	affect	
on	 to	 Indigenous	 over‐representation	 (Eades	 2004).	 Similarly,	 Cooke	 explores	 the	 use	 of	











being	 2.5%	 of	 the	 Australian	 population	 in	 2008,	 Indigenous	 people	 represented	 24%	 of	 the	
prison	 population,	 meaning	 Indigenous	 people	 are	 currently	 13	 times	more	 likely	 than	 non‐
Indigenous	people	 to	be	 imprisoned	(HREOC	2008).	The	majority	of	explanations	 for	 the	vast	
over‐representation	 of	 Indigenous	 people	within	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system,	 and	 the	 volatile	
relationship	which	exists	between	Indigenous	people	and	police	draw	on	explanations	rooted	in	
the	historical	context	of	colonisation	(Behrendt,	Cunneen,	and	Libesman	2008;	Cunneen	2001;	
Eades	 2009;	 Jennett	 1999;	 Kamira	 1999).	 Conversely,	 language	 difficulties	 can	 also	 have	
significant	 consequences	 for	 Indigenous	 victims	 of	 crime.	 Most	 of	 Eades’	 work	 shows	 that	
Indigenous	 witnesses	 can	 be	 discredited	 in	 court	 through	manipulation	 of	 the	 ASE	 speaking	
jury’s	perception	of	an	AAE	speaking	witness	(Eades	2009).		
	
AAE	 has	 been	 recognised	 by	 the	 courts	 and	 positive	 steps	 have	 been	 taken	 to	 address	 and	
prevent	communication	issues	(DJAG	2000;	Supreme	Court	of	Queensland	2005,	2010;	Supreme	
Court	 of	 Western	 Australia	 2008,	 2009).	 There	 have	 also	 been	 attempts	 to	 improve	 the	
recognition	of	Aboriginal	English	 in	non‐criminal	matters	 such	as	native	 title	hearings	 (Byrne	
2003).	Awareness	has	 increased	but	 communication	 issues	 still	 remain.	No	studies	have	been	
undertaken	 of	 the	 prevalence	 of	 Indigenous	 language	 use	 –	 Aboriginal	 English	 or	 traditional	
languages	 –	 in	 Queensland	 courts,	 or	 in	 other	 Australian	 jurisdictions;	 thus	 there	 are	 no	
indicators	of	whether	the	raising	of	awareness	has	produced	more	 just	outcomes.	Also,	courts	
have	 discovered	 procedural	 difficulties	 when	 trying	 to	 acknowledge	 AAE	 (Lauchs	 2010);	 for	
example,	 judges	 not	 being	 able	 to	 advise	 a	 jury	 on	 possible	 language	 differences	 due	 to	 the	





is	 that	of	 the	Pinkenba	Six	 (Eades	2006).	 In	 this	case,	 the	defence	council	set	out	 to	show	that	
three	Aboriginal	boys	aged	12,	13	and	14,	after	being	approached	by	six	armed	police	officers,	
voluntarily	got	into	three	separate	police	vehicles,	which	were	then	driven	14	kilometres	out	of	
town	 to	an	 industrial	 area	at	Pinkenba	 (Eades	1995).	The	police	officers	 abandoned	 the	boys	
there	(Eades	2006).	The	case	centred	on	whether	or	not	the	boys	had	got	into	the	police	vehicles	




Aboriginal	 English	 such	 as	 gratuitous	 concurrence,	 the	 role	 of	 silence	 and	 eye	 contact	 in	 fact	
helped	the	defence	to	culturally	disadvantage	the	Aboriginal	boys	and	to	position	their	accounts	
as	unreliable	and	inaccurate	(Eades	1995,	1996,	2004,	2006,	2009).	There	is	often	a	focus	on	the	
exploitation	 of	 aspects	 of	Aboriginal	English	by	defence	 counsels	within	 literature	 centred	on	
Aboriginal	English	in	the	legal	context.	This	alleged	presence	of	malice	is	not	always	the	cause	of	
ineffective	 communication	 between	 speakers	 of	 ASE	 and	 AAE	 in	 the	 legal	 context.	 The	 same	
results	 can	 arise	 through	 ignorance,	 even	with	 the	 best	 of	 intentions,	 as	 is	 the	 1993	 case	 of	
Robyn	Kina.		
	
In	 1988,	 an	 Aboriginal	 woman	 by	 the	 name	 of	 Robyn	 Kina	 was	 found	 guilty	 of	 the	 stabbing	





as	 a	 result	 of	 provocation	 (Eades	 1996).	 Eades	 (1996)	 highlights	 that	 the	 lawyers	 who	
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interviewed	 Kina	 originally	 were	 not	 aware	 that	 the	 difficulties	 they	 were	 experiencing	
communicating	 with	 Kina	 were	 due	 to	 serious	 cultural	 differences.	 Not	 being	 able	 to	 gather	
critical	 evidence	 lead	 to	one	of	 the	 shortest	 trials	 in	Queensland	history,	with	 less	 than	 three	
hours	 of	 evidence	 and	 the	 jury	 only	 requiring	 50	 minutes	 to	 return	 a	 guilty	 verdict	 (Eades	
1996).	A	few	years	later,	public	interest	in	the	case	resulted	in	the	Queensland	Attorney	General	
contacting	Kina	and	an	appeal	was	 initiated	 (Eades	1996).	Kina	 successfully	 appealed	against	
the	 conviction	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 her	 lawyers	 did	 not	 gather	 from	 her	 the	 information	
necessary	 to	defend	her	effectively	(Pringle	1994).	The	conviction	was	quashed	and	Kina	was	
subsequently	released	from	prison	(Eades	2004).	Unlike	Pinkenba,	Kina	was	failed	by	her	own	
lawyers;	 therefore	 highlighting	 that	 cultural	 difference	 in	 communication	 can	 lead	 to	 gross	
miscarriages	of	justice,	even	when	the	best	of	intentions	are	present.	Thus,	as	shown	by	Eades	
(1996),	the	communication	difficulties	present	were	not	about	personalities	but	about	cultural	
difference	 in	 language	 usage.	 The	 case	 of	 Robyn	 Kina	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	







lack	 of	 awareness	 and	 acknowledgement	 of	 this	 dialect	 has	 far	 reaching	 detrimental	
consequences	 for	 its	 speakers.	 As	 Eades	 (2002,	 2003)	 points	 out,	 how	 linguistic	 differences	
affect	 the	 broader	 social	 and	 political	 discourses	 needs	 to	 be	 analysed	 in	 order	 to	 fully	
understand	its	consequences	on	AAE	speakers.	These	issues	are	just	as	relevant	for	Indigenous‐
police	 interactions.	 If	 the	majority	of	Aboriginal	people	speak	some	 form	of	AAE,	and	 that	 the	
communicative	 patterns	 of	 Aboriginal	 people	 are	 influenced	 by	 cultural	 schemas	 and	 who	
defines	the	setting	of	the	interaction,	it	would	not	be	unreasonable	to	draw	the	conclusion	that	
AAE	could	 in	 fact	have	an	effect	on	 the	relationship	between	Aboriginal	people	and	the	police	
(Butcher	2008;	Malcolm	1994).		
	
Police	 are	 at	 the	 frontline	 of	 the	 justice	 system.	 They	 have	 the	 discretion	 to	 charge	 and	 the	
responsibility	to	investigate	criminal	offences.	The	courts	and	correctional	stages	of	the	justice	
system	play	no	part	until	the	police	have	concluded	their	engagement	with	an	accused.	Thus	the	







Literature	 which	 draws	 on	 post‐colonial	 theory	 argues	 that	 the	 role	 which	 police	 played	
throughout	colonisation,	from	violence	towards	Aboriginal	clans	to	enforcing	the	state	policies	







Racism	 and	 racial	 prejudice	 are	 often	 put	 forward,	 particularly	 in	 regards	 to	 policing,	 as	
explanations	 for	 the	 continuing	 Indigenous	 disadvantage.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 events	 of	




racist,	 prejudiced	 beliefs	 (Cunneen	 2001).	 Racism	 clearly	 existed	 in	 the	 Queensland	 Police	





and	Aboriginal	peoples	 following	 the	death	of	Cameron	Doomadgee	and	riots	 in	Aurukun,	 the	
Queensland	Government	requested	the	Crime	and	Misconduct	Commission	(CMC)	to	conduct	an	
independent	 inquiry	 into	 policing	 and	 Aboriginal	 peoples	 (CMC	 2009).	 The	 CMC’s	 report	
recognises	the	importance	of	effective	cross‐cultural	communication	between	Aboriginal	people	





...	 in	 the	 area	 of	 policing,	 law,	 crime	 and	 justice,	 there	 is	 much	 at	 stake	 in	 cross	
cultural	 encounters	 –	 breakdowns	 in	 communication	 can	 lead	 to	 injustice	 ...	 in	
Queensland’s	 indigenous	communities	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	police	effectively	without	




issues	between	ASE	and	AAE.	Although	 the	QPS	are	 taking	 steps	 to	 address	 issues	of	 cultural	









…	any	behavior	or	pattern	of	 behavior	 that	 tends	 to	 systematically	deny	 access	 to	












or	 motives,	 can	 engage	 in	 unintentional	 racism.	 Clinicians	 may	 inadvertently	
sabotage	 their	 own	well‐intended	 actions	 and	 perpetuate	 the	 very	 problems	 they	
endeavour	to	overcome.	To	eliminate	their	unintentional	racism,	clinicians	need	to	










We	have	 shown	 that	 the	 communication	 difficulties	 between	AAE	 and	ASE	 speakers	 not	 only	
lead	 to	 misunderstanding	 but	 have	 contributed	 to	 unjust	 outcomes	 for	 Indigenous	
Queenslanders.	 Cultural	 Schema	 Theory	 has	 been	 used	 to	 show	 how	 the	 different	 cultural	




been	produced	by	 the	 same	 schema.	Historically,	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 presently,	 racism	has	
been	a	common	reaction.	This	has	been	recognised	in	both	RCADIC	and	CMC	reviews.	But	laying	




work	 in	 the	 courts	but	no	one	has	undergone	 similar	 research	 in	 the	policing	context.	Future	


























































































































































Immigration	 to	 Australia	 has	 long	 been	 the	 focus	 of	 negative	 political	 interest.	 In	 recent	
times,	 the	 proposal	 of	 exclusionary	 policies	 such	 as	 the	Malaysia	 Deal	 in	 2011	 has	 fuelled	
further	 debate.	 In	 these	 debates,	 Federal	 politicians	 often	 describe	 asylum	 seekers	 and	
refugees	 as	 ‘illegal’,	 ‘queue	 jumpers’,	 and	 ‘boat	 people’.	 This	 paper	 investigates	 how	 the	
political	discourse	constructs	asylum	seekers	and	refugees	during	debates	surrounding	 the	
Malaysia	Deal	in	the	Federal	Parliament	of	Australia	in	2011.	Hansard	Parliamentary	debates	
were	analysed	 to	 identify	 the	underlying	 themes	and	constructions	 that	 permeate	political	
discourse	 about	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees.	 This	 paper	 argues	 that	 a	 dichotomous	
characterisation	of	legitimacy	pervades	their	construction	with	this	group	constructed	either	
as	 legitimate	 humanitarian	 refugees	 or	 as	 illegitimate	 ‘boat	 arrivals’.	 These	 constructions	
result	in	the	misrepresentation	of	asylum	seekers	as	illegitimate,	undermining	their	right	to	








Government	 had	 plans	 to	 strike	 a	 deal	 with	 the	Malaysian	 Government	 to	 swap	 800	 asylum	
seekers	 for	 4000	 refugees.	 The	 proposed	 ‘Malaysia	 Deal’	 was	 the	 latest	 in	 a	 long	 history	 of	
policies	designed	to	manage	the	arrival	of	‘irregular’	migrants	to	Australia.	The	White	Australia	
Policy1	saw	the	restriction	of	non‐European	migration	for	more	than	70	years	until	 the	1970s	
when	 the	 policy	 was	 formally	 abandoned	 (Crock	 and	 Berg	 2011:	 113;	 Grewcock	 2009).	
Following	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Vietnam	 War,	 the	 arrival	 of	 more	 than	 50	 boats	 carrying	 asylum	
seekers	 from	 South	 East	 Asia	 prompted	 an	 increase	 in	 concern	 regarding	 people	 arriving	 by	
boat	and	as	a	result	the	term	‘boat	people’	emerged	in	the	media,	public	and	political	discourse	
(Grewcock	2009;	Phillips	and	Spinks	2011).	This	concern	and	anxiety	has	captured	the	attention	
of	 successive	 governments	 and	 resulted	 in	 the	 Federal	 Government’s	 introduction	 of	
restrictions	 and	 exclusionary	 measures	 towards	 unauthorised	 arrivals,	 most	 notably	 the	
establishment	 of	 mandatory	 detention	 for	 all	 unauthorised	 arrivals	 introduced	 under	 Prime	
Minister	Paul	Keating	in	1992	(Grewcock	2009;	Phillips	and	Spinks	2011).	The	last	two	decades	
have	 increasingly	 been	 characterised	 by	 negative	 attitudes	 towards	 asylum	 seekers,	
crystallising	 around	 major	 events	 such	 as	 the	 Tampa	 Crisis2,	 and	 resulting	 in	 exclusionary	
political	 agendas	 and	 policies	 such	 as	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 Pacific	 Solution3	 under	 former	
Prime	Minister	John	Howard	(Every	2006:	10).	
	
The	 proposed	 Malaysia	 Deal	 emerged	 within	 an	 ongoing	 maelstrom	 of	 public	 debate	 about	




largely	 abandoned	 by	 the	 Labour	 Government,	 the	 parliamentary	 discourse	 surrounding	 this	
recent	 event	 offers	 significant	 insights	 into	 the	 social	 construction	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 and	
refugees	 in	 Australian	 politics.	 This	 paper	 examines	 Hansard	 transcripts	 of	 the	 Federal	
Parliamentary	 debates	 about	 the	 Malaysia	 Deal	 in	 both	 the	 Senate	 and	 House	 of	
Representatives.	 Specifically,	 the	 data	 collection	 was	 limited	 to	 the	 time	 period	 from	 1	 May	
2011,	 until	 1	October	 2011,	which	 included	 several	months	 of	 negotiation,	 the	 signing	 of	 the	







have	 previously	 been	 found	 to	 focus	 on	 these	 themes,	 and	 represent	 asylum	 seekers	 and	




often	at	 the	 centre	of	 the	construction	of	 legitimacy,	while	nationalism	and	border	protection	
themes	are	evoked	in	order	to	construct	this	group	as	threatening	to	society.	While	all	of	these	
themes	 are	 evident	 in	 the	 parliamentary	 debates	 around	 the	 Malaysia	 Deal,	 we	 argue	 that	
notions	of	legitimacy	and	genuineness	have	come	to	dominate	the	discourse.	In	the	past,	debates	
on	issues	such	as	the	Tampa	focused	more	heavily	on	the	need	for	border	security,	which	may	
have	been	particularly	 resonant	with	 the	public	 in	an	 immediate	post	9/11	environment.	The	
discourse	 around	 the	 Malaysia	 Deal	 indicates	 that	 while	 concerns	 about	 national	 interest,	
identity,	and	border	protection	are	still	evident,	the	focus	has	begun	to	shift.		
	
In	 this	 paper,	 we	 argue	 that	 Parliament’s	 preoccupation	 with	 legitimacy	 has	 led	 to	 the	






The	 issue	 of	 asylum	 claims	 and	 resettlement	 is	 an	 intensely	 political	 issue	 in	 the	 Australian	
context,	 with	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 consistently	 labelled	 using	 stereotypical	 and	
deceptive	 language	 by	 the	media	 and	 politics,	 particularly	 since	 the	Tampa	 incident	 in	 2001	
(Klocker	2004:	3;	Mares	2002a;	Klocker	and	Dunn	2003;	Pickering	2001).	Political	and	public	





Pickering	 (2001)	 argues	 that	 the	 language	 used	 in	 relation	 to	 asylum	 seeker	 and	 refugees	 is	
most	 often	 binary	 in	 nature.	 The	 use	 of	 terms	 such	 as	 ‘genuine’	 versus	 ‘non‐genuine’,	 ‘legal’	
versus	 ‘illegal’,	 and	 ‘refugees’	 versus	 ‘boat	 people’	 contribute	 to	 a	 delineation	 between	 two	
groups	of	people.	The	use	of	 such	 language	polarises	 the	 issue	of	asylum	seeking	and	 refugee	
determination	(Pickering	2001:	172).	The	choice	of	these	terms	over	more	accurate	terms	such	




















The	 analysis	 of	 the	 Parliamentary	 debates	 on	 matters	 related	 to	 the	 Malaysia	 Deal	 revealed	
considerable	 inconsistency	 and	 variety	 in	 the	 terms	 and	 language	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 asylum	
seekers	 and	 refugees	 in	 Federal	 Parliament.	 The	 most	 frequent	 misleading	 and	
misrepresentative	terms	used	in	the	political	debate	were	‘illegal	arrivals’,	 ‘genuine	refugee/s’,	
‘boat	people’,	 and	 ‘queue	 jumper/s’	or	 simply	 ‘queue’.	The	analysis	 revealed	a	construction	of	
two	distinct	groups	of	asylum	seekers	and	refugees	emerging	through	the	use	of	terms	such	as	
‘genuine’	 and	 ‘illegal’,	 perpetuating	 the	 dichotomous	 construction	 of	 legitimacy.	 The	 term	
‘genuine’	was	 consistently	 used	 in	 order	 to	make	 the	 distinction	 between	 irregular	maritime	
arrivals	 (IMAs)	and	offshore	applicants,	ultimately	constructing	two	distinct	groups	of	asylum	
seekers	 and	 refugees.	 Similarly,	 politicians	 in	 Federal	 Parliament	 used	 the	 term	 ‘illegal’	 in	
reference	to	irregular	maritime	arrivals	to	contrast	this	group	against	offshore	applicants.	This	
consistent	 depiction	 of	 two	 separate	 and	 distinct	 groups	 is	 associated	 with	 the	 theme	 of	







…	we	have	had	241	boats	and	12,000	 illegal	 arrivals.	…	Since	 the	Malaysia	people	




a	 ‘non‐genuine’	 refugee	 with	 the	 use	 of	 binary	 language	 constructing	 offshore	 applicants	 as	
more	‘genuine’:	
	
As	 part	 of	 that	 transfer	 agreement,	 we	 would	 bring	 to	 Australia	 people	 who	 are	
genuine	 refugees,	who	 are	 processed	 in	Malaysia	 and	who	 are	 already	 there	 now	
and	are	waiting	a	resettlement	opportunity.	(House	May	23,	2011)	
	












The	 construction	 of	 a	 particular	 group	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 as	 ‘illegal’	 and	 ‘non‐
genuine’	 found	 during	 this	 current	 analysis	 is	 consistent	 with	 past	 research	 (Saxton	 2003;	
Klocker	and	Dunn	2003;	Pedersen	et	al.	2006).	The	political	construction	of	asylum	seekers	as	
‘non‐genuine’	and	‘illegal’	disconnects	the	asylum	seekers	from	the	reasons	for	seeking	asylum.	
Instead	of	 highlighting	 the	need	 for	protection	of	 asylum	seekers,	 the	 ‘illegal’	 label	 applied	 to	
them	 criminalises	 their	 actions	 and	 positions	 them	 as	 a	 threat.	 Furthermore,	 this	 distinction	
between	IMAs	and	those	processed	in	overseas	refugees’	camps	informs	the	significant	negative	
attitudes	towards	asylum	seekers	and	refugees	in	the	Australian	public	and	politics	(Pedersen	et	
al.	 2006:	 106).	 The	 need	 to	 seek	 asylum	 from	 persecution	 and	 threat,	 as	 the	motivation	 for	
irregular	migration,	is	no	longer	associated	with	those	constructed	as	‘illegal’	and	‘illegitimate’.	
Rather,	 Federal	 politicians	 construct	 this	 group	 as	 a	 threat	 due	 to	 their	 perceived	 illegality	
(Every	 2006:	 24)	 as	well	 as	 threatening	 to	 the	 interests	 and	 livelihood	 of	 ‘genuine’	 refugees.	
Such	 negative	 connotations	 toward	 IMA’s	 further	 enhance	 offshore	 applicants’	 perceived	
legitimacy	(Lynn	and	Lea	2003:	432).	
	
The	 Parliamentary	 discourse	 constructed	 two	 separate	 categories	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 through	
the	positioning	of	IMAs	as	‘illegal’	and	a	threat	to	‘genuine’	refugees.	Moreover,	these	categories	
seemed	 to	 be	 determined	 through	 discussions	 on	 the	mode	 of	 arrival	 of	 asylum	 seekers,	 the	




‘Boat	 people’	 is	 a	 term	 often	 used	 to	 describe	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 who	 arrive	 in	
Australia	 by	 boat.	 Throughout	 the	 Parliamentary	 discussions	 held	 during	 2011,	 Federal	
politicians	 frequently	 used	 the	 term	 ‘boat	 people’	 to	 distinguish	 between	 IMAs	 and	 offshore	








would	be	 sending	boat	people	 to	East	Timor.	She	made	 this	announcement	before	









Augoustinos	 2008:	 581).	 In	 addition,	 this	 language	 challenges	 the	 status	 and	 legitimacy	 of	
asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 who	 arrive	 by	 boat	 (Pickering	 2001:	 183).	 Coalition	 Senator	
Mathias	Cormann	further	demonstrates	this	fixation	on	an	individual’s	mode	of	arrival:	
	
The	 Prime	Minister	 used	 to	 say	 that	 detaining	 boat	 people	 on	 Pacific	 islands	was	
‘costly,	unsustainable’	and	wrong	in	principle.	…	She	used	to	insist	that	boat	people	
couldn't	be	sent	to	Nauru	because	Nauru	wasn't	a	signatory	to	the	UN	convention	on	







Research	 done	 by	 O’Doherty	 and	 Lecouteur	 (2007)	 has	 suggested	 that	 the	 inconsistency	 in	
language	and	terms	used	to	describe	asylum	seekers	and	refugees	will	cause	blurring	between	
these	various	terms.	Subsequently,	this	blurring	may	result	in	the	political	and	social	acceptance	
of	 the	 various	 misleading	 terms	 describing	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 (O’Doherty	 and	
Lecouteur	2007:	10).	Additionally,	the	hostile	political	rhetoric	emerging	during	the	discussion	





Delineating	 legitimacy	according	to	the	mode	of	arrival	of	asylum	seekers	 is	directly	 linked	to	
the	idea	of	a	‘queue’	in	the	application	and	acceptance	process	for	refugees.	In	public	debate,	the	
political	 discourse	 often	 constructs	 the	 ‘queue’	 as	 a	 concrete	 entity	 that	 asylum	 seekers	 and	
refugees	should	join	in	order	to	be	resettled	to	another	country	(Grewcock	2009;	Mares	2002b).	
The	 current	 analysis	 revealed	 that	 the	 image	 of	 the	 ‘queue’	 is	 connected	 with	 notions	 of	
genuineness,	 such	 that	 those	who	 join	 the	 ‘queue’	 are	 ‘genuine’	 asylum	seekers	 and	 refugees.	




The	message	 to	people	smugglers	and	 to	asylum	seekers	would	be	 that	 if	you	 risk	
your	life	and	spend	your	money	on	getting	on	a	boat	trying	to	come	to	Australia,	you	
risk	being	 taken	 to	Malaysia	and	being	put	 to	 the	back	of	 the	queue.	Malaysia	 is	a	




governing	 Labour	 Party	 and	 Opposition	 Liberal	 National	 Coalition	 Party	 consistently	
emphasising	 the	 importance	of	 the	 ‘queue’,	 ‘waiting’	 and	orderliness	of	 the	migration	 system.	
The	analysis	revealed	that	the	political	discourse	constructed	offshore	applicants	as	adhering	to	
the	 ‘organised	 and	 balanced	 system	 of	 migration’	 and	 appropriately	 ‘waiting’	 in	 the	 ‘queue’	
(Marles,	 House	 September	 22,	 2011).	 Contrastingly,	 IMAs	 are	 constructed	 as	 bypassing	 this	
proper	process	and	seeking	asylum	through	 inappropriate	channels.	Federal	Parliamentarians	
often	 contrasted	 these	 two	 groups	 of	 people	 against	 each	 other	 during	 the	discussions	of	 the	
Malaysia	 Deal.	 Coalition	 Senator	 Back	 demonstrates	 the	 delegitimisation	 of	 those	 considered	
‘queue	jumpers’:	
	
…	 people	who	 have	 been	 through	 the	 UNHCR	 process,	 the	 very	 people	who	 have	
been	 accepted	 as	 humanitarian	 refugees	 to	 come	 to	 Australia,	 are	 languishing	 in	














decision	 making	 process	 which	 is	 unaffected	 by	 social	 and	 economic	 characteristics	 of	










A	 third	 implicit	 criterion	 for	 legitimacy	established	 in	 the	construction	of	asylum	seekers	and	
refugees	concerned	the	wealth	of	arrivals,	resting	on	the	assumption	that	only	those	considered	
to	 be	 poor	 were	 ‘genuine’	 refugees.	 Federal	 parliamentarians	 from	 the	 two	 major	 parties	
consistently	questioned	whether	IMAs	were	‘legitimate’	refugees	by	depicting	them	as	‘wealthy’	
individuals,	 highlighting	 their	 ability	 to	 pay	 people	 smugglers	 for	 passage	 to	 Australia,	 while	
asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 who	 cannot	 afford	 to	 pay	 were	 constructed	 as	 ‘legitimate’	 and	
more	 deserving	 of	 protection.	 For	 example,	 the	 Leader	 of	 the	 Opposition	 in	 the	 Senate,	 the	
Honourable	 Eric	 Abetz	 uses	 the	 notion	 of	 payment	 to	 delegitimise	 IMAs	 and	 increase	 the	
legitimacy	of	those	in	refugee	camps	overseas:	
	
We	heard	 from	 the	Greens	 that	we	are	dealing	with	allegedly	 the	most	vulnerable	
people,	those	who	are	paying	literally	thousands	and	thousands	of	dollars	to	people‐
smugglers	to	come	to	Australia.	They	freely	enter	Indonesia,	they	travel	there	freely	




IMAs	 because	 they	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 pay	 people	 smugglers	 to	 facilitate	 their	 journey	 to	
Australia.	Abetz	 simultaneously	 constructs	 offshore	 applicants	 as	 ‘legitimate’	 because	 they	do	









What	 is	 occurring	 in	 the	 Federal	 political	 discourse,	 through	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	 supposed	
wealth	 of	 IMAs,	 is	 the	 construction	 of	 two	 distinct	 groups	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees:	
legitimate	 and	 illegitimate.	 ‘Legitimate’	 asylum	 seekers	 are	 those	 who	 cannot	 afford	 to	 pay	







The	 implication	of	 this	construction	 is	 that	 IMAs	are	perceived	as	acting	unfairly,	 and	gaining	
unwarranted	 advantage	 (Every	 and	 Augoustinos	 2008:	 574).	 Those	 who	 have	 the	 ability	 to	




but	 this	does	not	necessarily	 increase	 their	 sense	of	 safety,	 reduce	 their	vulnerability	or	 their	
legitimacy	as	an	asylum	seeker	(Mares	2002a).	Through	emphasising	an	individual’s	ability	to	









Throughout	 discussions	 on	 asylum	 seeking	 and	 refugees	 held	 in	 Federal	 Parliament	
surrounding	 the	 Malaysia	 Deal,	 their	 categorisation	 as	 belonging	 to	 two	 distinct	 groups,	
legitimate	 or	 illegitimate,	 dominated	 the	 political	 discourse.	 The	 use	 of	 inaccurate	 and	
misleading	 language	 labelling	 some	 asylum	 seekers	 as	 ‘illegal’,	 and	 others	 as	 ‘genuine’,	
perpetuated	this	construction.	The	application	of	these	 labels	was	determined	according	to	an	
implicit	criteria	based	on	 the	mode	of	arrival	of	asylum	seekers,	 their	place	 in	 the	queue,	and	
their	ability	to	pay	for	their	passage	to	Australia.		
	




delegitimising	 this	 mode	 of	 arrival	 and	 the	 people	 who	 travel	 this	 way	 but	 Federal	
parliamentarians	 also	 used	 this	 term	 to	 represent	 ‘queue	 jumpers’	 and	 those	 who	 have	 the	
ability	to	pay	people	smugglers	to	facilitate	their	journey	to	Australia	by	boat.	By	depicting	IMAs	
as	 illegal,	 Federal	 parliamentarians	 are	 also	 creating	 an	 image	 of	 an	 alternative	 and	 distinct	
group	of	people	who	are	portrayed	as	‘legal’.		
	
These	 informal	 criteria	 for	 determining	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 bears	
little	 relation	 to	 the	 actual	 criteria	 by	 which	 refugee	 status	 are	 granted.	 While	 it	 is	 widely	
acknowledged	that	it	is	not	illegal	to	seek	asylum,	nor	is	it	illegal	to	travel	to	this	country	in	an	
irregular	manner	to	do	so,	Australian	Federal	politicians	continue	to	create	a	perception	to	the	









1		 The	 ‘White	 Australia’	 policy	 refers	 to	 historical	 immigration	 policies	 that	 favoured	 immigrants	 from	 certain	
countries.	 Under	 this	 policy	 only	 Europeans	 and	 more	 specifically,	 northern	 Europeans	 could	 immigrate	 to	
Australia,	with	the	intention	of	promoting	a	homogenous	population	(Crock	and	Berg	2011;	DIAC	2009).		
2		 In	August	2001	the	Howard	Government	refused	a	Norwegian	freighter,	the	MS	Tampa	carrying	over	400	rescued	
asylum	seekers,	entry	 to	Australian	waters	 (Phillips	and	Spinks	2011).	This	 resulted	 in	a	 standoff	between	 the	













































































































enable	 evidence‐giving	 from	 remote	 rooms),	 volunteer	 court	 visitor	 information	 services,	
victim	assistance	programs,	duty	solicitors	offering	legal	aid,	and	training	of	court	staff.	Good	
security	 science,	 too,	 has	 made	 courts	 more	 secure,	 physically,	 for	 those	 who	 visit	 them.	
Whether	 security	 services	 have	 been	 drawn	 from	 a	 sheriff’s	 department	 or	 have	 been	
contracted	 ‘in’,	 the	 end	 result	 has	 been	 a	 strong	 (and	 growing)	 emphasis	 upon	 risk	
management	of	 courts	 and	 the	 safety	 of	 those	who	enter	 them.	After	 all,	 governments	 and	
courts	have	a	 responsibility	 to	protect	 those	who	work	 in,	 or	who	visit,	 court	precincts,	 as	
visitors,	as	clients	or	as	administrative	or	legal	professionals.	But	the	upshot	of	this	is	to	paint	
a	general	picture	of	defendants	as	security	risks.	The	question	thus	arises:	to	what	extent	is	it	
possible	 to	 secure	 courtrooms	 to	 an	 optimal	 degree	 without	 jeopardising	 the	 important	
feature	of	 curial	 ‘openness’?	By	examining	 the	way	 in	which	courts	now	operate	on	a	daily	






in	 response	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 courtrooms	 and	 their	 environs	 are	 dangerous	 places	 (Sarre	 and	
Prenzler	 2012).	 For	 example,	 there	 are	 each	 month,	 on	 average,	 three	 hundred	 ‘security	
incidents’	in	NSW	courts	(NSW	Attorney‐General	2009).	There	is,	thus,	in	Australian	courts,	an	
ever‐present	threat	to	the	safety	of	judicial	officers,	court	staff,	litigants,	legal	aid	officers,	court	
volunteers,	 the	 public	 and	 accused	 persons	 on	 trial.	 There	 is,	 concomitantly,	 a	 moral	 duty	
resting	on	 the	state	 to	ensure	 that	 the	courts	are	operated	 in	such	a	manner	as	 to	prevent	or	
forestall	harm	to	anyone	in	or	around	them.	Indeed,	there	are	legal	risks	associated	with	poor	
security,	 namely	 potential	 civil	 liabilities	 attached	 to	 any	 government	 that	 does	 not	 secure	
persons	adequately	while	they	are	in	courtrooms	or	court	precincts	(Sarre	and	Prenzler	2012).		
	
There	 are	 three	 discernible	 ways	 that	 courts’	 departments	 (and	 the	 government	 ministers	
responsible	for	them)	have	undertaken	the	task	of	assessing	and	alleviating	risk.		
	
The	 first	 is	 improving	 the	 process	 of	 collecting	 data	 and	 the	 quality	 of	 information	 used	 in	
decision‐making,	whether	that	involves	a	focus	upon	security	levels,	processes	(such	as	prisoner	
transfer	 and	 security	 screening),	 placement	 of	 witnesses	 and	 families,	 judicial	 officers,	 and	
prosecutors.	This	can	be	referred	to	as	‘intelligence’.	
	
The	second	 is	 the	organisation	of	court	spaces,	which	become	the	 focus	of	attention	after	any	

















Several	 methods	 were	 used	 in	 this	 study,	 including	 activity	 maps	 (tracing	 flows	 of	 people	
through	 court	 spaces	 across	 the	 day),	 analysis	 of	 incident	 reports,	 interviews	 with	 key	
informants	 and	 user	 juries	 (groups	 of	 advocates	 walked	 around	 courts,	 recording	 their	
impressions	and	comparing	notes	in	a	debrief).	This	paper	draws	on	the	third	of	these	sources,	













thorough	 reporting	 of	 critical	 incidents;	 and	 iv)	 implementing	 proactive	 (not	 just	 reactive)	
approaches	to	reducing	or	avoiding	incidents	in	or	around	the	courts.		
	
The	 aim	 of	 improving	 communication	 and	 the	 exchange	 of	 information	 across	 security	
personnel	 involve	 developing	 better	 technologies	 and	 systems	 for	 data	 collection	 and	
dissemination,	 employing	 specialised	 security	 analysts	 to	 assess	 the	data	 collected,	 as	well	 as	
establishing	strategic	and	coordinated	security	across	all	court	jurisdictions.	In	Victoria,	this	last	
objective	has	required	the	formation	of	a	court	security	operations	committee	with	operations	

















where	 there's	 no	 security	 guarding	 presence	 at	 all,	 so	 that's	 quite	 a	 challenge	 to	
cater	 for	 all	 of	 these	 issues	 and	 responsibilities	 across	 the	board.	 (Security	 officer	
2012)	
	
This	 perspective	 ties	 in	 with	 security	 personnel	 wanting	 to	 work	 collaboratively	 and	








we	 then	sent	a	copy	of	 that	plan	 to	security.	So	 if	we’d	gotten	 [a	 client]	coming	 in	
tomorrow	 and	 she	needs	 a	 secure	 escort	 and	we’re	 putting	 her	 in	 a	 secure	 room,	
they	have	all	of	 that	notification	sent	 to	 them	as	 soon	as	we’ve	made	a	plan.	…We	
also	 sent	 it	 to	 what	 we’d	 call	 the	 event	 owners.	 An	 event	 owner	 is	 a	 court	 staff	
member	 who	 could	 be	 dealing	 with	 that	 issue.	 It	 could	 be	 one	 of	 our	 family	







We’ve	 got	 our	 case	 track	 database	 on	 which	 you	 can	 make	 what	 are	 called	















consider	 similar	 types	 of	 training	 in	 customs	 type	 profiling,	 the	 reporting	 of	 incidents	 and	
dealing	with	confrontational	behaviour.	In	this	way,	fostering	a	shared	knowledge	of	protocols	
(not	 only	 the	 sharing	 of	 information)	 could	 support	 a	 concierge	 or	 a	 very	 implicit	 security	
approach	by	all	personnel	within	the	court	system.	The	other	significant	feature	of	a	proactive	
approach	was	 the	 collection	of	 information	 that	 could	 enable	 the	development	of	 a	 profile	 or	
picture	 of	 what	 is	 happening	 over	 time	 that	 could	 aid	 in	minimising	 or	 preventing	 incidents	
occurring:	
	
	…	we	 can	be	proactive	not	 just	 in	bringing	 in	personnel	 to	 address	 the	 issues	but	
also	being	proactive	in	treating	the	individuals	who	are	copping	the	abuse	…	We	can	
also	 proactively	 minimise	 the	 number	 of	 incidences	 likely	 to	 occur	 at	 court	 [by	







to	 improving	how	all	 personnel	 reported	 incidents.	 Although	 there	was	 confidence	 that	most	
‘aggravated	 serious	 incidents’	 were	 being	 reported,	 it	 was	 ‘difficult’	 to	 get	 people	 to	 report	
[general]	 security	 incidents.	These	 incidents	were	 those	 related	 to	 subtle	 intimidation	actions	
by	 polarised	 groups	 of	 people	 (such	 as	 hand	 gestures,	 menacing	 stares,	 walking	 or	 standing	
close	to	the	‘other	side’).		
	




















tribunals	 in	 Victorian	 was	 created	 in	 2010.	 Both	 security	 and	 safety	 components	 are	 to	 be	
considered	 by	 this	 manager	 which	 involves	 not	 only	 attending	 any	 security	 incident	 that	
impacts	 (or	may	 impact)	on	 the	good	order	and	 running	of	a	 court	or	on	court	 staff,	 but	also	
being	attentive	to	anything	including	anyone	else	coming	into	the	court	environment:	
	
…	In	relation	to	[our]	duty	of	care	 ...	 I	 think	[there	has	been]	a	subtle	shift	 in	court	






alarms,	 CCTV	 monitoring,	 hand	 held	 scanners	 and	 metal	 detectors	 are	 now	 commonplace.	




courts	 have	 reaped	 the	 benefits	 of	modern	 design	 expertise.	 This	work	 has	 been	 designed	 to	
ensure	that	those	who	enter	courts	are	not	intimidated	by	the	process.	Given	that	the	security	
screens	may	 quell	 some	 concerns	 about	 physical	 security,	 the	 redesigning	 of	 how	people	 are	
located	 in	 space	and	 the	 type	of	 encounters	 they	have	with	 staff,	 can	enhance	 their	 feeling	of	




















and	 talking	 through	 a	 slot	 in	 plate	 glass	 as	 compared	 to	 sitting	 down	…	 as	 equal	
partners,	getting	the	transaction	done,	sharing	the	screen	when	necessary,	and	the	
papers.	I	think	the	effect	is	not	only	[improved]	security	and	risk	management,	but	
just	 the	 dignity	 that	 that	 affords	 the	 public	 is	 quite	 profound.	 (Registry	 Manager	
2012)	
	





court	 users	 are	 screened	 for	 weapons.	 It	 was	 also	 stated	 that	 the	 sit‐down	 counter	 service	




court	designers	 in	 regards	 to	 the	use	of	space,	and	the	 furniture,	 interior	colours	and	 finishes	
chosen.	 The	 Dandenong	 Court	 in	 Victoria	 was	 mentioned	 as	 a	 good	 example	 of	 a	 new	
refurbishment	 and	 one	 that	 was	 based	 on	 a	 consultation	 between	 court	 staff,	 security	 and	
designers:	
	
[The	 waiting	 area]	 is	 a	 relaxing	 place	 visually	 [with]	 a	 combination	 of	 leather	
furniture	 that	 can	be	moved,	bucket	 chairs,	 ottomans	 and	 sofas,	with	 low	wooden	
screening,	and	it	sort	of	stays	in	all	its	constellations,	but	during	the	day,	people	will	
actually	move	it	slightly	in	order	to	speak	to	each	other	or	confer	with	their	lawyer.	







other	 with	 it’.	 They	 won't.	 If	 you	 create	 a	 dignified,	 respectful	 environment,	
complemented	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 roving	 security	 officers	 and	 capable	 staff,	 the	
likelihood	of	someone	picking	up	a	chair	is	so	low,	and	the	advantages	of	having	that	







get	 those	 court	 matters	 dealt	 with	 efficiently	 and	 effectively,	 clients	 should	 feel	




how	a	court	 can	 function,	 ‘without	 consultation	or	due	diligence’	 and	 that	 their	approach	can	
have	an	‘impact	on	the	safety	of	a	victim	or	court	users’	generally	(Security	officer	2012).	This	
security	 officer	 questioned	 whether	 you	 can	 have	 ‘court	 design	 101’	 that	 will	 work	 in	 all	
locations	and	for	all	purposes	considering	the	variety	of	court	buildings	that	exist.	It	was	states	
that	there	is	a	tendency	to	miss	the	point	‘that	security	does	have	to	stand	alone	sometimes	and	
can	 impact	 [on	 the]	 final	 design’.	 Getting	 the	 architecture	 right	 and	 the	 security	 concern	was	
said	 to	be	very	delicate.	 It	was	very	 important	 to	consult	and	engage	a	whole	range	of	people	
from	‘Heads	of	the	Jurisdiction,	to	the	police’.		
	
It’s	 a	 real	 balancing	 act	 …	 [because]	 we	 have	 [different]	 demands	 and	 we	 have	





would	 require	a	 concierge	 type	 service	 that	may	not	be	 available	 in	 all	 courts	 (mainly	due	 to	
resource	difficulties).	There	is	also	a	concern	that	there	can	still	be	security	incidents	with	this	
type	of	 service.	The	 other	 factor	 is	 the	 volume	of	 people	of	 the	 court	 and	 this	was	 said	 to	be	
‘something	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 factored	 into	 all	 of	 this’	 (Security	 officer	 2012).	 For	 registry,	 the	





noise	 is	 appalling	 when	 people	 come	 through.	 [This]	 affects	 people’s	 sort	 of	
psychological	status	as	they	move	into	the	buildings.	(Registry	officer	2012)	
	
The	desirability	of	a	concierge	desk	or	 reception	desk	 is	an	 interesting	one.	We’ve	
just	systematically	gone	around,	taking	funding	away	from	that,	or	re‐allocating	that	
resource	 in	 our	 security	 staffing,	 and	 then	 some	 of	 us	 more	 recently	 have	 been	










…	And	a	lot	of	 it	 isn’t	about	what	is	going	to	happen,	 it’s	what	may	happen.	And	in	
your	mind	–	 if	you’re	 fearful	of	 that	person	because	something’s	happened	before,	
just	 the	 possibility	 of	 something	 happening	 is	 enough.	 It	 doesn’t	 have	 to	manifest	
itself	 in	 anything.	 You’d	 be	 pretty	 silly	 to	 start	 anything	 physical	 in	 this	 place,	





With	heritage	buildings	and	addressing	 security	 issues,	 changes	 in	 technology	 is	 said	 to	be	of	
assistance	 such	 as	 installing	wireless	 CCTV	 cameras	 in	 courts	 or	 investigating	 hardware	 that	
allows	 swipe	 access	 for	 staff	 which	 has	 improved	 their	 everyday	 work	 environment	 and	
security.		
	
Newer	courts	have	been	able	 to	use	 the	research	 into	design	 that	has	been	undertaken	 in	 the	
past	decade.	With	court	design	there	was	said	to	be	an	‘interesting	dichotomy’	between	creating	
open	spaces	(like	larger	foyers,	using	glass	walls	for	transparency)	and	turning	our	courthouses	
into	 fortresses.	Although	 for	 some,	 the	court	design	should	 ‘communicate	 the	authority	of	 the	
jurisdiction’	(Registry	2011)	and	contribute	to	the	‘respect	for	the	jurisdiction’	(Judicial	officer	





Generally	 speaking,	 the	 last	 decade	 has	 seen	 the	 development	 of	 significant	 policies	 and	
procedures	 manuals	 concerning	 safety	 and	 security	 in	 and	 around	 courts.	 These	 procedures	
attempt	 to	 reconcile	 the	 need	 for	 risk	 amelioration	 and	 appropriate	 security	 with	 curial	
openness.	It	is	simply	not	appropriate	to	turn	any	courtroom	or	court	building	into	a	fortress.	In	
dealing	with	 the	 strains	 that	will	 emerge	 from	 a	 state	 taking	 this	 stance,	 courts	 departments	




an	 appropriate	 and	 intelligent	 use	 of	 that	 power,	 and	 careful	 selection	 of	 staff	 and	 staff	
attributes:	
	
When	 I	 first	 started	 about	 ten	 years	 ago,	 the	 sheriff’s	 officers	 were	 mostly	 ex‐
military	men,	usually	just	before	retirement.	They	were	in	their	50s,	or	60s.	They’d	
come	out	of	the	military	with	a	bit	of	power	but	didn’t	want	to	retire	and	they	were	
very	 firm.	 They	 …	 were	 very	 brusque	 and	 they	 were	 very	 militarised.	 And	 then	
slowly	…	the	entry	qualifications	changed	…	and	a	lot	of	quite	small	…	women	and	
small	much	older	men	were	hired	and	I	asked	somebody	one	day	about	this	and	he	
said,	 ‘It’s	 a	 psychological	 thing’.	He	 said,	 ‘the	more	 these	 big	 bruiser	 guys	 tried	 to	
intervene	in	brawls	the	more	they	brawled	…You	send	in	a	little	guy	with	white	hair	
and	about	five	foot	five	...	No	problems,	the	little	fragile	women	were	going	to	go	‘oh,	
this	 is	 disgraceful,	 stop	 immediately’’	 and	 they	 go,	 ‘Oh,	well,	 sorry	madam’…	They	
also	have	a	sixth	sense	about	when	trouble’s	brewing.	(Victim	support	worker	2012)	
	
The	 implementation	of	 the	 ‘management	of	difficult	people’	 in	 the	court	 environment	has	not	




We	 can	 rely	 on	 technology	 and	 practices	 and	 procedures	 all	 you	 like,	 and	 it’s	
certainly	very	helpful.	But	at	the	end	of	the	day,	if	we’ve	got	staff	who	are	working	as	
a	team,	 looking	after	each	other	and	professionally	trying	to	do	what's	expected	of	
them,	 they	do	wonders.	And	 I	can	remember	coming	 to	 the	court	many	years	ago,	
before	we	 had	 guards	 in	 a	 lot	 of	 places,	 and	 you'd	 often	 have	 a	 staff	member	 do	
courageous	things.	You'd	have	Grizzly	Adams	walk	in	and	threaten	everyone,	and	in	











court	 staff.	 The	 type	of	 training	 identified	 ranged	 from	reporting	on	 incidents	 to	dealing	with	
confrontational	 behaviour	 and	 mental	 health	 issues.	 Other	 training	 involved	 detecting	
behaviour	and	being	aware	of	possible	risks:		
	
Customs	 type	 of	 profiling	 (which	 is	 different	 to	 ‘social	 profiling’)	 and	 is	 about	
understanding	a	range	of	body	language,	how	[a	person]	 is	presenting	…	how	they	
carry	 themselves	 …	 their	 nervousness,	 [observing]	 their	 type	 of	 attire,	 whether	
things	 could	 be	 hidden	 [like	 a	 glass	 knife	 that	 cannot	 be	 detected	 by	 screening].	
(Security	manager	2012)	
	




If	 anger,	 aggression	 and	 abuse	 aren't	 treated,	 [the	 court	 user	 will]	 end	 up	 in	 a	
threatening	 situation	 which	may,	 if	 it’s	 not	 treated,	 result	 in	 an	 act	 of	 violence.	 I	
think	it’s	inculcating	the	staff	with	the	spirit	that	people	come	to	us	under	times	of	
great	 personal	 stress	 getting	 staff	 to	 appreciate	 that	 people	 are	 walking	 in	 under	
already	 heavy	 personal	 pressure	 and	 may	 have	 difficulty	 with	 quite	 convoluted	
forms	and	processes	and	terminology.	(Security	manager	2012)	
	
Some	 of	 our	 best	 staff	 are	 the	 staff	 that	 simply	 operate	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 person	





The	emphasis	on	 training	has	also	been	designed	 to	decrease	any	 inappropriate	 comments	at	
entry	screening.	Staff,	it	was	said,	need	to	be	professional	and	speak	in	a	courteous	manner	and	
not	 belittle	 a	 person.	 It	 was	 acknowledged	 that	 not	 having	 these	 skills	 could	 cause	 a	 major	
incident.	The	importance	of	communicating	well	was	also	due	to	security	personnel	needing	to	
be	able	to	work	with	all	types	of	people	at	the	court	including	the	administrators,	the	judiciary,	





Look	 at	 [the	 way]	 some	 of	 our	 horror	 clients	 [have	 been	 managed].	 When	 they	
started	 they	were	 really	 stormy	and	horrid.	And	as	we	 got	 to	know	 them,	 and	we	















We’re	 a	 very	 interesting	 outfit	 in	 terms	 of	 contract	 security	 guards	 because	
increasingly	 the	 guards	 are	 being	 used	 in	more	 and	more	ways	 that	 they	weren’t	
used	 in	the	past.	The	police	won't	do	anything	about	 those	 lower‐level	matters	 [in	
the	 courts],	 which	 may	 very	 well	 amount	 or	 escalate	 to	 a	 more	 serious	 security	




said	 to	be	 important.	One	way	that	 this	may	occur	 is	 to	have	 ‘the	same	standards,	same	KPIs,	
same	contract	requirements	and	standard	training’.	Such	an	approach	could	also	contribute	to	
security	 personnel	 having	 ‘clearer	 career	 paths’	 which	 may	 assist	 security	 companies	 in	
‘retaining	their	staff’	(Security	officer,2012).	
	
In	 sum,	 and	generally	 speaking,	 there	has	been	a	 commitment	by	governments	 in	 the	 field	of	




















Over	 the	 last	 quarter	 century	 many	 of	 these	 security	 processes	 have	 shifted	 from	 public	 to	
private	hands.	This	has	been	part	of	a	wider	and	broader	trend	towards	privatisation	of	security	
functions	generally	(Sarre	2005;	van	Steden	and	Sarre	2007)	and	is	a	consequence	of	continuing	
pressure	 by	 governments	 to	 involve	 non‐state	 actors	 in	 their	 own	 security	 (Prenzler	 2000;	
Johnston	2003;	Button	and	George,	2006;	Stenning	2009).		
	
While	 the	employment	of	private	staff	 to	undertake	security	measures	used	to	be	 referred	 to,	
colloquially,	as	contracting	‘out’	of	such	services,	the	more	favoured	term	is	now	contracting	‘in’.	
The	importance	of	this	distinction	cannot	be	overstated.	When	some	function	is	contracted	out,	
there	 is	 usually	 a	 corresponding	 outsourcing	 of	 legal	 responsibility.	 When	 a	 function	 is	
contracted	 in,	 the	 legal	 responsibility	 rests	 firmly	with	 the	 principal,	 in	 this	 case	 the	 various	
courts	authorities.	The	debate	over	legal	authority,	responsibility	and	liability	in	this	process	is	









The	 delegation	 of	 powers	 and	 duties	 to	 private	 interests	 to	meet	 particular	 social	
needs	 does	 give	 rise	 to	 a	 series	 of	 potential	 management,	 cooperation	 and	
accountability	 problems,	 especially	 when	 private	 correctional	 and	 custodial	 and	









working	 reasonably	well.	 The	 judiciary	 by	 and	 large	 accept	 the	 privatised	 service	
model;	 persons	 in	 custody	 though	 not	 universally	 laudatory	 are	 on	 the	 whole	
appreciative	of	the	considerate	way	in	which	they	are	treated;	AIMS	personnel	have	
good	working	relationships	with	both	Corrective	Services	and	Police;	and	the	costs	




Indeed,	 the	 security	 model	 developed	 in	Western	 Australia	 was	 perceived	 as	 the	 result	 of	 a	





Reflecting	upon	 three	decades	 of	 security	 developments	 in	 the	United	 States	 in	 2007,	Cooper	
wrote	as	follows:	
	
No	 longer	 is	 ‘court	 security’	 a	 function	 to	 be	 delegated	 primarily	 to	 the	 sheriff’s	
department	or	other	law	enforcement	agency,	but	it	is	rather	a	critical	responsibility	
of	 judges	 and	 court	 administrative	 staff,	who	must	work	 in	 partnership	with	 law‐
enforcement	and	other	professionals	to	ensure	the	safety,	security,	and	integrity	of	
the	 judicial	 process	 and	 the	 full	 range	 of	 personnel,	 facilities,	 systems,	 and	 other	
components	 upon	 which	 it	 relies.	 The	 implications	 of	 this	 shift	 in	 definition	 for	
judicial	administration	are	also	significant.	Court	security	is	now	an	integral	part	of	
the	 responsibilities	 of	 court	 administration,	 reflecting	 the	 increasing	 recognition	
























have	 anything	 restraining	 or	 threatening	 me	 from	 doing	 that	 …	 to	 come	 in	 here	


















and	 places.	 LP0882179.	 The	 project	 collected	 data	 from	 three	 Australian	 state	 jurisdictions	 (Victoria,	 South	
Australia,	Western	Australia)	 and	one	 federal	 jurisdiction	 (Family	 Court	 of	Australia)	 over	 a	 three	 year	 period	



















































over	 20	 inquests	 into	 possible	 suicides,	 and	 in‐depth	 interviews	 with	 six	 Coroners,	 three	
main	issue	emerged:	first,	there	exists	considerable	slippage	between	different	Coroners	over	
which	 deaths	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 classified	 as	 suicide;	 second,	 the	 high	 standard	 of	 proof	
required,	and	immense	pressure	faced	by	Coroners	from	family	members	at	inquest	to	reach	
any	 verdict	 other	 than	 suicide,	 can	 significantly	 depress	 likely	 suicide	 rates;	 and	 finally,	
Coroners	 feel	no	professional	obligation,	either	 individually	or	collectively,	 to	contribute	 to	
the	 production	 of	 consistent	 and	 useful	 social	 data	 regarding	 suicide—arguably	 rendering	






Much	 is	often	made	of	 changes	 in	our	 suicide	 rates.	As	a	 society,	we	are	 relieve	when	we	are	
informed	 that	 fewer	people	are	ending	 their	own	 lives	 (Australian	Bureau	of	 Statistics	2012),	
confused	when	we	are	told	exactly	the	opposite	(Haesler	2010),	and	concerned	when	our	own	
rates	are	compared	unfavourably	with	other	nations	and	peoples	(Georgatos	2013).	It	 is	often	




estimates	 that	 suicide	 is	 significantly	more	common	 than	our	 statistics	would	have	us	believe	
(Harrison,	Abou	Elnour	and	Pointer	2009).	This	systemic	under‐counting	may	be	for	a	range	of	
reasons.	Walker,	 Chen	 and	 Madden	 (2008)	 contend	 that	 factors	 such	 as	 disparities	 between	
jurisdictions,	lack	of	standardisation	in	the	reporting	of	Coronial	deaths,	and	issues	over	forms	




The	 central	 role	 of	 the	 Coroner	 has	 always	 been	 to	 investigate	 deaths	 ‘considered	worthy	 of	
inquiry’	 (Burney	 2000;	 3).	 This	would	 include	 deaths	 such	 as	 those	 by	 accident,	where	 there	
was	 some	 suspicion	 of	 wrongdoing,	 and	 those	 by	 suicide.	 This	 became	 seen	 as	 a	 largely	
administrative	 task,	 conducted	 in	 a	 non‐adversarial	 environment,	 as	 part	 of	 the	 effective	
administration	 of	 the	 populace.	 However,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 recording,	 assessing	 and	
categorising	of	death,	the	Coroner’s	role	has	more	recently	expanded	to	incorporate	elements	of	






Much	of	 the	operation	of	 the	 office	 of	 Coroner	or	Coroners	 courts	 in	Australia	 is	 centered	on	





deemed	 to	warrant	 investigation—now	 they	 are	 also	an	 important	 element	of	 the	process	by	
which	 the	 State	 accumulates	 social	 data,	 data	 which	 is	 used	 to	 identify	 problems	 and	 shape	
policy.	 The	 problem	 here	 is	 clear:	 if	 Coroners	 are	 reluctant	 to	 reach	 a	 finding	 of	 suicide,	 as	
Walker,	 Chen	 and	 Madden	 (2008)	 contend,	 then	 their	 role	 in	 production	 of	 valid	 statistics,	




This	 research	 seeks	 to	 investigate	 the	 English	 and	Welsh	 Coronial	 Inquest,	 particularly	 as	 it	
relates	to	the	accurate	investigation	of	potential	suicides.	In	doing	so,	it	also	seeks	to	make	some	
comparisons	 with	 how	 similar	 deaths	 are	 managed	 in	 Australia.	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	
important	differences	between	the	two	systems.	The	most	significant	concerns	the	role	played	
by	the	inquest.	In	England	and	Wales,	all	deaths	that	are	considered	worthy	of	inquiry—which	
includes	 potential	 suicides—are	 necessarily	 the	 subject	 of	 a	 public	 inquest.	 In	 Australia,	 the	













public	 scrutiny	 and	 judgment.	 This	 notion,	 that	 questionable	 deaths	 be	 the	 subject	 of	 public	
investigation,	 an	 investigation	 accessible	 to,	 and	 readily	 understood	 by,	 all	 interested	 parties	
within	the	community,	became	central	to	English	conceptions	of	justice	and	democracy.	Indeed,	
much	of	Burney’s	book	examines	 the	complex	 tension	 that	 arose	within	 the	Coronial	 Inquest,	
between	the	voices	of	this	participatory	tradition,	and	the	bearers	of	new,	scientific	knowledge	





well‐being	 and,	 ultimately,	 public	 education.	 Its	 shortcomings,	 however,	 lay	 in	 its	












bereaved	 families),	 and	 an	 investigative	 and	 preventative	 role	 (investigative,	 in	 delivering	 an	




This	 study	was	 conducted	within	 one	 geographic	 area	 in	 England.	 The	Research	 consisted	 of	
observations	 made	 at	 twenty	 public	 inquests	 into	 possible	 suicides,	 followed	 by	 hour‐long,	
semi‐structured	interviews	with	six	of	the	coroners	who	had	presided	over	the	above	inquests.	
	
From	 the	 observations	 made	 at	 inquest,	 three	 relevant	 conclusions	 were	 drawn.	 First,	 there	
appears	 to	 be	 no	 single	model	 for	 running	 a	 Coronial	 inquest.	 Far	 from	 being	 a	 uniform	 and	
consistent	 element	 of	 the	 English	 legal	 system,	 the	 Coronial	 Inquest	 takes	 a	 wide	 range	 of	
different	 forms.	 Though	 the	 Coroners	 are	 uniformally	 professional,	 patient,	 and	 skilled	 at	
managing	grieving	families,	each	Coroner	seems	to	organise	their	own	courtrooms	as	they	see	
fit.	Second,	 to	be	able	 to	reach	a	 finding	of	suicide,	 the	standard	of	proof	 is	extremely	high.	 In	
England,	 suicide	 determination	 is	 based	 around	 the	 criminal	 standard	 of	 ‘beyond	 reasonable	
doubt’,	rather	than	the	Australian	model,	which	has	adopted	the	civil	standard	of	‘on	the	balance	
of	 probabilities’.	 Finally,	 the	Coroners	 are	 often	 placed	under	 significant	 pressure	 throughout	
the	proceedings	by	the	deceased’s	family	not	to	bring	in	a	finding	of	suicide.	Almost	all	inquests	
are	 attended	by	 family	members,	 and	 even	where	 they	 appear	 inclined	 to	 accept	 a	 finding	 of	
suicide,	attempts	are	still	continually	made	to	control	the	general	narrative.	
	





First,	 there	 exists	 considerable	 slippage	between	different	Coroners	 as	 to	what	 is	 likely	 to	be	
considered	 suicide,	 and	 what	 is	 not.	 There	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 a	 number	 of	 reasons	 for	 this.	 As	
mentioned	 previously,	 there	 has	 always	 been	 a	 tension	 within	 Coronial	 death	 investigations	
between	those	who	regard	the	process	as	a	useful	application	of	the	scientific	quest	for	truth—
often	exemplified	by	a	different	approach	to	the	use	of	invasive	autopsy—and	those	who	place	








A	 further	 reason	 for	 a	 seeming	 lack	 of	 consistency	 in	 reaching	 findings	 of	 suicide	 involves	
considerable	differences	in	experience,	ability,	and	levels	of	training	of	Coroners.		
	



















final	 reason	why	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 significant	 slippage	 between	 Coroners	 over	 findings	 of	
suicide	is	perhaps	more	important,	and	more	telling,	than	the	others.	That	is,	there	appears	to	
be	a	difference	of	opinion	over	the	central	role	of	the	Coroner;	some	Coroners	take	a	fairly	hard	











I	often	engage	 the	 family	and	will	 say,	 ‘I’m	 thinking	along	 these	 lines.	What’s	your	
view?’	Sometimes	if	you	carry	the	families	with	you,	it’s	more	cathartic—it’s	totally	
wrong,	 but	 it’s	 a	more	 cathartic	 experience	 for	 them	…	 you	 put	 the	 family	 at	 the	
heart	of	the	inquiry.	(Coroner	4)	
	
It’s	 all	 about	 enabling	 people	 to	 get	 on	 with	 their	 lives	 …	 giving	 them	 closure,	





that	 the	 Coronial	 inquest	 process	 acts	 to	 depress	 suicide	 rates,	 an	 observation	 supported	 by	
most	research	in	the	area	(Harrison	et	al	2009;	Walker	et	al	2008).	The	Coroners	note	that	the	
standard	of	proof	is	at	the	very	highest	end	of	‘beyond	reasonable	doubt’.	That	is,	the	notion	of	
‘beyond	 reasonable	 doubt’	 is	 not	 a	 singular	 measure;	 it	 is	 a	 continuum,	 with	 the	 finding	 of	
suicide	placed	at	the	furthest	end.		
	
The	 standard	 of	 proof	 of	 beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt	 as	 applied	 in	 the	 public	
prosecution	 services	 is	 quite	 a	 lot	 lower	 really	 …	 I	 doubt	 many	 people	 would	 be	
prosecuted	if	you	needed	the	level	of	sureness	you	need	for	a	suicide	verdict	…	Don’t	
misunderstand	 that	 there’s	 only	 one	 standard	 of	 proof,	 which	 is	 beyond	 a	
reasonable	 doubt,	 but	 then	 of	 course	 it’s	 up	 to	 you	 to	 interpret	 what’s	 beyond	 a	
reasonable	doubt.	(Coroner	1)	
	
Consequently,	 findings	 of	 suicide	 can	 be	 relatively	 hard	 to	 attain,	 which	 means	 that	 many	
suicides	 are	 classified	 as	 something	 else—even	 when	 most	 impartial	 observers	 might	 have	





Every	 Coroner	 does	 things	 differently,	 and	 like	 I	 say,	 a	 rough	 rule	 of	 thumb—if	
you’re	 looking	 at	 statistics,	 I	 can	 guarantee	 that	 suicide	 is	 under‐represented.	
Roughly,	I	say	you	could	add	a	third	onto	the	figure	…	(Coroner	4)	
	





















when	we	can	actually	make	their	situation	better?	…	So,	 I	 think	Coroners,	 to	some	
extent,	 are	 softies,	 and	 might	 not	 necessarily	 bite	 the	 bullet	 and	 say,	 yes,	 this	 is	
suicide.	(Coroner	4)	
	










there’s	 doubt	 …	 I	 wouldn’t	 be	 persuaded	 just	 because	 they’re	 all	 shouting	 [the	
family]	…	 I’m	 afraid	 you’ve	 just	 got	 to	 be	 robust	 about	 it	 and	 stick	 by	 your	 guns.	
(Coroner	2)	
	
Clearly,	 there	 is	 a	 division	 here	 between	 those	 Coroners	 who	 see	 their	 principal	 task	 as	
providing	 comfort	 and	 closure	 to	 grieving	 families,	 and	 those	 for	 whom	 the	 job	 remains	
steadfastly	 administrative.	 Interestingly,	 this	 tension	 may	 well	 be	 relatively	 new,	 as	 there	 is	
little	 sign	 of	 it	 in	 Burney’s	 excellent	 book	mentioned	 earlier,	 on	 the	 English	 Coronial	 inquest	
during	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries.	What	may	have	happened	here	are	the	
effects	 of	 what	 Freckelton	 (2008:	 576)	 refers	 to	 as	 the	 rise	 of	 ‘therapeutic	 jurisprudence’—
defined	as	‘the	study	of	the	role	of	the	law	as	a	therapeutic	agent’.		
	










Coroners’	work	 is	 intimately	 connected	with	well‐being—a	concern	of	 therapeutic	
jurisprudence.	Part	of	 the	Coroner’s	 role	 is	 to	determine	whether	 there	are	public	
health	or	safety	issues	arising	out	of	the	death	and	whether	any	action	needs	to	be	





Such	 ‘therapeutic’	 concern	 for	 the	wellbeing	of	 the	grieving	 family	 leads	on	 to	 the	 fourth	 and	
final	 issue	 emerging	 from	 the	 interviews.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	Coroners	 feel	 under	no	 obligation	 to	
make	their	findings	amenable	to	the	production	of	accurate	and	useful	suicide	statistics.	As	can	
be	 seen,	 most	 see	 their	 task	 as	 a	 fundamentally	 administrative	 function	 concerning	 the	
management	of	particular	kinds	of	death,	as	well	as	helping	families	deal	with	the	passing	of	a	
loved	one.	 They	 do	not	 see	 their	 job	 as	making	 life	 easy	 for	 those	 charged	with	 turning	 such	
deaths	 into	 meaningful	 numbers,	 and	 by	 adopting	 this	 approach,	 Coroner’s	 become—
consciously	or	otherwise—the	principal	gatekeepers	of	our	suicide	statistics.		
	




to	 go	 through	 the	 same	 material	 to	 see	 if	 you	 come	 to	 the	 same	 judgment	 or	 a	
different	 judgment?’.	 They	 said	 ‘Yeah’.	 ‘That’s	 fine’	 I	 said,	 ‘what	 you’re	 doing	 is	
meaningless,	but	just	do	it	if	you	want	to’.	(Coroner	3)	
	
We’ve	 now	 introduced	 narrative	 verdicts	 which	 are	 here	 to	 stay	 as	 far	 as	 I’m	
concerned,	 and	are	a	huge	boon	 for	 the	public,	 and	a	huge	benefit	 to	 the	Coroner’	
court.	 So	 I’m	 not	 very	 sympathetic	 to	 somebody	 coming	 along	 and	 saying:	 ‘well,	
you’re	disturbing	our	statistics’.	Coroner	6	
	
Those	 Coroners	who	 place	 greater	 emphasis	 upon	 the	 non‐governmental,	 non‐administrative	
elements	of	their	job—that	is,	who	emphasise	more	pastoral,	therapeutic	approaches	to	running	




guilty	 as	 anyone	 sometimes	 of	 being	 a	 softy.	 I	 appreciate	 that	 it	 must	 rankle	




recorded	 anywhere	 but	 a	 lot	 of	 us	 do	 it,	 is	 to	 try	 and	 help	 the	 family	 in	 closure,	
without	being	paternalistic.	 It	can	be	a	cathartic	exercise	and	to	that	extent	I	 think	
you’ve	 justified	 your	 own	 existence,	 never	 mind	 the	 State’s	 work	 which	 you	 do.	
(Coroner	5)	
	





what	Coroners’	 principal	 functions	 ought	 to	 be.	 If	 the	 statistics	 their	 actions	 give	 rise	 to	bear	




to.	 Rather	 than	 simply	 managing	 the	 data	 of	 death,	 do	 Coroners	 now	 form	 part	 of	 the	







of	 the	modern	 school,	 ignore	 the	 complex	 relationship	 between	 its	 bureaucratic	 components,	
and	 it’s	 long	 history	 of	 pastoral	 guidance.	 The	 English	 Coronial	 inquest	 appears	 to	 have	 an	










proof	 required	 (in	 spite	 of	 the	 statistical	 inaccuracies	 this	 most	 certainly	 produces),	 and	
unanimous	support	for	the	continued	existence	of	a	compulsory	inquest	for	all	potential	deaths	
by	 suicide,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 few	 advantages	 in	Australia	 adopting	 the	 same	protocols	 and	
procedures.	The	only	argument	that	could	run	counter	to	this	would	involve	a	greater	emphasis	
upon	 therapeutic	 models	 of	 Coronial	 practice,	 which	 would	 lean	 towards	 emphasising	 the	
benefits	 of	 suicide	 inquests	 in	 aiding	 the	 grieving	 process	 of	 bereaved	 families.	 Given	 the	
problems	outlined	above,	and	given	we	have	no	historical	expectation	of	an	 inquest,	 let	alone	
the	high	 costs	 involved	 and	 the	 extra	workload	placed	upon	our	 already	 taxed	Coroners,	 this	
seems	highly	unlikely.		
	
Finally,	 the	 important	 question	 arises:	 what	 is	 the	 principal	 role	 of	 the	 inquest	 in	 suicide	
investigations?	 There	 seems	 to	 be	 little	 agreement	 among	 the	 English	 coroners	 interviewed.	
While	most	understand	and	accept	their	role	within	the	governmental	regulation	of	death,	this	
often	 seemed	 secondary	 to	 their	 less	 tangible	 pastoral	 role	 in	 helping	 the	 families	 deal	 with	













































Indigenous	 commentators	 have	 long	 critiqued	 the	way	 in	which	 government	 agencies	 and	
member	of	academic	 institutions	 carry	out	 research	 in	 their	 social	 context.	Recently,	 these	
commentators	 have	 turned	 their	 critical	 gaze	 upon	 activities	 of	 Research	 Ethics	 Boards	
(REBs).	Informed	by	the	reflections	on	research	processes	and	by	Indigenous	Canadian	and	
New	Zealand	research	participants,	as	well	as	 the	extant	 literature,	this	paper	critiques	the	





Indigenous	 peoples	 from	 across	 various	 Settler	 Societies	 have	 long	 expressed	 concern	 at	 the	
impact	social	 research	carried	out	by	government	agencies	and	academic	 institutions	have	on	
them	 and	 their	 communities	 (see	 Battiste	 2000;	 Smith	 1999).	 More	 recently,	 Indigenous	
commentators	have	focused	their	critical	gaze	specifically	upon	the	activities	of	Research	Ethics	
Boards	 (REBs).	 Thus	 far,	 much	 of	 the	 critical	 Indigenous	 analysis	 demonstrates	 that	 a	
considerable	 amount	 of	 REB	 activity	 impinges	 on	 the	 ability	 of	 First	 Nation	 researchers	 and	
participants	 to	 pursue	 knowledge	 construction	 in	 ways	 that	 suit	 the	 epistemological	
‘requirements’	 of	 them	 and	 their	 communities.	 Informed	 by	 the	 author’s	 reflections	 on	 the	
institutional	ethics	process	and	research	with	First	Nations,	 those	of	 Indigenous	Canadian	and	
New	Zealand	research	participants,	and	the	extant	literature,	this	paper	critiques	the	processes	
employed	 by	New	 Zealand	REBs	 to	 assess	 Indigenous‐led	 criminological	 research.	 Key	 issues	
identified	 include	 a)	 a	 general	 lack	 of	 experience	 and	 expertise	 amongst	 REB	 members	 in	
researching	with	 Indigenous	 peoples	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 of	 the	 research	methodologies	
(including	ethics	protocols)	of	First	Nation	peoples;	b)	the	tendency	of	REBs	in	Settler	Societies	
to	 privilege	 the	 ‘liberal’	 notion	 of	 the	 autonomous	 research	 subject	 as	 the	 focus	 of	 their	























REB1	at	 the	 institution	where	he	had	recently	enrolled	 for	his	doctorate.	The	research	project	
was	developed	to	explore	criminal	justice	policy	for	indigenous	peoples	in	the	NZ	and	Canadian	
contexts.	 The	 design	 utilised	 direct	 engagement	 with	 First	 Nation	 advisors,	 elders’	 and	





REBs.	However,	some	REBs	note	 the	 importance	of	recognising	consent	 is	culturally	 informed	




were	 constructed	 through	 direct	 collaboration	 with	 participants,	 elders’	 councils	 and	
experienced	 First	 Nation	 researchers	 in	 both	 jurisdictions.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 collaborative	
process,	 a	 research	 protocol	 was	 developed	 that	 privileged	 collective	 strategies	 for	 eliciting	
informed	 consent	 and	 gathering	 data.2	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 collaboratively	 constructed,	
community‐centred	 and	 contextualised	 research	 protocols	 developed	 by	 the	 author	 and	 his	
potential	participants,	the	REB	in	question	followed	a	heavily	standardised	process	for	assessing	
the	ethicality	of	both	a	researcher	and	specific	project.	It	was	evident	from	even	a	cursory	glance	
at	 the	 relevant	 background	 documents	 issued	 by	 the	 REB,	 supplemented	 by	 communications	
between	the	author,	his	supervisor	and	members	of	the	committee,	that	the	focus	of	their	ethics	
deliberations	centred	on	 institutionally‐defined	risk	avoidance	and	 thus,	 the	empowerment	of	
the	 institution	 to	 which	 they	 belonged	 (see	 for	 example,	 www.aut.ac.nz/research/research‐
ethics	 for	 the	 core	 documents,	 guidelines	 and	 protocols	 of	 the	 REB	 in	 question).	 The	
researcher’s	 previous	 experience	with	 REBs	 in	New	 Zealand,	 and	 as	 an	 occasional	 advisor	 to	
Maori	post‐graduates	applying	to	REBs	and	their	processes,	meant	that	resistance	to	the	ethics	
protocols	he	had	presented	in	the	application	was	highly	anticipated.3	This	was	due	in	the	main	
to	 the	decision	 to	privilege	 the	 ethics	protocols	 favoured	by	Maori	 and	Canadian	First	Nation	
participants	in	the	first	instance.		
	
The	 REB	 in	 question	 had	 already	 rejected	 a	 previous	 version	 of	 the	 proposal	 submitted	 in	
August	2009,	in	which	the	author	had	already	informed	the	REBs	that	privileging	of	individual‐
focused	 protocols	 for	 eliciting	 informed	 consent	 was	 not	 appropriate	 for	 the	 research.	
Subsequently,	 the	 author	 and	 his	 supervisor	 carried	 out	 further	 consultation	 and	 discussions	
with	research	advisors	and	participants	before	resubmitting	 the	application	 in	 late	October	of	
that	year.	The	revised	submission	included	a	thorough	critique	of	the	REB	rationale	for	rejecting	
the	 previous	 submission,	 while	 offering	 a	 dual‐consent	 process	 that	 ensured	 the	 researcher	
would	avoid	behaving	 ‘unethically’,	as	defined	by	First	Nation	participants.	The	author	and	his	
supervisor	 also	 sought	 to	 placate	 the	 REB	 by	 offering	 to	 use	 their	 preferred,	 individualised	
process;	as	set	out	in	this	extract	from	the	second	submission:	
	
Discussions	 between	 the	 primary	 researcher	 and	 First	 Nation	 advisors	 for	 this	
project	 indicate	 that	 the	 consent‐related	 processes	 preferred	 by	 ...	 University	 are	
unethical	 and	 culturally	 inappropriate	 for	 research	 engagement	 with	 these	 First	
Nations.	 It	would	appear	then	that	a	compromise	 is	required,	and	so	 the	 following	
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process	will	be	used	 to	satisfy	 the	requirements	of	 ...	with	 regards	confirmation	of	
informed	consent:	All	individual	participants	in	the	research	will	be	informed	of	the	
purpose	of	the	research	either	verbally,	or	through	receipt	of	a	written	copy	of	the	
PIS,	 which	 will	 be	 offered	 to	 them	 prior	 to	 primary	 researcher	 reading	 out	 the	
document	 ...	 The	 process	 required	 by	 ...	 University	 will	 be	 explained	 to	 all	
participants,	who	will	be	informed	that	the	requirements	of	the	institution	privileges	







to	 force	 upon	 him	 and	 the	 research	 participants	 their	 preferred,	 individualised	 consent	 and	
ethics	 process.	 As	 a	 result,	 many	 more	 months	 were	 lost	 by	 the	 author	 and	 his	 supervisor	
negotiating	 with	 the	 REB	 in	 question,	 before	 we	 finally	 received	 formal	 institutional	 ethical	
approval	in	April	2010.	As	indicated	in	endnote	two,	the	author	added	questions	relating	to	the	
issues	arising	 from	 the	REB	process	 to	his	 research	 schedule.	The	 responses	of	Canadian	and	






Settler	 Societies	 play	 in	 stifling	 Indigenous‐led,	 community‐centred	 research,	 whether	 in	
criminology	or	other	social	sciences.	A	common	theme	of	the	Indigenous	critique	has	been	the	
contribution	made	by	REBs	 in	 the	 colonising	project	 that	was,	 and	 is,	 ‘Western’	 research	 (e.g.	




 Individualism:	marked	 by	 the	 privileging	 of	 the	 autonomous	 research	 participant,	 and	
informed	 consent	 processes	 that	 force	 individualised	 protocols	 upon	 collectives	 (see	
Ellis	and	Earley	2006;	Glass	and	Kaufert	2007:	32‐33;	Piquemal	2000).	
 Limited	 expertise:	members	 of	 REBs	 often	 lack	 adequate	 disciplinary,	 epistemological	
and	 methodological	 expertise	 in	 Indigenous	 research/issues,	 resulting	 in	 an	 over‐
reliance	 on	 tick‐the‐box	 approaches	 that	 ensure	 the	 hegemony	 of	 institutionally‐
acceptable	protocols	(see	Smith	1997).	
 Universalistic	tendencies:	characterised	by	a	propensity	for	utilising	research	and	ethics	
processes	 based	 on	 Eurocentric	 notions	 of	 ‘right’	 (research)	 conduct,	 and	 essentialist	
notions	of	what	does/does	not	constitute	an	ethical	researcher	which,	when	combined,	
result	 in	 the	eulogising	of	 the	 ‘individual’	participant	and	 the	marginalisation	of	 social	
groups	 that	 utilise	 collectivist	 processes	 for	 guiding	 knowledge	 construction	 and	
dissemination	(see	Battiste	and	Henderson	2000;	Ermine	2000;	Wilson	2004).	
 Formulism:	a	reliance	on	standardised,	 formulaic,	 ‘tick‐the‐box’	approaches	to	research	
and	ethics	 that	mask	 the	 complexity	of	 the	 social	 context	within	which	 research	 takes	
place	(see	Hammersley	2006).	
	
In	 essence,	 as	 a	 researcher,	 the	 experience	 of	 REB	 conduct	 and	 the	 experiences	 of	 similar	
processes	shared	by	other	First	Nation	researchers,	correlates	with	the	issues	identified	in	the	




















being	 peculiarly	 local,	 merely	 a	 subset	 of	 Eurocentric	 universal	 categories	 …	 It	
suggests	 one	 main	 stream	 and	 diversity	 as	 a	 mere	 tributary	 ...	 [t]ogether	
mainstreaming	 and	 universality	 create	 cognitive	 imperialism,	 which	 establishes	 a	




REBs	operating	 in	 Settler	 Societies	 such	as	New	Zealand.	This	 claim	 is	 evidenced	 through	 the	
type	of	case	study	that	forms	the	basis	of	this	paper,	as	well	as	other	Indigenous	commentaries	
(Battiste	 2007;	 Coram	 2011).	 Universalism	works	 as	 a	 dominant	 operational	 principle	 in	 the	
Settler	Society	context	despite	the	fact	that	the	majority	of	REBs	operating	in	the	context	offer	
guidelines	with	instructions	that	exhort	researchers	(and,	one	presumes,	the	REBs	themselves)	
to	 ‘respect	 difference’	 (e.g.	 see	 the	 ethics	 guidelines	 offered	 by	 the	 Health	 Research	 Council	
2010;	the	Ministry	of	Social	Development	2002;	and	AUT	University).		
	
The	 universalism	 that	 appears	 inherent	 in	 institutionalised	 ethics	 processes	 is	 based	 on	 a	






exists	 because	 of	 the	 mistaken	 assumption	 that	 the	 morals	 necessary	 for	 governing	 ‘ethical’	
research	activity	can	be	separated	from	‘real	life’	and	reduced	to	a	standardised	list	of	rules.	In	
contrast,	Christians	 (2007:	438)	argues	 that	 ‘[e]thics	 is	 located	 in	 the	sociocultural	 first	of	 all,	
instead	 of	 in	 rational	 prescriptions	 and	 impartial	 reflection’.	 From	 this	 position,	 because	 it	 is	
organic	 and	 socio‐culturally	 centred,	 ‘research	 ethics’	 or	 what	 constitutes	 ‘right	 conduct’	 is	













insiders	and	outsiders	 research	with	us	 ...	 reading	 that	document	 [the	REBs	written	
response	 to	 the	 author’s	 second	 ethics	 application]	 reads	 like	 they	 didn’t	want	 to	






‘Condescending	 ethics’	 –	 positions	 participants	 as	 the	 ‘Other’,	 reinforces	
powerlessness,	 and	 further	 marginalises	 them	 with	 knowledge	 production	
processes.	(Reid	and	Brief	2009:	83)	
	
We	 might	 begin	 to	 understand	 the	 current	 situation	 by	 analysing	 institutionalised	 ethics	
processes	 in	New	Zealand,	and	other	Settler	Societies,	as	a	contemporary	manifestation	of	 the	
condescending	ethos	 that	has	 informed	 the	practice	base	 for	 the	academies	 research	 activities	
regarding	First	Nations,	 since	 the	beginning	 of	 colonisation	 (Agozino	2003;	 Smith	1999).	 The	
condescension	of	institutionalised	REBs	and	their	processes	relates	directly	to	their	preference	
for	 individualised	 research	 ethics,	 and	 the	 categorisation	 of	 the	 ‘subject’	 as	 an	 autonomous	






Butz’s	 invocation	 of	 Habermas’	 concept	 of	 communicative	 action	 in	 relation	 to	 his	 own	
experiences	of	REBs,	provides	a	helpful	schema	for	understanding	the	condescending	ethos	of	
the	institutionalised	ethics	processes	discussed	here.	According	to	Butz,	Habermas	distinguishes	
between	 two	 principle	 forms	 of	 ‘action’	 in	 late	 modernity,	 Instrumental	 and	 Communicative.	
Instrumental	 action	 is	 ‘oriented	 to	 technical	 manipulation	 and	 control,	 and	 communicative	
action	 to	 the	 ideal	 of	 intersubjective	 understanding	 and	 consensus	 among	 individuals’	 (Butz	
2008:	250).	As	Butz	states	(2008:	250,	emphasis	his):	
	
The	 former	 is	 outcome	 oriented,	 the	 latter	 process	 oriented.	 For	 Habermas,	
communicative	action	 is	ethically	prior	to	 instrumental	action,	 in	 that	 the	 justice	of	








asking	 participants	 individually	 to	 sign	 written	 consent	 agreements	 regardless	 of	
the	 research	 context,	 then	 a	 fully	 communicative	 appreciation	 of	 the	 adjectives	
voluntary	 and	 informed	 are	 subordinated	 to	 the	 instrumental	 purposes	 of	 the	
monitoring	 and	 controlling	 attached	 to	 the	 noun	 consent.	 (Butz	 2008:	 251	 –	
emphasis	his)		
	
Central	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 condescending	 nature	 of	 REB	 process	 and	 Indigenous	
research,	 is	 the	 concept	 of	 power.	 In	 the	 mythology	 of	 the	 development	 of	 contemporary	
research	ethics,	REBs	 arose	 from	concerns	of	power	 imbalances	between	 the	 researcher	 –	 all	
powerful,	and	therefore	 ‘potentially	dangerous’	–	and	the	research	subject	–	powerless	and	 in	




research	 conduct’	 (Juritzen,	 Grimen	 and	 Heggen	 2011).	 Juritzen	 et	 al.	 argue	 in	 favour	 of	
expanding	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 power	 in	 the	 researcher‐research	 subject	 relationship	 to	
critically	encompass	‘ethics	committees	as	one	among	several	actors	that	exert	power	and	that	







one	 key	 source	 of	 discontent	 with	 REBs	 which,	 in	 the	 author’s	 experience,	 is	 key	 to	
understanding	the	condescending	nature	of	the	interactions	between	these	institutional	bodies	
and	 First	 Nation	 people:	 that	 the	 membership	 of	 REBs	 is	 often	 lacking	 experience	 and	
knowledge	 of	 First	 Nation	 communities,	 and	 the	 core	 principles	 and	 practices	 related	 to	





not	 the	 ethics	 protocols	 and	 guidelines	 developed	 by	 REBs	 to	 guide	 post‐graduate	 and	
researcher	conduct,	but	rather	how	these	protocols	are	interpreted	and	employed	by	committee	
members;	especially	where	members	clearly	have	little	experience	of	the	context	within	which	






the	 right	 things,	 consult,	 engage,	 privilege	 [the	 Indigenous],	 but	 the	 practice	 is	
different.	Mainly	white	committees,	no	experience	of	us,	who	 revert	 to	 their	ways,	 to	
what	they	understand	to	be	right.	(CII3)	
	
Arguably,	 in	 the	case	of	 Indigenous‐focused	research,	the	lack	of	knowledge	and	experience	of	
the	 research	 context	 is	 of	 greater	 risk	 to	 both	 researcher	 and	 participants	 than	 lack	 of	
disciplinary	 expertise.	 Hammersley	 (2006:	 4)	 describes	 the	 dangers	 thus:	 ‘Researchers’	
decisions	 about	 how	 to	 pursue	 their	 inquiries	 involve	 weighting	 ethical	 and	 other	
considerations	 against	 one	 another,	 and	 this	 requires	 detailed	 knowledge	 of	 the	 contexts	
concerned’.		
	
By	 drawing	 conclusions	 on	 the	 ethics	 of	 research	 situations	 they	 have	 little	 expertise	 in	 or	
knowledge	 of,	 and	 ignoring	 advice	 from	 those	 with	 the	 relevant	 experience,	 REBs	 place	
Indigenous	 researchers	 and	 their	 research	 participants	 in	 danger	 of	 carrying	 out	 or	




operate	 as	 if	 making	 research	 decisions	 were	 a	 matter	 of	 applying	 a	 coherent	
[standardised]	set	of	ethical	rules	that	do	not	conflict	with	any	other	considerations,	








of	knowledge	construction,	 especially	ethics	processes,	was	 the	role	 that	research	activity	has	
played	 in	 both	 the	 colonial	 and	 neo‐colonial	 contexts	 process	 in	 marginalising	 First	 Nation	
peoples	(Tauri	2009).	If	we	are	to	successfully	challenge	Eurocentric	hegemony	over	knowledge	
construction,	then	it	is	imperative	that	we	challenge	the	power	and	authority	the	academy	has	
over	 the	 knowledge	 production	 process;	 a	 process,	 and	 authority	 that	 is	 centralised	 within	
institutionally‐centred	 bodies	 such	 as	 REBs.	 One	 response	 is	 quite	 clear:	 for	 First	 Nations	 to	
develop	their	own	ethics	processes	that	provide	support	to	Indigenous	researchers	and	to	First	
Nation	peoples	confronted	by	the	condescending	ethos	of	 the	Academy	(although	 it	 is	beyond	
the	scope	of	this	paper	to	provide	greater	detail	on	how	such	bodies	might	work	and	what	they	
might	 look	 like).	 This	 ‘radical’	 call	 to	 action	 should	 not	 be	 interpreted	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	
marginalise	 institutionally‐based	 REBs.	 Instead,	 it	 should	 interpreted	 as	 a	 call	 to	 construct	
Indigenous‐dominated	processes	that	have	as	their	first	duty,	the	protection	of	our	researchers	
and	research	participants	from	the	well	documented	problems	First	Nation	peoples	have	with	
institutionalised	 ethics	 processes	 in	 Settler	 Societies.	 ‘Doing	 it	 for	 ourselves’	 is	 an	 essential	






By	 controlling	 the	models	 of	 research,	who	 gets	 to	 speak	 and	how	 subjects	 get	 to	
represent	 themselves,	 IRBs	 are	 in	 a	 powerful	 position	 as	 part	 of	 the	 institutional	
structure.	 In	 this	 position	 they	 can,	 and	 often	 do,	 silence	 the	 voices	 of	 the	
marginalised	and	perpetuate	an	academic	political	 economy	and	a	 traditional	 top‐






1		 The	title	by	which	institutional	ethics	review	boards	are	known	can	vary	depending	on	geographic	 location,	 for	
example	 in	 the	US	 they	 are	 often	 referred	 to	 as	 RECs	 and	 IRBs,	while	 in	 Canada	 they	 are	 designated	REBs	 or	
GREBs.	The	term	REB	is	used	here	to	refer	to	all	committees	of	this	kind.		
2		 The	author	carried	out	thorough,	community‐level	negotiations	to	ensure	the	development	of	protocols	deemed	
‘ethical’	 by	 Maori	 and	 Canadian	 First	 Nations	 participants.	 The	 negotiations	 took	 place	 over	 a	 sixteen	 month	
period	via	phone,	email	and	during	two	visits	to	the	region	of	Canada	where	part	of	the	research	project	was	to	
take	 place.	 For	 the	 New	 Zealand	 context,	 the	 author	 was	 advised	 on	 appropriate	 research	 ethics	 by	 three	
prominent	Maori	researchers,	and	relied	in	part	on	extensive	research	and	engagement	with	Maori	communities	
over	 the	 previous	 15	 years	working	 in	 the	 academy	 and	 as	 a	 government	 official	working	 directly	with	Maori	
communities.		




























































































Like	many	 cautionary	 tales,	The	Hunger	Games	 takes	 as	 its	major	 premise	 an	 observation	
about	 contemporary	 society,	measuring	 its	 ballistic	 arc	 in	 order	 to	 present	 graphically	 its	
logical	conclusions.	The	Hunger	Games	gazes	back	to	the	panem	et	circenses	of	Ancient	Rome,	
staring	 equally	 cynically	 forward,	 following	 the	 trajectory	 of	 reality	 television	 to	 its	
unbearably	barbaric	end	point	–	a	sadistic	voyeurism	for	an	effete	elite	of	consumers.	At	each	
end	 of	 the	 historical	 spectrum	 (and	 in	 the	 present),	 the	 prevailing	 social	 form	 is	 Arendt’s	
animal	 laborans.	 Consumer	or	 consumed,	Panem’s	population	 is	 (with	 the	exception	of	 the	
inner	circle)	either	deprived	of	the	possibility	of,	or	distracted	from,	political	action.		
	
Within	 the	 confines	 of	 the	 Games	 themselves,	 Law	 is	 abandoned	 or	 de‐realised:	 Law	 –	 an	
elided	Other	in	the	pseudo‐Hobbesian	nightmare	that	is	the	Arena.	The	Games	are	played	out,	
as	 were	 gladiatorial	 combats	 and	 other	 diversions	 of	 the	 Roman	 Empire,	 against	 a	
background	resonant	of	Juvenal’s	concern	for	his	contemporaries’	attachment	to	short	term	
gratification	 at	 the	 expense	 the	 civic	 virtues	of	 justice	 and	 caring	which	 are	 (or	would	 be)	
constitutive	of	a	contemporary	form	of	Arendt’s	homo	politicus.		
	
While	 the	 Games	 are,	 on	 their	 face,	 ‘reality’	 they	 are	 (like	 the	 realities	 presented	 in	
contemporary	reality	television)	a	simulated	reality,	de‐realised	in	a	Foucauldian	set	design	
constructed	 as	 a	 distraction	 for	 Capitol,	 and	 for	 the	 residents	 of	 the	 Districts,	 a	 constant	
reminder	 of	 their	 subservience	 to	 Capitol.	 Yet	 contemporary	 Western	 culture,	 for	 which	
manipulative	reality	TV	is	but	a	symptom	of	an	underlying	malaise,	is	inscribed	at	least	as	an	
incipient	Panem,	Its	public/political	space	is	diminished	by	the	effective	slavery	of	the	poor,	




Man	…	nor	woman	neither	…	never	 is,	but	always	 to	be,	blessed.	 (Alexander	Pope,	
‘Essay	on	Man’,	with	assistance	from	Hamlet)	
	





The	Hunger	 Games	 –	 the	 first	 of	 three	 novels	 in	 Suzanne	 Collins’s	 trilogy	 –	 presents	 a	 stark	
rendition	of	life	in	a	reconstructed	post‐Apocalyptic	North	America,	the	nation‐state	of	Panem.	
Panem	 has	 been	 rebuilt	 to	 the	 extremes	 of	 conspicuous	 consumption,	 self	 gratification,	 the	
vapid	celebration	of	youth	and	beauty,	and	a	decadent	and	sadistic	voyeurism	–	at	least	for	the	
residents	of	Capitol,	who	mirror	 the	Ancient	Roman	elite,	 supported	by	a	 ruthlessly	exploited	







At	 the	 core	 of	 this	 cautionary	 tale	 are	 the	Games	 themselves:	 a	hi‐tech	 gladiatorial	 last‐child‐
standing	battle	staged	annually.	Twenty	four	adolescents,	two	from	each	of	the	12	Districts,	are	
chosen	 at	 random	 in	 a	 public	 ceremony	 styled	 the	 ‘reaping’	 –	 the	 survivor’s	 District	 will	 be	
showered	with	gifts	for	the	coming	year,	and	the	survivor	is	guaranteed	a	life	of	ease	back	home,	




For	 Jameson,	text	 is	a	surface	on	which	 is	written	a	continuous	and	collective	narrative	of	 the	
struggle	 to	 wrest	 ‘a	 realm	 of	 Freedom	 from	 a	 realm	 of	 Necessity’	 (Jameson	 2002:	 3).3	 For	
Arendt,	the	struggle	is	conceived	as	the	transcendence	of	the	mere	existence	of	animal	laborans	
(Arendt	 1968:	 199)	 into	 the	 realm	 of	 homo	 politicus.	 The	 residents	 of	 the	 Districts	 are	
quintessentially	 animal	 laborans,	 their	 lives	 consumed	 ‘with	 the	 acquisition	 of	 food’	 (Collins	
2012:	 378),	 immiserated	 to	 ‘the	 biological	 process	 of	 the	 human	 body,	 whose	 spontaneous	








Arendt	 would	 optimistically	 suggest,	 to	 ‘inspire	 admiration	 in	 the	 present	 and	 future	 ages’	








and	punish	 those	who	would	 rise	up	 against	 authority.4	 Symbolically,	 the	Games	 are	Orwell’s	
dystopian	vision	of	a	‘boot	stamping	on	a	human	face,	for	ever’	(Orwell	2004,	334).		
	
District	 12’s	 tributes,	 Peeta	 Mellark	 and	 Katniss	 Everdeen,	 are	 a	 unique	 pairing.	 When	 her	
twelve	year	old	 sister,	Prim,	 is	 selected	at	 the	Reaping,	Katniss	 instinctively	volunteers	 in	her	
place.	 Peeta,	 the	 male	 tribute,	 just	 happens	 to	 have	 carried	 an	 unrequited	 infatuation	 with	
Katniss	 from	 their	 first	 day	 at	 school.	 Superficially,	 Katniss’s	 reaction	 calls	 to	 mind	 that	 of	
Theseus,	who	takes	 the	place	of	an	Athenian	 tribute	selected	 to	be	sacrificed	 to	 the	Minotaur.	
Her	self‐sacrificial	act,	however,	is	not	premeditated.	It	is,	in	fact,	neither	a	moral	nor	a	political	






tributes	and	 themselves,	 for	 the	mere	possibility	of	survival.	Each	 is,	despite	alliances	such	as	
that	 formed	 between	 Katniss	 and	 Rue	 from	 District	 11,	 ultimately	 reduced	 to	 a	










artefact	 of	 power.	 This,	 from	 the	 reader’s	 perspective,	 is	 the	 Jamesonian	 social	 and	 historical	




division	between	 the	 largely	 faceless	 individuals	 exercising	power,	 and	 those	whose	 lives	are	
labour	(in	the	Districts)	and	those	in	Capitol	whose	life	is	apparently	no	more	than	conspicuous	
consumption,	 their	 labour	 a	 version	of	 ‘immateriality’	 (Hesmondhalgh	2010:	272),	 but	 labour	
nonetheless.	Whether	in	the	Districts	or	in	Capitol,	each	is,	in	their	own	way,	a	manifestation	of	
animal	 laborans,	 living	 out	 an	 existence	 which,	 though	 disparate	 in	 terms	 of	 security	 and	
comfort,	 remains	unified	as	 ‘unredeemable	 futility’	 (Arendt	1968,	1999).	Such	 ‘work’	parallels	
modern	Western	 liberalism’s	 valorisation	 of	 labour	 –	 a	 social	 dynamic	where	work	 becomes	






past	 and	 a	 speculative	 post‐Apocalyptic	 future,	 envisioning	 them	 within	 the	 politico‐cultural	
imaginary	 of	 the	 present.	 One	 of	 the	 21st	 century’s	 manifestations	 of	 that	 struggle,	 the	




At	 the	 far	 reaches	 of	 manipulative	 but	 ‘authentic’	 reality	 TV	 lies	 the	 Survivor‐style	 program.	
These	 construct	 a	 personal	 war	 of	 attrition	 offering	 ‘a	 ‘well	 produced’	 version	 of	 reality	
apparently	 more	 convincing	 than	 the	 transparently	 manipulative	 episodes	 of	 Big	 Brother’	
(Wright	 2004:	 10),	 while	 remaining	 faithful	 to	 the	 tradition	 of	 ‘humiliation	 and	 extreme	
behaviour’	(Mittel	2004:	89)	–	all	contained	in	a	highly	packaged	cultural	 form	(Enzensberger	
1982:	74).	The	battle	between	oppressor	and	oppressed	is,	for	the	contemporary	reader,	buried	
in	 this	 culturally	 comfortable	 trope	 of	 Survivor‐style	 reality	 television,	 snuggled	 in	 a	 cultural	
space	as	 familiar	 to	them	as	Roman	gladiatorial	combat	or	 the	survivalist	mentality	of	a	post‐
Apocalyptic	world	seem	alien.	
	
The	qualities	of	control	and	cruelty	 in	programs	 like	Survivor	 (Brenton	and	Cohen	2003:	114)	
are	 reflected	 and	 magnified	 in	 the	 dehumanisation	 of	 the	 Hunger	 Games	 and	 the	 panoptic	




reality	 television’	 (Schaffer	 2012:	 75),	 distanced	 from	 the	 realities	 of	 (or	 the	 need	 for)	 the	
political	 by	 the	 same	 distractions	 satirised	 by	 Juvenal:	 silently,	 apathetically	 or	 even	
inadvertently	 relinquishing	political	 action	 to	 the	 few	who	seek	or	 seize	power.	While	we	are	


















of	…	 the	work	 of	 being	watched,	 a	 form	of	 production	wherein	 consumers	 are	 invited	 to	 sell	
access	 to	 their	 personal	 lives’	 (Hesmondhalgh	 2010	 268),	 although	 for	 the	 tributes,	 the	
invitation	 is	an	offer	 they	can’t	 refuse.	The	Games	valorise	a	 self‐destructive	performativity	of	









Hart	 1948:	 390).	 Sublimation	 thus	 channels	 human	 aggression	 into	 socially	 positive	 and	
productive	 actions	 conducive	 to	 civilisation,	 less	 dominated	 by	 the	 sadistic	 impulses	 of	 the	
‘primitive’	psyche	(Oesterdiekhoff	2009:	186‐7).	
	
The	 true	 rulers	 of	 Capitol	 are	 a	 visible,	 yet	 invisible	 force	 (Arendt	 1985:	 vi).	 Government	
appears	largely	as	the	uncivilised	traces	inscribed	on	the	bodies	and	minds	of	both	the	residents	
of	 Capitol	 and	 the	 Districts	 through	 the	 sadistic	 mechanisms	 of	 oppression.	 Capitol	 culture	
seemingly	 cannot	 ‘be	 comprehended	 by	 the	 Western	 liberal	 mind’	 (Etlin	 2002:	 2),	 defying	
Foucault’s	 ‘universal	 juridicism	 of	 modern	 society’	 (Foucault	 1991:	 223)	 which	 seems	 to	 fix	
limits	 on	 the	 exercise	 of	 power.	 The	 population	 is	 humiliated	 and	 degraded,	 separated	 from	
their	authentic	selves,	rendered	‘resistless’	(Reiff	2006:	100).	
	
Yet	 the	 world	 of	 Capitol	 is,	 of	 course,	 not	 wholly	 inconceivable	 to	 the	 Western	 mind.	 Its	
conceptualisation,	 however,	 must	 be	 defused	 by	 defensive	 strategies	 differentiating	 the	
oppositional	 forms	 of	 civilised|primitive	 and	 buttressing	 assumptions	 of	 a	 significant	
discontinuity	 ‘between	ancient	 [primitive]	and	modern	modes	of	 thinking’	 (Friedlander	1965:	
500).	Lapses	from	civilisation	are	thus	relegated	to	the	nightmare	Other,	the	product	either	of	a	
non‐Western	 temper	 which	 have	 not	 wholly	 passed	 from	 the	 primitive	 to	 the	 civilised	 (the	
Oriental	or	pre‐modern	‘savage	other’	(Springer	2009:	306),	or	to	modern	Western	regimes	like	
Nazism,	or	indeed	Capitol,	which	have	regressed,	exhibiting	atavistic	impulses	of	[non‐Western	









resonates	 with	 Arendt’s	 characterisation	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 manifestations	 of	




only	 becomes	 alive	 by	 sucking	 out	 living	 labour,	 and	 the	more	 it	 sucks,	 the	more	 it	 is	 lively’	
(Marx	1968:	247).	It	embodies	the	‘meaner’	face	of	capitalism	developing	towards	the	end	of	the	
20th	and	into	the	21st	Century,	which	‘industrializes	the	mind’	(Enzensberger	1982:	3ff)	and	in	
which	 the	worker	must	 ‘sell	 not	 only	 her	 or	 his	 labour	…	but	 personality,	 self	 and	ultimately	
perhaps	 also	 soul’	 (Vandenberghe	 2008,	 880).	 Within	 such	 an	 architecture	 of	 power,	 the	





Through	 the	 law	 imposing	 function,	 the	 ‘original	 and	 fundamental	 form	of	 violence	 that	 is	 in	








against	 which	 law	 is	 constituted’	 (Fitzpatrick	 2002:	 80).	 Here	 is	 a	 place	 where	 no	 Law	 is	 –	




of	Treason	 (the	 first	product	 validated	by	Panem’s	Grundnorm).	Here,	 in	 the	 constitutive	pre‐
legal	 document	 of	 Panem,	 is	 the	 dominant	 legal	 phenomenon	 that	 grounds	 the	 existence	 of	
legitimate	authority:	fiat	non	lex.		
	
The	 narrative	 of	 Law	 provides	 precisely	 the	 ‘dramatised	 narrative’	 (Leiboff	 2012:	 387)	 that	
conforms	not	simply	to	chronological	events,	but	to	the	twin	aims	of	entertainment	and	control.	
As	 an	 apparatus	 of	 punitive	 justice,	 the	 panoptic	world	 (both	within	 and	without	 the	 Arena)	
‘bite[s]	 into	 this	 bodiless	 reality’	 (Foucault	 1991:	 16)	 –	 the	 world	 of	 shadow,	 facelessness,	
impalpable	 surveillance	 and	 retribution.	 Capitol	 thus	 harvests	 the	 strategic	 micro‐physics	 of	
power	 implied	 by	 panoptic	 insinuation	 (Foucault	 1991:	 26),	 the	 techno‐physics	 of	 the	
armaments	 supporting	 power,	 and	 a	 perverse	 metaphysics	 transcending	 juridicism	 itself,	







Katniss’s	 battle	 differs	 from	 the	 Survivor‐on‐steroids	 demanded	 by	 Capitol.	 She	 displays	 a	
capacity	for	the	‘imagination	of	attunement’	(Antaki	2012:	13)	or	a	‘transformative	imagination’	
(Unger	1996:	6),	 embodying	 the	potential	 for	 relating	with	others,	 even	 in	 the	most	brutal	 of	
surroundings,	through	an	aesthetic	dimension	incommensurate	with	the	conceptualised	rigour	
of	the	‘rules	of	the	game’.	Cradling	Rue	as	she	lies	fatally	pierced	with	a	spear,	Katniss	sings	her	




as	 she	 takes	 Rue’s	 hand	 and	 clutches	 it	 ‘like	 a	 lifeline	…	 [a]s	 if	 it’s	me	who’s	 dying,	 not	 Rue’	






At	 the	 climax	 of	 the	 Games,	 when	 an	 arbitrary	 and	 disingenuous	 rule	 change	 allowing	 two	
victors	 if	 the	 last	 two	 standing	 are	 from	 the	 same	 District	 is	 (equally	 arbitrarily)	 reversed,	
Katniss	 and	 Peeta	 are	 faced	 with	 the	 inevitable	 zero‐sum	 equation.	 Only	 one	 of	 them	 can	
survive.	But	as	Peeta	re‐iterates	Capitol’s	political	truth	–	‘they	have	to	have	a	victor’	–	Katniss’s	
imagination	is	engaged	as	homo	politicus.	Instead	of	its	winner	take	all	paradigm,	Katniss	offers	
an	 unthinkable	 alternative	 –	 that	 the	 Games	 should	 have	 no	 winner.	 Ironically,	 the	 very	
ambivalence	 of	 the	 freedom	which	 exists	within	 the	Arena	 bounded	 by	 Law	provides	 for	 the	
possibility	 of	 (political)	 action,	 the	 very	 embodiment	 of	 Arendt’s	 freedom.	 Freed	 from	 the	
constraints	of	survival	(or	embracing	the	possibility	of	death),	she	is	free	to	explore	the	‘infinite	
novelties	of	action’	which	constitute	the	‘central	category	of	political	thought’	(McGowan	1998:	
56)	 in	order	 to	 reinvent	 the	 future	out	of	 ‘new	horizon[s]	of	possibilities	mapped	out	by	new	
radical	alternatives’	(Santos	1995:	572).		
	
Katniss’s	 solution	 is	 to	 threaten	 a	 suicide	 pact.	 Both	 she	 and	 Peeta	 will	 eat	 the	 poisonous	
nightlock	berries	rather	than	fight	it	out,	confronting	Capitol	with	an	unresolvable	paradox.	The	
outcome	might	as	readily	be	their	deaths	as	it	is	the	re‐reversal	of	the	amended	rule	and	their	
survival.	 That,	 though,	 is	 conceptually	 insignificant.	 Katniss’s	 action	 is	 political	 in	 itself	 …	





eros,	 despite	 the	 obvious	 undercurrents	 of	 a	 tentative	 sexuality	 between	 Katniss	 and	 Peeta.	




skills	 which	 defeat	 all‐comers,	 a	 latter‐day	 Theseus	 challenging	 King	 Minos	 and	 slaying	 the	
Minotaur,	stands	to	become	a	feminist	icon.	
	
Returning,	 then,	 to	 the	 Jamesonian	 axiom	 that	 all	 tropes	 are	 envisioned	 on	 a	 stage	 delimited	
only	by	 the	eternal	 struggle	between	oppressor	and	oppressed.	Arendt	offers	 two	answers	 to	




of	 the	population	at	 the	expense	of	 the	remainder.	Such	a	solution	was	embraced	squarely	by	
the	 Greek	 democratic	 project,	 relegating	 a	 substantial	 proportion	 of	 the	 population	 to	 life	
outside	the	political	domain	(McGowan	1998:	112).	The	other	solution	is	implausible	–	that	the	
efficiencies	 of	 production	 which	 twenty‐first	 century	 technology	 can	 bring	 to	 bear	 on	
production	 now	 creates	 the	 possibility	 of	 equal	 prosperity	 (and	 thus	 an	 open	 field	 for	 the	
possibility	of	freedom	in	Arendt’s	terms).	Yet	even	were	the	political	will	to	equality	emerge,	its	
administrative	 implementation	 is,	 itself,	 problematic	 (McGowan	 1998:	 51‐2).	 The	 problem	 of	
freedom	in	Arendtian	terms	is,	for	Panem,	clearly	resolved	in	terms	of	the	former,	unpalatable,	
possibility:	 that	 the	 price	 of	 political	 action	 is	 the	 ruthless	 relegation	 of	 not	 merely	 the	
Panem	et	circenses:	Law,	Law	and	Power	in	The	Hunger	Games	
Crime,	Justice	and	Social	Democracy,	2nd	International	Conference,	2013							217	





moment	 of	 triumph,	 her	 inspired	 and	 anathematic	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 Games	 reconstitutes	
the	battlefield	in	a	broader	landscape	‘so	much	worse	than	being	hunted	in	the	Arena’	(Collins	
2012:	246).	As	an	act	of	homo	politicus,	it	deprives	Capitol,	in	its	own	political	imagination,	of	the	
possibility	 of	 total	 power.	 Katniss	 now	 functions	 as	 a	 focal	 point	 for	 the	 redrawing	 of	 the	
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2		 The	illusory	nature	of	the	claims	of	reality	TV	is,	perhaps,	best	demonstrated	by	their	association	with	suicide:	the	
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from	a	phone	 tower	 just	 after	 being	 eliminated	 (same	website).	The	Wrap	TV	 details	 eleven	 contestants	 in	US	
reality	 TV	 shows	 who	 have	 committed	 suicide	 between	 1997	 and	 2008:	
http://www.thewrap.com/tv/article/thewrap‐investigates‐11‐reality‐show‐players‐have‐committed‐
suicide_3409?page=0,0,	accessed	July	2012.	
3		 The	Marxian	 cast	 of	 the	 observation	 is	 apparent	 from	 Jameson’s	 reference	 to	Marx’s:	 ‘[b]eyond	 [the	 realm	 of	





18	 at	 a	 public	 ‘Reaping.’	 These	 tributes	 shall	 be	 delivered	 to	 the	 custody	 of	 the	 Capitol.	 And	 then	




in	which	 two	bras	discuss	how	wonderful	 the	one	 looks,	 now	 that	 they	have	had	 cosmetic	 surgery:	21	August	
2012.	 The	 extent	 of	 this	 commodification	 is	 apparent	 from	 the	 observation	 that	 ‘[t]he	 body	 has,	 in	 a	 sense,	




6		 The	decline	of	 the	public	 spectacle	 associated	with,	 for	 example,	 torture	 and	execution,	 and	 its	 replacement	 in	
most	 Western	 democracies	 with	 the	 deprivation	 of	 liberty	 and	 rights,	 rather	 than	 the	 infliction	 of	 pain	 or	
execution	is	a	singular	trope	of,	for	example,	Foucault’s	analysis	of	the	phenomenon	of	punishment	in	Discipline	
and	Punish:	The	Birth	of	the	Prison,	(1991)	London,	Penguin.	
7		 As	 such,	 Arendt’s	 characterisation	 of	 Nazism	 and	 Stalinism	 as	 totalitarian	 regimes	 dedicated	 solely	 to	 the	
retention	 of	 power	 for	 its	 own	 sake	 is	 at	 odds	 with,	 for	 example,	 O’Brien’s	 dismissal	 of	 German	 and	 Soviet	
dictatorships	 as	 delusional:	 ‘The	 German	 Nazis	 and	 the	 Russian	 Communists	 came	 very	 close	 to	 us	 in	 their	






















































































While	 Downes	 (2011)	 rightly	 points	 out	 that	 criminology	 was	 born	 comparative,	 this	
comparative	focus	seems	to	have	been	lost	until	the	late	twentieth	century.	A	waning	belief	in	
the	post	war	penal	welfare	state,	rising	crime	rates	and	increasing	prison	populations	have	
altered	 this.	 Over	 the	 last	 two	 decades,	 comparative	 criminological	 research	 has	 been	
studying	various	dimensions	of	punitiveness.	Therefore,	it	is	timely	to	critically	examine	the	
extent	to	which	the	current	evidence	is	capable	of	explaining	convergences	and	divergences	
in	 penal	 practice.	 Important	 in	 this	 respect	 is	 to	 test	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 global	 explanatory	
models	against	local	models	in	countries	that	appear	to	resist	the	dominant	trend,	such	as	the	
Netherlands	 and	 Canada.	 However,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 compare	 differences	 between	
autonomous	 jurisdictions	 in	 one	 country,	 for	 example,	 the	 states	 and	 territories	 within	








discipline,	 as	 crime	 and	 justice	 were	 not	 hot	 topics	 in	 the	 optimistic,	 generous	 and	 positive	
decades	following	the	Second	World	War.	However,	the	global	economic	crisis	of	the	seventies,	
the	subsequent	decline	of	belief	in	the	penal	welfare	state,	and	the	increase	in	crime	rates	and	
prison	 populations	 dramatically	 changed	 this	 picture.	 Criminologists	 started	 to	 look	 across	
borders	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 understand	what	 the	 causes	 of	 increasing	 prison	 populations	were.	
David	Garland’s	pioneering	‘Culture	of	Control’	(2001)	set	the	benchmark	for	an	understanding	
of	the	recent	trends	in	penal	policy.	Partly	as	a	reaction	to	his	work,	comparative	criminologists	
have	 produced	 a	 wealth	 of	 evidence	 and	 information	 over	 the	 last	 two	 decades,	 providing	
insight	 into	 what	 is	 impacting	 on	 prison	 populations.	 But	 despite	 the	 impressive	 output	 of	
comparative	 criminology	 over	 recent	 years,	 it	 is	 an	 ongoing	 struggle	 to	 understand	 what	 is	
driving	penal	policies	and	practices.	Using	imprisonment	rates1	as	a	measure	for	international	
comparison,	 we	 see	 that	 there	 is	 great	 diversity	 not	 only	 in	 the	 way	 countries	 have	 been	
responding	to	global	trends,	but	also	in	the	reasons	for	these	responses.	In	this	contribution,	we	
first	evaluate	the	viability	of	comparative	research	in	a	globalised	world,	we	discuss	the	lessons	





perspective	of	 comparative	 research.	As	Nelken	 (2011)	has	 asked,	 to	what	 extent	does	 it	 still	
make	sense	to	take	the	nation	state	as	the	object	of	comparison	in	a	globalised	world?	An	initial	
reason	for	asking	this	question	is	that	globalisation,	of	itself,	presents	specific	challenges	to	the	




a	 global	 criminology	 instead	 of	 comparative	 criminology	 to	 understand	what	 is	 happening	 in	
this	 field	 (Larsen	 and	 Smandych	 in	 Nelken	 2011).	 Another	 reason	 is	 the	 link	 between	
globalisation	and	punitiveness,	the	main	point	of	interest	of	comparative	criminology.	Baker	and	
Roberts	 (2005)	 point	 to	 the	 various	 reasons	 why	 ‘new	 punitiveness’	 is	 associated	 with	
globalisation.	They	argue,	however,	 that	globalisation	does	not	necessarily	cause	punitiveness,	
as	 it	 is	 not	 a	 universal	 trend.	 Globalisation	 is	 a	 complex	 phenomenon,	 which	 has	 definitely	
affected	penal	policies,	privileging	punitive	responses,	and	facilitating	‘policy	transfer’.		
	
Comparative	 criminologists	 have	 defended	 their	 discipline,	 pointing	 to	 differences	 between	





explaining	 levels	 of	 punitiveness,	 there	 are	 exceptions.	 The	 question	 is	 to	 what	 extent	 they	
‘confirm	the	rule’?	Globalisation	doesn’t	spell	convergence,	according	to	Lacey	(2011),	therefore,	
comparative	research,	on	a	national	and	regional	level,	is	crucial	to	understand	the	mechanisms	
by	 which	 master	 narratives	 affect	 penal	 policy	 in	 different	 ways	 in	 different	 countries.	
Meaningful	 comparative	 research	 needs	 to	move	 back	 and	 forth	 between	 the	 global	 and	 the	
local,	 refining	 the	 global	 model	 with	 local	 empirical	 data	 and	 findings,	 as	 features	 within	
individual	 countries	might	explain	how	and	why	 they	deviate	 from	the	 leading	pattern.	Along	
the	 same	 lines,	 Savelsberg	 (2011)	 concludes	 that	 both	 globalisation	 and	 cross‐national	
comparative	 research	 is	 needed,	 and	 that	 they	need	 to	be	 closely	 linked,	 as	 global	 trends	 are	
translated	in	a	nation‐specific	way	and	filtered	through	local	institutions.	Nelken	(2011)	agrees	
with	 this	 view,	 pleading	 that	 comparative	 research	 is	 particularly	 well	 placed	 to	 study	 the	





To	 critically	 examine	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 current	 evidence	 is	 capable	 of	 explaining	





First,	 a	 well	 established	 and	 solidly	 evidenced	 relationship	 is	 the	 one	 between	 welfare	 and	
punitiveness.	 Strong	 welfare	 states	 see	 criminality	 as	 a	 societal	 problem	 that	 needs	 to	 be	
addressed	with	a	social	policy	instead	of	a	penal	policy.	They	are	more	inclusive	and	have	lower	




failed	 in	 preventing	 increases	 in	 crime?	 Further,	 the	 welfare	 model	 as	 a	 protection	 against	
increasing	prison	rates	only	seemed	 to	work	 in	certain	countries,	 such	as	Scandinavia.	Others	
saw	 their	 prison	 populations	 going	 up	 while	 their	 welfare	 model	 was	 still	 in	 place.	 Downes	
(2011)	 points	 in	 this	 respect	 to	 the	 example	 of	 the	 Netherlands	 as	 being	 an	 anomaly,	
quintupling	 its	 prison	 population	 rate	while	 retaining	many	 of	 the	 features	 that	 should	 have	







The	 Netherlands	 has	 always	 been	 a	 tricky	 country	 for	 criminological	 analysis,	 and	 maybe	
therefore	 a	 good	 test	 case	 for	 the	 validity	 of	 explanatory	 models.	 For	 very	 many	 years	 the	
shining	 example	 of	 penal	 moderation,	 with	 imprisonment	 rates	 as	 low	 as	 18	 per	 100,000	
inhabitants	in	1973,	the	Netherlands	were	about	the	only	country	that	could	keep	pace	with	the	
US	in	the	way	it	multiplied	its	prison	population	(up	to	134	per	100,000	in	2005).	But	even	more	
interesting	 is	 the	 recent	 evolution	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 prison	 population	 has	 been	 on	 the	
decrease	 since	 2005	 (down	 to	 87	 per	 100,000	 in	 2011)	 (van	 Swaaningen	 2013).	 The	
explanations	given	for	this	rather	remarkable	trend	are	diverse	and	contradictory.	According	to	










increase	 in	 the	 prison	 population	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 drug	 and	 violence	 related	 cases	 brought	
before	 the	 judges.	But,	 as	Boone	and	Moerings	 (2007)	 indicate,	 this	does	not	mean	 that	 these	
offences	have	increased,	as	the	number	of	cases	sent	to	the	prosecutor	remains	stable,	it	is	the	
number	that	is	sent	to	the	courts	that	has	increased,	and	as	such,	it	is	an	expression	of	increased	
punitiveness.	 The	 decrease	 is,	 according	 to	 Vollaard	 and	 Moolenaar	 (2009),	 due	 to	 milder	
sentencing	practices	in	these	cases,	and	a	more	frequent	use	of	community	based	sentences	for	
less	serious	violent	acts.	Van	Dijk	(2011)	disagrees	with	the	latter,	as	alternative	sentencing	in	
his	 view	only	had	 a	marginal	 impact	 and	milder	 sentences	have	more	 to	do	with	an	 effective	
drop	in	the	number	of	serious	crimes	instead	of	the	judges’	practices.	According	to	him,	judges	




(2009)	 confirm	 the	 drop	 in,	 particularly,	 property	 crimes	 and	 acts	 of	 violence,	 due	 to	
demographic	 and	 economic	 factors,	 while,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 there	 develops	 a	more	 stringent	
penal	policy	 towards	both	categories	of	crimes	/	offenders.	As	a	result	of	 this	 lower	tolerance	
and	 changed	 police	 practices,	 less	 serious	 cases	 were	 being	 brought	 before	 the	 judges	 and	
therefore	 resulted	 in	 lesser	 sentencing	 (Boone	 and	 Moerings	 2007;	 Vollaard	 and	 Moolenaar	
2009).	Other	authors	 (Boone	and	van	Swaaningen	2012;	van	Swaaningen	2013)	contextualise	
both	 developments	 in	 a	 broader	 framework:	 prison	 numbers	 increased	 because	 of	 a	 more	
punitive	 approach	 throughout	 the	 sentencing	 process	 (more	 reporting	 of	 crime,	more	 people	
sent	 to	court,	also	 for	 less	serious	offences,	more	use	of	 imprisonment	and	 longer	sentences).	
They	see	these	changes	as	a	result	of	the	pressure	of	a	changing	public	opinion	expressing	less	




vulnerable	 groups.	 In	 addition,	 there	 is	 a	 growing	 criticism	 of	 the	 punitive	 approach.	 Due	 to	
miscarriages	of	 justice,	 the	media	 are	picking	up	on	 this	 trend	 and	 increasingly	 call	 in	 expert	
advice,	 and	 this	 is	 influencing	 the	 judiciary.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 crime	 is	 pushed	 down	 on	 the	
electoral	agenda	as	other	 concerns,	 as	 the	economic	crisis	and	healthcare,	have	become	more	
important.	 However,	 as	 van	 Swaaningen	 (2013)	 points	 out,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	
Netherlands	has	become	less	punitive,	as	there	are	various	examples	of	very	punitive	measures	




to	 van	 Swaaningen	 (2013)	 it	 is	 not	 a	 matter	 of	 less	 punishment,	 but	 of	 different	 forms	 of	




From	 this	 case	 study	 we	 see	 how	 complex	 the	 explanation	 of	 prison	 populations	 can	 be,	 as	
perceived	changes	 in	crime	can	also	be	 the	result	of	changed	police	performance,	prosecution	
practices	 and	 sentencing,	which	 in	 their	 turn	 can	be	 an	 expression	 of	 increased	punitiveness.	
Using	victim	surveys	can	act	as	a	corrector	for	this	sort	of	analysis,	but	also	perceptions	of	crime	
and	victimhood	can	affect	 reporting	and	signal	decreasing	 tolerance.	 So	 it	 seems	 that,	despite	
their	 welfare	 model	 still	 being	 in	 place,	 the	 Netherlands	 has	 lost	 some	 of	 its	 ‘inclusionary’	
character	 over	 time.	 Decreasing	 tolerance	 towards	 some	 categories	 of	 crimes	 and	 offenders	
results	 in	 higher	 numbers	 of	 these	 ending	 up	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	 Failings	 of	 that	
system	 raise	 critical	 voices,	 but	nonetheless	 it	 seems	 to	 expand	 in	new	 forms	of	 punishment,	
outside	of	prison,	but	still	a	feature	of	a	punitive	society,	despite	the	fact	that	the	imprisonment	





A	 second	 overarching	 theme	 that	 has	 gained	 rapid	 interest	 in	 criminological	 discourse	 is	 the	
relationship	between	neo‐liberalism	and	punitiveness.	As	Brown	(2011)	indicates,	this	has	been	
firmly	put	on	 the	criminological	 agenda	by	Wacquant	 (2009)	who	 identifies	neo‐liberalism	as	
the	 root	 cause	 of	 punitivism,	 challenging	 the	 predominance	 of	 ‘late	 modernity’	 in	 Garland’s	
(2001)	work.	While	Brown	(2011;	2012)	considers	this	approach	a	welcome	contribution	to	the	
debate,	 he	 fears	 that	 Wacquant’s	 interpretation	 of	 a	 specific	 form	 of	 neo‐liberalism	 might	
overstate	its	impact	and	lead	to	a	lack	of	attention	being	paid	to	counterbalancing	factors,	such	
as	 justice	 reinvestment.	 The	 theme	 has	 been	 picked	 up	 in	 recent	 work	 in	 comparative	
criminology,	 like	 the	 analysis	 of	 Cavadino	 and	Dignan	 (2006)	 and	 Lacey	 (2008),	 bringing	 the	
impact	of	political	economies	back	 in	 the	 limelight.	However,	while	both	analyses	are	starting	
from	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 political	 economy,	 they	 reach	 different	 conclusions.	 Lacey	 (2008,	 2011)	




and	 Dignan	 (2011)	 explore	 reasons	 for	 the	 relationship	 between	 neo‐liberalism	 and	
punitiveness.	They	see	as	 the	main	explanations	 the	political	 culture	and	 the	 interaction	with	
political	and	state	institutions	that	derive	from	the	different	political	economies,	as	well	as	the	
impact	 of	 public	 opinion	 and	 the	 media	 within	 these	 political	 economies,	 which	 shape	









categorised	alongside	 the	Anglo‐Saxon	neo‐liberal	countries	 (with	 the	US,	England	and	Wales,	
Australia,	New	Zealand	and	South	Africa),	while	their	prison	population	has	been	stable	and	a	




Italy,	Germany,	 France,	Netherlands).	On	various	occasions	Doob	 and	Webster	have	 criticised	
the	fact	that	Canada	is	too	easily	thrown	in	the	same	basket	as	the	other	Anglo‐Saxon	countries	
they	 have	 historical	 and	 institutional	 connections	 with,	 and	 that	 criminologists	 have	 been	
mainly	 looking	at	 change,	 ignoring	 the	 interesting	example	of	Canadian	stability	 in	 the	prison	
population	for	over	about	50	years	(Doob	and	Webster	2006;	Webster	and	Doob	2007,	2011).	





 Structural	 /	 political:	 Canada	 has	 a	 two	 tiered	 system,	 with	 the	 criminal	 law	 being	 a	
federal	 responsibility,	while	 the	administration	of	 justice	 is	 a	provincial	 responsibility,	
this	 structure	 protects	 the	 federal	 level	 from	 local,	 populist	 reactions.	 Further,	 victim	
advocacy	groups	don’t	have	strong	power,	politicians	show	great	reluctance	towards	the	
use	of	referenda	but	are	relying	on	career	civil	servants	and	experts	instead,	there	is	no	
politisisation	 of	 crime,	 and	 the	 judiciary	 is	 independent	 and	 has	 great	 discretionary	
power.		






According	 to	Webster	 and	Doob	 (2011),	penality	 is	more	 complex	 than	 the	political	 economy	
that	 Cavadino	 and	 Dignan	 (2006)	 describe,	 simple	 political	 or	 economical	 models	 are	
insufficient	 as	 an	 explanatory	 framework.	 As	 both	 Cavadino	 and	 Dignan	 (2006)	 and	 Lacey	
(2008)	 are	 focussing	 on	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 theoretically	 relevant	 factors,	 the	 explanatory	
power	of	their	approach	is	incomplete.	They	conclude	that	it	is	not	only	the	number	of	factors	
that	is	fundamental,	but	also	the	conceptual	approach	to	the	analysis	of	these	(multiple)	factors.	
It	 is	 particularly	 the	 interaction	between	 these	 structural,	 cultural,	 historical	 and	 institutional	
factors	that	explains	Canadian	penality.	The	same	factors,	but	in	another	context	might	result	in	
a	different	penal	reality.	The	 latter	might	be	happening	 in	Canada	at	 this	very	moment,	as	 the	




of	 neo‐liberalism	 in	 driving	 punitiveness.	 The	 relationship	 between	 both	 seems	 to	 be	 much	
more	 loose	 and	 indirect,	 and	 depending	 on	 the	 sort	 of	 neo‐liberalism	 that	 is	 adopted	 and	
imposed	(Karstedt	2012,	2013).	This	 is	confirmed	 in	the	analysis	of	O’Mally	(2002),	where	he	
compares	 neo‐liberalism	 in	 the	US	 and	Australia.	 Neo‐liberalism	 in	 the	US	 is	more	 entangled	




that	 in	 Australia,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 other	 federal	 states	 with	 a	 comparable	 first	 nation,	 such	 as	




accounting	 for	 their	different	historical	origins	and	demographic	composition,	 recent	changed	
cannot	be	fully	covered:	where	Victoria	traditionally	has	low	imprisonment	rates	at	about	100	





While	 these	 jurisdictions	 share	many	of	 the	 characteristics	 that	have	been	 identified	as	being	
important	 determinants	 for	 the	 size	of	 the	prison	population,	 local	 features	of	 these	 societies	
result	in	significant	differences	in	quantity	and	form	of	punishment.	Therefore,	there	is	a	need	
for	Australian	interstate	comparative	research,	analysing	the	differences	in	imprisonment	rates	
between	states	and	 territories	and	 their	evolution	over	 time,	defining	different	penal	 cultures	











However,	 there	 seems	 to	 have	 emerged	 a	more	 positive	 perspective	 in	 this	 field,	 sometimes	
coming	from	unexpected	corners.	One	example	is	the	US,	for	recent	decades	considered	as	the	
archetype	 of	 penal	 expansionism,	 with	 a	 peerless	 imprisonment	 rate	 of	 743/100,000,	 but	
recently	 –	 since	 2009	 –	 the	 prison	 population	 has	 been	 going	 down.	 The	 imprisonment	 rate	
decreased	in	half	of	the	states,	it	has	stabilised	in	many	others	and	only	increased	in	a	handful	
(Green,	 2013).	 According	 to	 Green	 (2013),	 there	 is	 reason	 for	 penal	 optimism	 and,	 in	





to	 broaden	 our	 lens	 and	 investigate	 factors	 other	 than	 the	 ‘usual	 suspects’.	 Behind	 the	more	
tangible	global	models	of	political	structures	and	economic	models,	lie	fundamental	values	and	
cultural	 norms,	 rooted	 in	 local	 historical	 backgrounds.	 In	 more	 recent	 work,	 investigating	
anomalies	 and	 unexpected	 changes,	we	 see	 an	 increasing	 emphasis	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 the	







1		 The	 number	 of	 prisoners	 out	 of	 100,000	 inhabitants.	 For	 a	 discussion	 regarding	 the	 advantages	 and	
disadvantages	of	using	imprisonment	rates	as	a	proxy	for	punitiveness,	see	Tubex	(2013).	
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